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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the emergence of a number of political and economic changes 
has given rise to new awakening of interest to re-examine the fiscal federalism. On 
the economic front, a greater role assigned to the market in resource allocation and on 
the political front, the transition from a period of one party rule at the Centre and State 
levels to that of coalition government and locally dominated regional parties has given 
rise to confrontational politics between the Centre and the States. 
In a federal set up, governmental activities and powers are distributed among 
various layers of government such as Central, State and local governments. India is a 
quasi-federal set up where both Centre and States (including local bodies) are 
allocated tax and expenditure powers so as to meet the growing needs and diversified 
preferences of people. However, while allocating the powers between the Centre and 
the States, Indian Constitution has assigned most of the buoyant sources of tax 
revenue to the Central government and expenditure functions to the States. This has 
resulted in a mismatch between the revenue sources and expenditure functions and is 
called fiscal imbalances. These imbalances may be vertical i.e problem of varying 
fiscal strength across different layers of government (Centre and State) and horizontal 
i.e among different jurisdictions at each level of government. 
As far as the revenue sources of a government in a developing economy are 
concerned, taxation is considered to be the most important source. Taxes may be 
Indirect or Direct depending on the incidence of the tax. 
Chapterwise introduction to the study is as follows: 
In Chapter I an effort has been made to analyse the relative significance of 
both direct and indirect taxes in the total tax revenue of Centre and States. It is 
concluded that the share of indirect (commodity) taxes in the total tax revenue of 
Central and State government is substantially larger than that of direct taxes. 
India's Indirect tax system is unique, in that, the Constitution specifies the tax 
powers of different levels of government under three lists; the Union List, the State 
List and the Concurrent list. The Union list empowers the Central government to levy 
excise duties (now called CenVAT), Customs, Income tax other than agricultural 
income. The State list provides the authority to State government to impose Sales tax 
(now it is State VAT), State excise duty, electricity duty, entertainment tax etc. Out of 
the central taxes, excises were the most important revenue-generating source for the 
Central government. While out of the different State taxes, Sales tax occupies the 
prominent position. 
Apart from the problem of mismatch of tax and expenditure powers of Centre 
and State government, the two important commodity taxes i.e excises and sales tax 
levied by both levels has caused distortions and inefficiencies in the tax system. Some 
of these basic problems confronting the Indian commodity tax system are discussed in 
this chapter. These include cascading, vertical integration of the firms, inequalities, 
tax evasion etc. 
Chapter II then provided an overall perspective on commodity tax structure 
and reform with reference to India. The Chapter gave the conceptual framework, 
which has guided this study. It discusses certain issues, which are related to both 
federalism and independent to Centre and State. These issues relate to lack of 
coordination in the fiscal decisions of both levels of government i.e Centre and State 
that resulted in conflicts in the form of fiscal imbalances and overlapping of tax bases. 
The ultimate solution lies in harmonizing the two main taxes of Union (i.e excises) 
and State government (i.e sales tax) in the form of a National Goods and Services Tax 
(GST). The process has already begun and a lot has been done in this direction by 
transforming central excises into CenVAT (2001) and sales tax at different rates as 
prevalent in States has been transformed and adopted by almost all States as a single 
State VAT. The Union Finance Minister Shri P. Chidambaram has also armounced in 
his Budget speech (2006), his intent to introduce GST from 2010. 
In Chapter III, an attempt has been made to analyse the theoretical aspects of 
fiscal federalism and indirect taxation in a federal country. This studies an ideal tax 
system, which requires uniformity in its structure based on equity and efficiency 
considerations. However, the partial equilibrium analysis demonstrates the non-
desirability of uniform rates. When the tax is imposed, the price gets distorted and 
causes efficiency loss. Then to increase efficiency in the tax system, the equity 
consideration is affected in the process. Various models are considered in this regard. 
The Ramsey tax model with an efficiency objective in view, has examined whether 
the uniform tax is preferable or not. In case of lumpsum tax, welfare rises. But on the 
issue of commodity wise variation no solution could be derived. The answers may 
however, be obtained by relaxing and varying different assumptions. 
But the equity objective doses not imply uniform taxation when the elasticity 
of demand differs between the goods in question. So only if the price elasticity were 
the same that uniform tax rates would be horizontally equitable. 
Apart from uniformity in the tax system, another aspect that is taken into 
consideration in a tax system in a federal country is harmonization of broad taxes (like 
union excises, sales tax, service tax etc.). 
The next section undertakes the study of theoretical principles guiding the 
federal fiscal arrangements in federalist countries. A number of comprehensive 
definitions of fiscal federalism are given, which also exhibits the benefits\merits of 
adopting federal principles in a fiscal system. Moreover, the economic theories of 
fiscal federalism are also explained in the light of three main functions of a 
government in a federal system i.e stabilization, redistribution and allocation. 
Different models are also discussed to explain how the government maximizes 
welfare of the consumers, when undertaking allocation function. These models 
include:-
a) Breton's perfect mapping model 
b) Olson's fiscal equivalence model. 
c) Oates' decentralization theorem. 
d) Tiebout's hypothesis. 
As discussed earlier, in India, the federal fiscal arrangements are explained in 
the Constitution from where both Central and State governments derive their powers 
and functions. However, discrepancy has emerged in the powers and functions of both 
these levels of government since financial powers are concentrated in the Central 
government and responsibility with the States. These discrepancies are known as 
Fiscal Imbalances and generally, there are two types of imbalances. One is the 
imbalances at different levels of the government or inter-governmental imbalances 
known as Vertical imbalances. Other is the Horizontal imbalances, which exists at the 
different units of the same level of government. Common tax base of two levels of 
government is another problem faced by the federal system. To mitigate these 
discrepancies inter-governmental or fiscal transfers are done through Finance 
Commission, Planning Commission and central transfers to States. 
Another problem faced by the federal system is of Overlapping of tax and 
expenditure functions among different governmental units. These overlapping can 
again be Vertical - between different levels of government and Horizontal - among 
different units within each level. In India, the States collect about 30% of aggregate 
total revenues of the Centre and the States taken together and incur about 55% of total 
expenditures. Thus, the revenues raised by the State governments form quite a 
significant proportion of total revenues and therefore, the method of raising these 
revenues and their consequences would have important allocative and equity 
implications. States' finance 43%of their expenditure from their own tax revenue 
sources and depends upon central transfers for the remaining 57%. The share of 
States' own revenue in their current expenditures (or fiscal independence) has 
declined from 45.1% in 1970-71 to 41.1% in 2003-04. 
Adoption of Value Added Tax (VAT) as prevalent in most West European 
countries is considered to be a most important solution to the problems of Indian 
commodity tax system. In fact, almost all-successful tax reforms are associated with 
the introduction of VAT and by now 140 countries had comprehensive VAT. In 
federal economies, to initiate tax reforms, the prevailing tax system should be made 
simple, transparent, board based and States should be given more fiscal powers. 
The existing taxes on commodities and services can be converted into VAT 
when certain conditions are fijlfilled. This requires that commodity taxes are extended 
up to the retail level, broad based taxes are included, no taxes should be paid on 
inputs, capital goods and inter-State sale of goods and revenue generated by Centre 
and states should at least remain the same as before the tax reforms. This requires levy 
of concurrent VAT by both Centre and States. It has a number of advantages also. 
Besides making the tax system efficient, this will safeguard the fiscal autonomy of the 
States, and when inter-State transactions are zero-rated, will get rid of tax exportation 
as well. 
However, such a system required a coordinated effort on the part of Centre 
and States. Through negotiations they can form a uniform tax base for both the levels 
of government, but a State could levy different tax rates for providing a higher level 
of public services. But this needs an amendment in the constitution allowing the 
Centre to levy tax at stages subsequent to manufacturing and to allow the States to 
levy the tax on consumption of services in addition to those on goods allowed 
presently. 
In India, the initial moves to implement VAT at the State level came in 1993 
with the then finance minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, in his budget speech stated the 
need to reform the outdated States sales taxes by replacing them with the VAT. The 
States became interested with the idea only when a presentation was made by the 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi in May 1994 before a 
conference of chief ministers for consideration. Small groups of chief ministers and 
finally an empowered committee of finance ministers were formed to examine the 
alternatives and select an acceptable design of VAT and to workout a schedule for its 
implementation. After a number of round of deliberations a deadline was set for the 
transition. But a final decision could not be reached. Then the date was set April 
1,2003. But hindrances occurred again at the last moment as traders and several States 
protested angrily. The date was shifted forward to Junel, 2003. Sixteen States seem to 
be ready and in one State Haryana, VAT has been actually introduced. But the union 
finance minister Jaswant Singh declared that VAT couldn't be implemented unless all 
States were prepared for it. Thus, another golden chance of reforming the commodity 
tax system was lost. Finally, all except one State (Uttar Pradesh, who is also now 
ready to adopt VAT with the change in the Government recently) have adopted the 
system in the year 2005. 
Then in the next two Chapters a comprehensive study is done of the two most 
important revenue generating taxes for Union and State governments; Union 
excises/Cenvat and Sales tax/State VAT. In Chapter IV, a detailed analysis of the 
Excise taxes: its genesis, development, significance, trends and reforms is attempted. 
At the Central level, at the time of Independence, India inherited a system of 
commodity taxation wherein union excise duties were levied on about a dozen articles 
yielding a small proportion of total tax revenue to the Centre. Following 
Independence, the rates were raised, the base was enlarged and more and more items 
were brought into its net, thereby, resulting in more revenues also. Excises were 
levied not only on finished goods, but also on raw materials, intermediate goods and 
capital goods. As a result of these factors, excise duties have come to occupy a 
dominant position in the revenue growth of the Central government. 
But there has been a decHne in the revenue growth in the decade of 80's and 
90's. The situation however, again changed and there is an increase in the excise 
revenue growth. The calculated buoyancy and grov/th rate estimates of excises reveals 
the same scenario.The buoyancy and growth rate are moving simultaneously i.e if one 
is increasing, the other is also increasing and vice-versa. But when comparing the 
trend during the pre-MODVAT period with post-MODVAT period, buoyancy rate 
has declined from 1.07 to 0.94, i.e, from an income-buoyant source it has turned into a 
non-buoyant source. 
But the growth rate has increased from 12.8% to 13.46%. It implies that the 
growth rate in GDP has been much faster than the growth rate of excises explaining 
fall in its income buoyancy. Except in the decadal period 1990-2000 and overall 
period 1970-2004, when both buoyancy and growth rates are lower, in other decadal 
periods buoyancy and growth rates are rising. 
The weak revenue performance of central excises cannot be adequately 
explained by the reduction in rates. Some of the major problems affecting the growth 
of excise revenue are also discussed. These inefficiencies had resulted from structural 
and administrative system followed by the tax authorities. These problems were: -
i) The Extended System 
The system was not integrated but an 'extended' one, wherein the tjixes were 
levied at the different stages of production. 
ii) Taxation at the Manufacturer level 
Although the Constitution had distinctly defined excisable goods as goods 
manufactured or produced in India and sales tax as tax on sale or purchase of goods. 
But the two taxes had come to overlap as the sales tax were levied on manufacture 
and importers to avoid problems in administering taxes levied it at the retail level. 
iii) Definitional Irregularities and Problem of Valuation 
Excise taxation implied taxation at the manufacturer level, but the term 
"manufacturing'' is quite difficult to define as goods might had undergone a change 
of form due to a variety of processing activities performed after their initial 
production or manufacturing. 
iv) Multiplicity of Rates 
Prior to tax reforms initiated in 1991, excise taxation in India was an 
interesting example of the multiple of rates, which were subject to frequent revisions. 
Various considerations contributed to the complexity of excise rates. 
Broadly speaking, necessities of life were either exempt or paid a low rate of 
duty, semi-luxuries were moderately taxed, and luxuries and tobacco products stood 
out distinctly as high-rated tariff items ranging from 100 to 110 per cent, capital 
goods were however, subject to a relatively low rate of duty. 
v) Taxation of Inputs and Capital Goods 
Input excises (raw materials, components and other intermediates) enhanced 
costs and profits and therefore increased the prices of goods much more than the 
amount of excise collected. Moreover, if excises were imposed on inputs as well as 
the fmished goods for which these inputs were used, a gap emerges between the 
nominal rate of tax and the cumulative rate of tax. This phenomenon made the excise 
system complicated and hindered the proper evaluation, particularly on equity 
criterion. 
vi) Exemptions and Concessions 
As in other countries, exemptions and concessions were an integral part of the 
Indian excise system. Excise preferences and reliefs were given to promote a wide 
range of socio-economic objectives. 
However, excise exemptions narrowed the tax base and therefore reduced 
governmental revenue. They interfered with the designing of the excise system and 
led to complexities in the excise law, which in turn caused tax evasion and litigation. 
Some of the goods exempted from the excise duties were technical, 
educational and research institute, goods of welfare of defence personnel, goods 
donated to the National Defence Fund or to the Ministry of Defence etc. 
vii) Controlled use of MOD VAT System 
To tackle the cascading effects of input taxation of excises, a modified system 
of value added tax (VAT) or MODVAT was introduced in 1986-87. Under the 
MODVAT scheme, credit of the excise duty and additional duty of customs 
(countervailing duty) was paid on inputs when used in the manufacture of the final 
products. However, there was restrictive use of MODVAT facility since tiie scope of 
tiie provisions of law was not readily accepted. 
vii) Exclusion of Services 
The excise taxes were levied on goods only, excluding the services from its 
base. Services however, form an integral part of manufacturing and the distinction 
between goods and services had minimized. 
In response to these inefficiencies, the government, time and again initiated 
various reform measures. However, a detailed study of these reform measures is done 
in the Chapter VI. The result of these reform measures was implicit, in the shift from 
union excise duties to a Central VAT (CenVAT) in the Budget 2000-01. 
Now, the prevailing structure includes (i) CenVAT (present name of excises), 
(ii) special excise duty, (iii) additional excise duty in lieu of sales tax, (iv) additional 
duty of excise on textiles and textile articles, and (v) cesses on specified commodities. 
The reforms implemented under excises have simplified its structure 
especially through CenVAT. While previously there were large numbers of rates, over 
the years it has been brought down considerably and the general rate of CenVAT is 
16%. Apart from rationalization of rate structure, exemption notifications have also 
been curtailed and the specific rates are converted into ad valorem rates. Further, the 
rate structure of CenVAT is linked to the Harmonized System of Nomenclature 
(HSN) present in a number of countries for providing help in international trade. 
However, the existing structure of CenVAT and the procedures for its administration 
are also characterized by some weaknesses. 
The CenVAT structure thus requires immediate reform measures to be initiated by 
the Central government. These measures are: 
(i) The administrative reform of excises is the most important aspect of the 
reform policy. 
(ii) There is a strong case for carefully reviewing the large number of products, 
which enjoy complete exemption. Apart from loss of revenue, such 
exemptions affect the CenVAT chain, which provides the core value of VAT-
type taxes. Many products need to restored to the CenVAT rate of 16%. 
(iii) Also, the role of special excise should be limited to few luxury consumer 
products such as cars, refrigerators etc. The rates of such duties should be in 
the range 5to 15%. Apart from raising much needed additional revenue, such 
taxes would counter the regressive nature of a uniform CenVAT. 
Also, the service tax should be integrated with the CenVAT/excise structure. 
In Chapter V, an overview is done of the system of State sales tax: its 
significance, trends, issues and reform measures. Modem sales tax system has its 
origin with imposition of general sales tax in the State of Tamil Nadu at a modest rate 
on multi-point basis. Since then all other States also started levying this tax. 
Sales tax is normally an ad-valorem levy imposed and collected from the 
seller with reference to the transactions or sale at the single point stage or at the multi-
point stage. The sales tax system till switching over to VAT, was partly origin-based 
and partly destination-based. It's importance as a buoyant revenue source for the 
States has increased by leaps and bounds. 
The buoyancy and growth rate estimated for the States in the period between 
1970-2004 and the decadal periods from 1970's show some interesting results. The 
buoyancy and growth rate were quite high (more than 1) in all decades except 1999-
2000 when sales tax was a non-buoyant source. 
Another feature that is noticeable in the estimates of buoyancy and growth rate 
is that except the two periods 1990-2000 and 2000-04, in all other periods buoyancy 
and growth rate are moving/changing in the same direction. In these two periods when 
the buoyancy rate was increasing from 1.02 to 1.52, the growth rate in fact reduced 
from 15.3% to 14.6%. This shows that during these two periods growth in sales tax 
revenue was comparatively more with regard to GDP growth. Moreover, it can also 
be concluded that out of the two commodity taxes; excises and sales tax, sales tax 
were a more buoyant source of revenue. 
Predominantly, first point sales tax was imposed by many of the States, 
rendering the tax base narrow. Multiplicity of rates and surcharges, turnover taxes and 
entry taxes loaded on to them made the systems complex and opaque. Moreover, the 
levy of central sales taxes (CST) created severe impediments to internal trade and 
market segmentation, inequitable resource transfers with richer States collecting 
significant amount of taxes from the consumers in poorer States. 
Various studies were done, since the Study Team on Domestic Trade Taxes 
submitted its report and the steps envisaged by these committees were to transform 
the prevailing sales tax system in the States into a destination based consumption 
type, retail stage value added tax (VAT). The Empowered Committee of State 
Finance Ministers was formulated and in 1999 decided to implement VAT in place of 
sales tax. Though deliberations were carried on by the empowered committee but a 
consensus couldn't be reached with the States and it's only in the year 2005 that 
almost all the States agreed to introduce State VAT. 
The experience of implementation of VAT has been very encouraging so far. 
During 2005-06, the tax revenue of the VAT implementing States showed an increase 
of around 13.8% over tax revenue of 2004-05. During April-June, 2006, the tax 
revenue of VAT implementing States has shown an increase of about 27.1% over the 
corresponding period of last year, which is quite remarkable and indicates that the 
VAT system has started stabilising and yielding the desired results. 
Another area of concern was the phasing of CST in a planned maimer and to 
compensate the States for the loss of revenue as a result of phasing out. Chidambaram 
announced the gradual phasing out of CST from April 1, 2007 with a compensation 
package for the States. 
In this Chapter, another important aspect of the commodity tax system is 
considered i.e services tax. Beginning with just three services taxed in the year 1994, 
the ambit of service tax has widened substantially, in terms of coverage of services 
and revenue generated by them. A comprehensive Goods and Services tax (GST) , 
however requires the CenVAT/ services tax to be integrated with the State VAT's 
introduced in 19 States and 2 UTs on April,2005 in place of earlier sales taxes. 
Chapter VI broadly outlines the various reform measures initiated by different 
study teams and committees set up by the government to overcome problems 
confronted by the commodity taxes (specifically, excise duties and sales tax) in the 
Indian economy. The foundation of these reform measures was laid down with the 
publication of Report of Taxation Enquiry Committee, 1953-54. 
At various intervals policy interventions have changed the course of 
commodity taxes in India. Major among them is the Report of Indirect Taxation 
Enquiry Committee, 1978 paving the way to introduce VAT in Indian model of 
10 
MODVAT on commodities at manufacturing level (UED) in 1986. Subsequently the 
number went on increasing and MODVAT was converted into CENVAT. The second 
Report is Domestic Trade Taxes which was instrumental in introducing VAT at State 
level by replacing sales taxes. Both these forms of taxes at Central and State need a 
lot, i.e. a comprehensive VAT is required. Secondly, service taxes are assuming 
greater fiscal importance, which is in the hands of Union government. It also bears the 
issue of revenue sharing. The ultimate solution seems to be Goods and Services tax 
(GST) only. 
Then, in the final Chapter VII, an overall review of the thesis is presented in a 
summarized form. 
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PREFACE 
In recent years, the emergence of a number of political and economic changes 
has given rise to new awakening of interest to re-examine the Fiscal Federalism. On 
the economic front, a greater role assigned to the market in resource allocation and on 
the political front, the transition from a period of one party rule at the Centre and State 
levels to that of coalition government and locally dominated regional parties has given 
rise to confrontational politics between the Centre and the States. 
In a federal set up, governmental activities and powers are disfributed among 
various layers of government such as Central, State and local governments. India is a 
quasi-federal set up where both Centre and States (including local bodies) are 
allocated tax and expenditure powers so as to meet the growing needs and diversified 
preferences of people. However, while allocating the powers between the Centre and 
the States, Indian Constitution has assigned most of the buoyant sources of tax 
revenue to the Central government and expenditure functions to the States. This has 
resulted in a mismatch between the revenue sources and expenditure ftmctions and is 
called fiscal imbalances. These imbalances may be vertical i.e problem of varying 
fiscal strength across different layers of government (Centre and State) and horizontal 
i.e among different jurisdictions at each level of government. 
Taxation is considered to be the most important source of revenue for a 
government in a developing economy.Taxes may be Indirect or Direct depending on 
the incidence of the tax. In Chapter I an effort has been made to analyse the relative 
significance of both direct and indirect taxes in the total tax revenue of Centre and 
States. However, it is concluded that the share of indirect (commodity) taxes in the 
total tax revenue of Central and State government is substantially larger than that of 
direct taxes. 
Out of the cenfral taxes, excises were the most important revenue-generating 
source for the Central government. While out of the different State taxes. Sales tax 
occupies the prominent position. 
Apart from the problem of mismatch of tax and expenditure powers of Centre 
and State government, the two important commodity taxes i.e excises and sales tax 
levied by both the levels of government has caused distortions and inefficiencies in 
the tax system. Some of these basic problems confronting the Indian commodity tax 
vu 
system are discussed in this chapter. These include cascading, vertical integration of 
the firms, inequalities, tax evasion etc. 
Chapter II then, provides an overall perspective on commodity tax structure 
and reforms with reference to India. The Chapter gave the conceptual framework, 
which has guided this study. It discusses certain issues, which are related to both 
federalism and independent to Centre and State. These issues relate to lack of 
coordination in the fiscal decisions of both levels of government i.e Centre and State 
that resulted in conflicts in the form of fiscal imbalances and overlapping of tax bases. 
In Chapter III, an attempt has been made to analyse the theoretical aspects of 
fiscal federalism and indirect taxation in a federal country. This studies an ideal tax 
system, which requires uniformity in its structure based on equity and efficiency 
considerations. However, the partial equilibrium analysis demonstrates the non-
desirability of uniform rates. When the tax is imposed, the price gets distorted and 
causes efficiency loss. Then to increase efficiency in the tax system, the equity 
consideration is affected in the process. Various models are considered in this regard. 
Apart from uniformity in the tax system, another aspect that is taken into 
consideration in a tax system in a federal country is harmonization of broad taxes (like 
union excises, sales tax, service tax etc.). Tax harmonization is adopted to overcome 
the problems of overlapping of tax bases due toe the federal fiscal arrangements 
provided in the Constitution. 
Adoption of Value Added Tax (VAT) as prevalent in most West European 
countries is considered to be a most important solution to the problems of Indian 
commodity tax system. In fact, almost all-successful tax reforms are associated with 
the introduction of VAT and by now 140 countries had comprehensive VAT. 
However, such a system required a coordinated effort on the part of Centre 
and States. Through negotiations they can form a uniform tax base for both the levels 
of government. 
Then, in the next two Chapters a comprehensive study is done of the two most 
important revenue generating taxes for Union and State government's i.e Union 
excises and Sales tax. Also, an attempt is made to study how both these taxes are 
transformed into CenVAT and State VAT both the levels of government. In Chapter 
Vlll 
IV, a detailed analysis of the Excise taxes: its genesis, development, significance, 
trends and reforms is attempted. 
In Chapter V, an overview is done of the system of State sales tax: its 
significance, trends, issues and reform measures. Buoyancy and growth rate 
calculated for the two taxes concludes that out of the two commodity taxes: excises 
and sales tax, sales tax were a more buoyant source of revenue. In this Chapter an 
attempt is also made to examine the Central Sales tax (CST) and Services tax. 
Chapter VI broadly outlines the various reform measures initiated by different 
study teams and committees set up by the government to overcome problems 
confronted by the commodity taxes (specifically, excise duties and sales tax) in the 
Indian economy. The foundation of these reform measures was laid down with the 
publication of Report of Taxation Enquiry Committee, 1953-54. Other major Reports 
were Report of Indirect Taxation Enquiry Committee, 1978 paving the way to 
introduce MODVAT on commodities at manufacturing level (UED) in 1986. 
Subsequently, MODVAT was converted into CenVAT in 2000-01. The second 
Report is Domestic Trade Taxes which was instrumental in introducing VAT at State 
level by replacing sales taxes. Both these forms of taxes at Central and State need a 
lot, i.e. a comprehensive VAT is required. The ultimate solution seems to be Goods 
and Services tax (GST) i.e merging CenVAT, State VAT Service tax into a single 
rate. The Union Finance Minister Shri P. Chidambaram has also announced in his 
Budget speech (2006), his intent to introduce GST firom 2010. 
Then, in the final Chapter VII, an overall review of the thesis is presented in a 
summarized form. 
IX 
CHAPTER-I 
FISCAL FEDERALISM AND TAX REGIME IN INDIA: AN OVERVIEW 
Prologue 
Present era polity belongs largely to federalism - political and fiscal. The last 
decade of the twentieth century had witnessed the most unexpected developments in 
the sphere of federalism. There are trends, which were characterized by movements 
towards both formation of new federations and disintegration of two federations. The 
European countries, which fought two world wars in order to retain their political 
identity, moved towards a unified monetary and political system. They were 
encouraged by impressive economic benefits of the Economic Union, which was 
formed after the Second World War (Thimmaiah, 1999). What was more astonishing 
was that inspite of their diverse languages, their ethnic heterogeneity had not 
interfered in the formation of a United Europe. 
On the other side of the European Continent, USSR and Yugoslavia have 
disintegrated as federations. These two federal nations were held together by very 
powerful Central governments. But over centralization led to absence of regional 
participation that created dissatisfaction apart from stagnation of the pace of 
development resulting in deterioration of the standard of living of the common 
people. Lack of autonomy for the regions led to the collapse of the two federal 
systems when the central authorities became weak. This event had also got a lesson 
for Indian Union in that the States had been demanding adequate degree of political 
and financial autonomy (establishment of States of Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, 
Uttaranchal etc.) for a long time. If the demand for fair degree of autonomy is not 
conceded by the Central government, the mutual trust between the Central and the 
State governments will be lost and the whole edifice of the federal structure may 
shake when the power of the Central government became weak. 
Indian Experience 
A federation means a union of several States brought about by the instrument 
of a treaty or agreement. The very first article of the Indian Constitution defines India 
as a Union of States. Though the word federation has been deliberately avoided in the 
Indian Constitution, the fiscal structure created under it is essentially federal in nature. 
1 
The federal form of government implies that the Constitution has provided for two 
tiers of government, i.e, the Union' and the State governments (including Local 
bodies) and there is a division of legislative, administrative and financial powers and 
functions between them. 
Federal system of government is a mixed blessing. It has the advantage of 
economic integration which promotes industrial and defense capabilities of a nation. 
Simultaneously, decentralized decision making units meet the politico-economic 
aspirations of the people at the sub-national level. 
Although a federal system provides for divided governmental functions and 
powers, imbalances also often arise between functional responsibilities and financial 
resources at different layers of the government. This is so because revenue-raising 
capacities and revenue needs of various federating units are different. 
Financial imbalances at the vertical level (Centre vs. States as well as States 
vs. Local) and at the horizontal level (among the States and Local bodies) are sought 
to be removed or reduced through Constitutional arrangements. In this regard, 
President of India (under ai-ticle 280) appoints Union Finance Commission every 
quinqueimium or earlier if necessary and under article 283 (i) and (y) the Constitution 
provides for appointment of State Finance Commission at each State level. 
The Union Finance Commission recommends to the President, the principles 
of distribution between the Union and the States of the proceeds of taxes and the 
allocation among the States of the shares of such proceeds. 
Now the question that is raised is why these imbalances arise in a federal 
system of government? To get an answer to the question we have to look into the 
fiscal structure of the economy. Since Independence, India has followed the path of 
planned economic development. The government spends on developmental activities 
to improve income distribution, to direct the allocation of resources in the desired 
lines, to generate and accelerate economy and also to promote employment 
opportunities. Government's expenditure is financed by revenue from various sources 
such as taxes, borrowing from the people and banks, profits of public undertakings, 
deficit financing (i.e. creafion of new money) and foreign aid. Of all these, taxation is 
the most important source of revenue for the government. 
In most democratic countries like India, taxation powers of Central, State and 
local governments are mentioned in the Constitution itself through precise entries in 
the three lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution i.e. the Centre list, State list 
and Concurrent list. The Centre list consists of defence, national industries and mines, 
foreign affairs, banking and currency, inter-State commerce, national highways, 
railways, airways, telecommunications and waterways. The State list covers health, 
education, agriculture, irrigation, roads, and law and justice. Labour relations, 
education and criminal law fall under concurrent list. Accordingly, the Indian 
Constitution made revenue and expenditure assignments to governments at different 
levels to carry on the constitutionally entrusted functions. 
However, the problem of double taxation had emerged where the States 
complain on Centre's increased encroachment on the sphere exclusively allotted to 
them under the Constitution. 
In this scenario when the taxation powers of the government at different levels 
were mutually exclusive or overlapping and the fiscal decision of different levels of 
government was not coordinated, it had resulted in various kinds of inefficiencies in 
the tax system. These were i) cascading ii) vertical integration of the firms that 
militate against the objective of promoting ancillary industries iii) non-transparency 
iv) evasion and avoidance of tax, and v) inequity. Various Economists have suggested 
harmonization of the tax system as a solution to these inefficiencies. 
An Overview of Finances of Centre and States 
As we all know that the role of a government has undergone a radical change. 
It is a Welfare State that is committed to accelerate economic development 
(Agarwala, 1985). It has to provide public services and for the purpose it must have 
adequate resources. It further needs resources for financing development programme. 
The primary means of financing all such programme by the government is taxation. 
A tax is a compulsory payment levied on the persons or companies to meet the 
expenditure incurred on conferring common benefits upon the people of a country. 
The Tax policy formulated after Independence aimed at accelerating growth with 
social justice and was based on a socialistic pattern of society, basically drawn from 
the socialist model. Within the framework of mixed economy, the tax policy was 
assigned the following objectives: -
1) To bring about optimum and efficient resource allocation within the economic 
system. 
2) To help accelerate the rate of savings and investment. 
3) To reduce income inequalities. 
4) To check price rise and inflationary tendencies. 
5) To promote employment opportunities. 
With the above objectives in view, the tax policy had a central role in the 
planning process, especially in providing social justice through equitable distribution. 
It was directed to raise resources from well to do. The First Five-year plan 
(FYP,1953) for e.g., pronounced " the state must itself raise, to the extent possible 
through taxation... in consonance with accepted social criteria". It is true that many 
productive sources of revenue have been tapped, but " the systems of taxation 
generally have not been built on sound principles suited to the requirements of rapid 
economic growth." 
According to Chelliah (1969) a tax system is needed to bring in revenues to 
the goverrmient but tax revenues can be raised in many different ways. The theory of 
taxation deals mainly with a question of what would be the best and proper way of 
raising taxes for the government. In other words, the main criteria of a good tax 
system are: - (a) The tax system should be fair or equitable, (b) It should cause the 
least possible harmful effects to the economy and to the extent possible promote its 
growth, (c) It should be simple both for administration and compliance and (d) Last 
but not the least it should be income elastic. The characteristic of income elasticity is 
important because a system is required which will automatically produce more 
revenues when the economy grows so that it would not be necessary for the 
government to keep raising tax rates or introducing new taxes from time to time to get 
more revenues. 
There are different types of taxes and to distinguish among these taxes is to 
consider their point of impact in the circular flow of income and expenditure in the 
economy (Musgrave & Musgrave 1989). Taxes may be imposed on household 
income, consvimer expenditures, business receipts, profits, wage receipts, retained 
earnings, dividends etc. Broadly taxes may be classified as Indirect (on outputs) and 
Direct (on factors) taxes. 
Alternatively they can be distinguished based on whether or not the burden of 
a tax can be shifted wholly or partly to others. In the case of direct taxes, the liability 
is determined with direct reference to the taxpayer, while in the case of indirect taxes 
such ability is assessed indirectly. If a tax is such that its burden cannot be shifted to 
others and the person who pays it to the government has also to bear it, it is called a 
Direct tax. Examples of direct taxes are income tax, corporation tax, gift tax, 
inheritance tax, expenditure tax, wealth tax, capital gains tax and so on are examples 
of direct taxes. 
On the other hand, indirect taxes are those whose burden can be shifted to 
others so that those who pay these taxes to the government do not bear the whole 
burden but pass it on wholly or partly to others. For instance, excise duty on the 
production of sugar is an indirect tax because the manufacturers of sugar include the 
excise duty in the price and pass it on to buyers. Ultimately, it is the consumers on 
whom the incidence of excise duty on sugar falls, as they will pay higher price for 
sugar than before the imposition of the tax. Thus, though excise duties are on the 
production of commodities but they can be shifted to the consumers. Likewise, sales 
tax on commodities can also be passed on to the buyers or consumers in the form of 
higher prices charged for the commodities. Therefore, excise duties and sales taxes on 
commodities are example of indirect taxes. A more simple classification of direct and 
indirect taxes is that of all taxes on commodities and services and on income. Taxes 
such as sales tax, excise duties, customs duties, taxes on entertainment, rail and bus 
passenger fares and so on are called Indirect taxes. They are also known as 
Commodity taxes. 
Although there is no legal definition of direct and indirect taxes in India. 
Taxes under the charge of Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) are direct taxes 
while those administered by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) are 
indirect taxes. 
Table 1.1 shows that in 1970-71, direct taxes accoimted for a sizeable 21.2% 
of total tax collections: Rs. 10.09 billion out of Rs.47.52 billion. However, the 
proportionate share dropped to less than half at 14.4 % in 1985-86, and stood at 14% 
in 1990-91. The declining trend of direct taxes led to a rising share of indirect taxes. 
The ratio between direct and indirect taxes worsened with every passing decade, 
recording 21.2% to 78.8% in 1970-71,16.5% to 83.5% in 1980-81 and 14% to 86% in 
1990-91. Of late, the decline in the relative share of direct taxes has not only been 
arrested but also reversed. For the year 1995-96, the share of direct taxes stood at 
20%, 23.5% in 2000-01, 24.5% in 2002-03 and 28.1% in 2004-05. The combination 
of low tax rate and broader base supported the rising share of direct taxes in total tax 
revenue as part of the accepted recommendations of the Tax Reforms Committee 
constituted by the government of India in August 1991 (TRC). On the other hand, 
indirect taxes show a decline trend from 80% in 1995-96 to 76.5% in 2000-01, 75.5% 
in 2002-03 and 72.65% in the period 2004-05 (Table 1.1). For details see Annexure 
A.1.2andA.1.3. 
Table 1.1: Direct and Indirect taxes of Centre and States (Rs. b) 
Year 
1970-71 
1975-76 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05(R.E) 
Tax Collection ( Rs.b) 
Total tax 
collection(A+B) 
47.52 
111.82 
198.44 
432.67 
877.22 
1752.59 
3053.2 
3145.35 
3562.77 
4140.85 
4940.16 
Direct 
taxes(A) 
10.09 
24.93 
32.68 
62.52 
122.6 
357.77 
717.62 
731.09 
873.65 
1095.43 
1390.17 
Indirect 
taxes(B) 
37.43 
86.89 
165.76 
370.15 
754.62 
1394.82 
2335.56 
2414.24 
2689.12 
3045.38 
3550 
Share in total (%) 
Share of direct 
taxes in total(%) 
21.23 
22.29 
16.46 
14.44 
13.97 
20.41 
23.5 
23.24 
24.52 
26.45 
28.14 
Share of indirect 
taxes in total (%) 
78.77 
77.71 
83.54 
85.56 
86.03 
79.59 
76.4 
76.75 
75.48 
73.55 
71.86 
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Indian Economic Statistics 
(Various Issues) 
The declining share of direct taxes was not consistent with the norms of tax 
theory. It is well known that as an economy experiences modernization, 
diversification, and expansion of corporate sector, the scope for dirept taxes widens."^ 
In India, the share of service sector in national income has increased over the 
years and lately it has become the largest sector of the economy. Though the base for 
direct taxation has also grown with the enlargement of the service sector but the 
proportionate share of direct taxes had fallen. 
The limited role of direct taxes in developing countries can be explained in 
terms of their peculiar circumstances, which include large agricultural sector of 
subsistence nature, small-scale industrial activities, lack of monetisation and 
accounting practices, and low levels of income. Even a modest exemption limit of 
personal income tax keeps the vast majority of income earners outside the income tax 
net. In addition to these underlying reasons, a host of specific factors also contributed 
to the reduced role of direct taxes. These included: (a) scaling down rates of direct 
taxes, (b) plethora of exemptions/ concessions, (c) abolition of estate duty, (d) 
declining share of the Centre in income tax revenue, and (e) large-scale tax evasion. 
In India, taxes are levied by all the three levels of government, namely. 
Central, State and Local. Some of the taxes levied by different levels of government 
fall on a common tax base. The major taxes levied by the Centre are corporate income 
tax, personal income tax (non-corporate income tax), CenVAT (earlier called union 
excise duties) and customs duties. The other Central taxes include wealth tax, gift tax, 
expenditure tax, service tax, and interest tax. The major taxes levied by the States are 
State VAT (earlier called sales tax), State excise duties and stamp and registration 
fees. The other State taxes include entertainment tax, motor vehicles tax, goods and 
passenger tax and profession tax (which falls on trade or on those who provide 
professional services such as legal practitioners and contractors). Property tax and 
octroi (a tax on entry of goods into a local area) whenever levied have been the major 
taxes of local governments. 
Constitutional Provisions 
India's Constitution is the supreme organic law of the land. The Constitution 
which became operative on January 26, 1950, describes in detail the subject matter of 
laws that may be enacted by the Union and the Legislatiires of the States and it is 
elaborated in lists I, II. and III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Under 
Article 246 read with the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, these powers have 
been defined through precise entries. Thus, in the Constitution, Entries 82 to 92 B of 
List I (Union list) in the Seventh Schedule refer to the taxation powers of the Union 
government (Annexure A. 1.4). Entries 45 to 63 of List II (State list) in the same 
Schedule specify the taxation powers of the State governments (Armexure A. 1.5). List 
III (Concurrent list) does not contain any head of taxation, which means the Union, 
and the States have no concurrent powers of taxation (Armexure A. 1.6). The absence 
of joint occupancy of tax fields is meant to avoid duplication in tax administration, 
and minimize tax rivalry between the Centre and the States, and among the States 
themselves. The residual powers of taxation, as in general legislation, belong to the 
Union vide entry 97 of List I in the Seventh Schedule. For example, gift tax imposed 
by the Union derives its authority from these residual powers. 
The Constitution, however, does not provide for any taxation powers to Local 
governments as they derive them from respective States. However, the implication of 
Article 276 was that the taxes on professions, trades, callings or employment are for 
the benefit of a State or of a municipality, district board, local board or any other local 
authority. The States on their own may assign any of the taxes in the State list to the 
local bodies and they are called assigned taxes. The taxes generally assigned to local 
governments are property taxes, octroi and other taxes on vehicles. 
However, the property of the Centre is exempt from State taxation under 
Article 285 (1). Likewise, the property and incomes of the States are exempt from 
Union taxes [Article 289 (1)]. In respect of the Union Territories, the Parliament has 
the power to impose any tax included in the State list. 
The Constitution made elaborate and complex arrangements relating to the 
distribution, between the Union and the States, of taxes, the power of borrowing, and 
provision for grants-in-aid by the Union to the States. The underlying philosophy of 
these arrangements was to place at the disposal of the two tiers of government 
adequate financial resources to enable them to discharge their respective 
responsibilities under the Constitution. 
Although there was no strain on Centre-State relations in the fields exclusive 
in the Central sphere, the strains were felt exclusively in the areas covered by the List 
II and III. As we had already seen that taxes are broadly classified as either on 
commodities and services or on income. Here this study emphasizes on commodity 
taxes only. 
Fiscal Significance of Commodity Taxes 
The tax revenue of Centre and States taken together as a proportion to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) shows an increase from 10.4% in 1970-71 to 13.8% in 
1980-81 and further to 15.4% in 1990-91. It, however, declined to 14.5% in 2000-01 
and after remaining stable for the next two years it has shown a slight recovery and it 
was 15% in 2003-04 (Table 1.2). 
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The total tax revenue so generated by the two tiers of government, was 
unequally distributed; 67% was raised through the taxes assigned to the Centre 
(gross) and 33% through the taxes allotted to the States (ovra taxes) in the year 1970-
71 as shown in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 respectively. For details refer to Annexure A. 
1.3. However, a change has been witnessed in the pattern of the revenue generated by 
the Centre and States. There has been a decline in the share of the Centre's revenue 
and it reached to around 59.5% in 2001-02 but it again increased and was 6\% in 
2003-04. On the other hand, the share of State's revenue show a rising trend from 
33% to 41% in 2001-02 but reduced to 39% in 2003-04. 
Table 1.3: Significance of Central taxes (%) 
Year 
1970-71 
1975-76 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05(R.E) 
Share of gross central 
taxes in total tax 
revenue 
67.5 
68.0 
69.9 
66.26 
65.6 
63.46 
61.77 
59.47 
60.6 
61.42 
61.95 
Share in gross central taxes 
Direct taxes 
27.1 
28.9 
22.74 
19.6 
19.15 
30.17 
36.21 
36.99 
38.61 
41.32 
43.85 
Indirect taxes 
72.9 
71.1 
77.26 
80.4 
80.85 
69.83 
63.79 
63.01 
61.39 
58.68 
56.15 
Share of net central taxes in 
total tax revenue 
51.58 
53.75 
47.3 
48.95 
49.06 
46.75 
44.76 
43.45 
44.85 
45.15 
45.71 
Source: Same as in table 1.1 
Table 1.4 Significance of State Taxes (%) 
Year 
1970-71 
1975-76 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
Share of State taxes in 
total tax revenue 
32.53 
31.95 
33.58 
33.73 
34.36 
36.53 
38.22 
40.52 
39.39 
39.07 
Share in State taxes 
Direct taxes 
9.05 
8.06 
4.06 
4.32 
4.08 
3.45 
2.96 
3.06 
2.85 
2.79 
Indirect taxes 
90.95 
91.94 
95.94 
95.68 
95.92 
96.55 
97.04 
96.04 
97.05 
97.21 
Source: Same as in table 1. 
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Commodity taxes are the main sources of income for both Centre and States. 
They constitute around 80% of tax revenue for Centre (Tablel.5) and 91% of tax 
revenue for States (Table 1.6) in 1970-71. The two tables show that commodity taxes 
in case of States have shovra a rising trend only and its share has reached to 99% in 
the year 2003-04. But, in case of Centre there have been fluctuations and the share of 
commodity taxes reduced to just 63.3% in 2001-02 but the very next year the share 
was 83.5%. The trend of share of the different taxes in the total tax revenue (Table 
1.5) indicates that in 1990-91 i.e. just prior to the beginning of the reforms the 
revenue from customs duty as per cent the total revenue of the Centre accounted for 
48%, union excise duty 33% and personal and corporation income taxes taken 
together accounted for 15.3%. Sales tax as per cent to the States' own tax revenue 
accounted for 63%, State excise 18% and vehicle taxes (motor vehicles tax, passenger 
and goods taxes taken together) accounted for 9.9% (Table 1.6). There has been a 
slight change in the trend after the reforms and in 1995-96 the share of income tax at 
the Centre has increased to 5.3% and of the corporation tax to 20.1%, increasing the 
total of the two taxes to 25.4%. In case of States, sales tax increased to 66.3%, state 
excise declined to 15.9% and vehicle taxes accounted for 9.8%. 
The share of commodity taxes in case of Centre has considerably declined. 
The contribution of the State taxes however, remains unchanged. So, it was necessary 
to analyse the main reasons why the share of commodity taxes, specifically, union 
excise duty eind sales taxes, has declined over the period and what measures could be 
taken to reform the system. While there was no essential difference between the 
excise tax and sales tax, from the angle of incidence on the consumer, it has to be 
recognized that the two taxes are neither identical nor interchangeable and that there 
are some basic deficiencies between the two different levies. 
In the first place, an excise is a levy at the production point whereas a sales 
tax is levied on a commodity at one or more points of sale or piirchase between the 
stages of production and final consumption. Any particular commodity completes its 
production process only at one stage and theoretically incidence of an excise duty 
should be only at one point. Since, however, the component parts of the commodity 
are subject to excise duty, an excise duty on the final product involves a multiple duty 
on the components unless the duty is based on the value added by the manufacturer. 
In the case of sales, the same commodity might pass through various stages of sales. 
11 
leading to sales tax at more than one point, depending upon the system of the sales 
tax levy. Unlike excise duty levied at the production point, sales tax includes not 
merely the cost at the production point, but also subsequent costs after the production 
/ stage i.e. freight, insurance and also profits and the excise duty itself. 
The Centre levies excise duties uniformly throughout the country and does not 
differentiate between one region and the other, while the sales tax structure and the 
rates of sales taxes differ from State to State. Again, while most of the excise duties 
are specific, sales taxes are ad-valorem duties and during the period of high inflation, 
the sales tax yield automatically increases, other things remaining the same. 
However, in some countries sales tax is considered to be same as excise duties and 
question has been raised whether the ad-valorem excise duties are not really sales 
taxes (Gurumurthi, 1999). Despite all these similarities, both taxes have 
"distinguishing features" and both have "a positive place in a comprehensive system 
of taxation and are expressly mentioned in our constitution"(GOI, 1965). 
During the last 30 years Union excise duties and State sales taxes have 
expanded substantially showing phenomenal growth and buoyancy. Among the tax 
receipts of the Union, the excise duties occupy the most dominant position and 
account for 56% in 1970-71 of the total tax receipts of the Centre as compared to 
33.3% during 1990-91. However, it again increased to 49.3% in 2003-04. Taking all 
the States together the yield from State sales taxes in 1970-71 was 51% of the 
aggregate State taxes. During 1990-91 the sales tax revenue was 57% and in 2003-04 
it was 69.2% of the total yield from the State taxes. In the coming chapters we'll talk 
in detail about theses two taxes. 
Now briefly an analysis of the revenue significance of the Central taxes and 
the State taxes in the total tax revenue of the government would be done. 
Trends in Central Taxes 
Central taxes accounted for about two-thirds of total tax collections in India in 
the decades of 70's and 80's. The relative significance of various taxes in Central 
revenues has undergone major changes since Independence. In 1970-71, the share of 
Central taxes was 67.4%, in 1980-81 it increased to 69.9%. But, 90's onwards, there 
was a decline in the share from 65.6% in 1990-91 to 59.47% in 2001-02. But it again 
increased to 63.08% in 2004-05 (Table 1.3). 
12 
As in the case of combined (Centre and States) tax revenues, tax structure at 
the Central level has also evolved around indirect taxes during the post-Independence 
period. The share of direct taxes in Central tax revenues declined almost consistently 
over the years 1970-90 with the result that indirect taxes came to occupy a dominant 
place in Central finances (Table 1.3). The share of direct taxes in gross Central taxes 
reduced considerably from 27.1% in 1970-71 to 22.74% in 1980-81, further to 19.6% 
in 1985-86 and 19.2% in 1990-91. On the other hand, share of indirect taxes 
increased from 72.9% in 1970-71 to 77.3% in 1980-81, 80.4% in 1985-86 and 
80.85% in 1990-91. 
The TRC was asked, inter alia, to examine and make recommendations on 
"ways of improving the elasticity of tax revenues both direct and indirect as a 
proportion of total tax revenues and of GDP." Pursuant to its recommendations, rates 
of both corporate and personal income tax were substantially reduced. Following 
better compliance, the declines in the relative share of direct taxes have been reversed. 
Direct taxes as a percentage of Centre's total tax collections rose from 19.2% in 1990-
91 (pre-reform period) to 30.2% in 1995-96, 36.2% in 2000-01. 38.6% in 2002-03 and 
43.9% in 2004-05 (Table 1.3). 
The relative significance of various taxes in Central revenues has also 
undergone major changes since 1970's (Table 1.5). Some of the important direct taxes 
of the Central government include Income tax, corporation tax, wealth tax and gift 
tax, while indirect taxes include Excise levies, custom duties and service tax. 
Income Tax 
In 1970-71, income tax accounted for almost 4.65% of Central tax collections. 
It further increase to 7.98% in 1975-76. However, the relative contribution declined 
over the years and was 2.9% in 1990-91. For the year 1995-96, it is estimated at 
5.26%. Thereafter, it increased substantially and was 23.12%) in 2002-03 and 21.47% 
in 2003-04. (Table 1.5) For details refer to Annexure A. 1.7. In the case of Corporation 
tax, the relative contribution was 15.09% in 1970-71 while in 1990-91 it was 12.39%. 
In the intervening period, however, moderate changes are noticeable in the 
proportionate share of corporation tax. For the year 1995-96, its share in total Central 
tax collections is estimated at 20.12%, 18.42% in 2000-01 and 28.96% in 2002-03 
and 33.58% in 2003-04. 
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Wealth Tax and Gift Tax 
These are so called capital taxes of the Central Government without much 
revenue significance. 
Union Excise Duties 
In the post-Independence period, a major change in the Indian tax system 
pertains to the phenomenal rise in the relative revenue significance of Union excise 
duties. In 1970-71, excise revenue accounted for a modest 55.8% of total Central tax 
collections: Rs. 13.68b out of Rs.24.51 b. It declined substantially to 27.06% in 1975-
76. But it again started rising and it increased to 39.85% in 2001-02. In the 2002-03 
budget, its share stands at 51.6%. The relative contribution of excise revenue has 
declined since the 1970's owing mainly to proliferation of exemptions/concessions, 
evasion, and litigation. 
Customs Duties 
During pre-Independence days and even during the early post-Independence 
period, customs duties formed the mainstay of Central tax revenues. However, the 
relative share of customs duties started declining fi-om early 1950's till 1970's in view 
of a protective trade policy and dwindling foreign exchange reserves. The share of 
customs revenue in Centre's total tax collections increased from 21.37% in 1970-71 
to 47.96% in 1990-91. This upward trend was attributable to a changed emphasis 
from physical to fiscal controls to regulate imports, a policy reiterated in the Long-
Term Fiscal Policy of December 1985. But since then there has been wide 
fluctuations in the customs duties and it has reduced to 24.99% in 200-01, 20.73% in 
2001-02. Then it however increased to 28.13% in 2002-03. 
Service Tax 
The service tax was levied in 1994 and since then its share has increased quite 
substantially. It was 1.05% in 1995-96 and increased to 4.4% in 2003-04; Rs 8.62b 
out of Rs 819.39b and Rs 83b out of total Central tax collections of Rs 1875.38b 
Trends in State Taxes 
From a modest amount of Rs. 15.3 billion in 1970-71, revenue from States' 
taxes has grown consistently over the years and was estimated at Rs. 66.2b in 1980-
81, 303.8b in 1990-91, 1180 b in 2000-01 and 1599.2 b in 2003-04 budgets of the 
15 
State governments. As in the case of Central taxes, the proportionate share of direct 
taxes at the State level has dropped significantly from 21.9% in 1970-71 to 12.3% in 
1980-81.In 2001-02 it declined to 86% but again increased to 87% in the next year. 
On the other hand, the share of indirect taxes has increased sharply from 78.1% to 
87.7% over the same period (Table 1.6)(For details see Armexure A. 1.8). 
Land Revenue 
There is no direct tax, which can claim a prominent place in the tax systems of 
the States. Land revenue that formed the bulwark (backbone) of State's tax revenue 
during the pre-Independence period and even in the early post-Independence years 
has declined in importance over the years (Table 1.6). In some States, land revenue 
has been abolished. Its share has increased from Rs 1.1b in 1970-71 to 1.5b in 1980-
81, further to 6.1b in 1990-91,14.2b in 2000-01 and 22b in 2003-04. 
Agricultural Income Tax 
Agricultural income tax, which could have been an important source of 
revenue for the States, has remained negligible till date. If we analyse the data, the 
share of agricultural income tax, which was 0.1 lb in 1970-71, only increased to 0.46b 
in 1980-81. In the coming years, though it has reached the figure of 1.98b in 1990-91 
but it again declined and was 0.42b in 2003-04. 
Sales Tax 
An outstanding development in the sphere of State finances since 
Independence has been the abrupt growth in the relative revenue significance of sales 
tax. Sales tax also known as trade tax, has grown considerably in depth and coverage, 
and forms the mainstay of State's tax revenue. It is levied not only on consumer goods 
but also on raw materials and capital goods. In 1970-71, the relative share of sales tax 
was 53.5%): Rs. 7.1b out of a total collection of Rs. 12b from States' taxes. This share 
increased considerably and was 64% in 1980-81 (Rs 38.9 b out of Rs 58.8 b), 68.9% 
in 2002-03 but declined to only 36.1% in 2003-04. 
State Excises on Liquor 
Under Entry 51 of List II in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the 
States are empowered to levy, "duties of excise on....(a) alcoholic liquors for human 
consumption; (b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics; but not 
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including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance 
included in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry". 
After sales tax, State excise duties (on liquors and other narcotics) are the most 
important source of States' own tax revenues. Though second in importance, their 
relative significance has fluctuated considerably over the years from 14.5% in 1970-
71 to 13.6% in 1980-81 and increasing to 18.03% in 1990-91. It however started 
declining and now its share just stand at 7.3% in 2003-04. This has happened because 
of the policy of prohibition'* adopted in some States from time to time. However, it is 
noteworthy that while in Western counties the main objective of duties on intoxicants 
is revenue collection, in India the overriding consideration in imposing these duties is 
to discourage consumption of intoxicants as a matter of public policy. 
Taxes on Motor Vehicles and Passenger and Goods Tax 
Under entry 57 of List II in the Seventh Schedule, State Governments enjoy 
the power to levy taxes on vehicles suitable for use on roads. Although motor vehicles 
taxes basically meant for regulating and confrolling motor traffic, in recent years, it 
has been used as a fiscal measure and has assumed fiscal importance. These are levied 
for registration, permits, driving licenses etc. and are based on the type of vehicle 
(truck, bus, car, scooter etc). The yield from the tax increased from Rs 1.73 b in 1970-
71 to Rs 6.87 b in 1980-81, 26.28 b in 1990-91, and 87.41 b in 2000-01 and 143.28 b 
in 2003-04. Its share in states' own tax revenue has increased from 13.05%) in 1970-
71 to 8.29%) in 2000-01 and 5.3% in 2003-04. Passenger and goods tax has, of late, 
gained in prominence.^ However, in many of the States these two taxes have been 
merged, so both the taxes are taken together and secondly, both the taxes fall on the 
same base. (Table 1.6) 
Entertainment Tax 
Under entry 62 of List II in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, States 
are empowered to levy taxes on entertairmient. Such taxes are levied on the price 
charged for admission to any place of entertainment such as a circus, cinema, theafre, 
exhibition, variety show, etc. With the expansion of cinema, the bulk of revenue from 
this tax is provided by the cinema shows. Though the tax is collected from the 
exhibitors, the ultimate burden is borne by the cinegoers. The frend of revenue from 
entertainment tax at all - States shows that the yield remained almost constant at the 
rate of 4%) except changes in two years (1985-86 & 2003-04) when the rate actually 
went below 2%. 
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Electricity Duty 
Along with the electricity rates, consumers are charged a duty whose revenue 
is shown under 'taxes' in the Budget. The yield from the tax depends upon the amount 
of consumption of electricity. Indnectly, the yield of the tax depends on industrial 
development; also the consumption of electricity can be taken as an indicator (index 
of development). Also, availability of electricity supply affects the yield of the tax. 
The trend of revenue from the tax at all States level, as given in Tablel.6, shows that 
the yield from the tax was Rs. 0.67 b in 1970-71, rising to Rs.6.33 b in 1985-86 and 
with a decline to 4.4 b in 1995-96 it again began rising and was 14.47 b in 2000-01. 
Then there was a decline to 7.56 b in 2003-04. The share of the tax in States' own tax 
revenue decreased from 5.06% in 1970-71 to a meagre 0.28% in 2003-04. 
Local Finance 
The Constitution does not reserve any taxes for the local bodies. Since local 
government is a State subject (entry 5 of List II), State Governments may assign any 
of the taxes in the State List, wholly or partially, to urban local bodies. Taxes usually 
assigned to local bodies are property taxes, octroi and taxes on professions. Property 
tax (house tax) is an important source of revenue for local bodies. 
Assigning taxes enables State Governments to exercise a degree of supervision 
and control over the affairs of city corporations, municipalities, district boards, and 
other local bodies. These local bodies provide certain public services like basic health 
and education, construction and maintenance of local roads, sanitation, street lighting, 
and parks. Local governments also receive grants-in aid from State Governments and 
earn non-tax revenue from enterprises operated by them. 
Octroi 
Octroi was a tax on the entry of goods into a local area from other areas for the 
purpose of consumption or sale. It was mentioned in entry 52 of List II (State List) in 
the Seventh Schedule. Industry and trade circles have criticized the continuation of 
octroi and termed it as a retarding factor in the growth of business and commerce in 
the country. By obstructing the free movement of vehicles carrying goods, the levy of 
octroi causes delays and thus hampers industrial progress. Although, octroi is 
abolished now in major States but still it's an important source of revenue for local 
bodies in certain States. 
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Basic Problems of the Commodity Taxes 
Commodity taxation is an important part of fiscal armoury of India. It 
however, lacks transparency as to who pays the tax (Aggarwal, 1997). Introduction 
of tax reforms in India had to take into account its possible effects on the financial 
relations of Centre and the States. In the Indian federation, when the fiscal system 
could not coordinate the fiscal decisions of different levels of government, it caused 
various inefficiencies in the system. It includes cascading, vertical integration of the 
firms, inequalities, evasion and avoidance of tax. Some of the reasons of these 
inefficiencies in the system of commodity taxation were: -
a) Point of Levy/ Tax Base 
Indian Constitution had clearly defined the tax bases of excise duties and sales 
taxes (Entry 84 and 54); excises to be levied at the manufacturer or producer level 
and sales tax at the time of sale and purchase of goods. In practice, however, the levy 
of sales tax had also switched over mostly to the first point of sale i.e on 
manufacturers and importers of goods due to problems in administering taxes at the 
retail level. This had led to overlapping between the tax bases of excise duties and 
sales tax and caused cascading. Also, it increased the cost of holding of inventories, 
higher interest payments, changes in relative factor prices and inefficient production 
techniques. 
b) High and multiple rates 
Another important problem of the commodity taxes was muhiplicity and large 
number of rates. There used to be some 350 specific excise duty rates and 40 ad 
valorem rates the highest of which was 105%( Purohit & GOI, 1993) .The rates were 
kept high to raise the same amount of revenue since tax base is narrow. Since the 
level of sales taxes at the first point cannot be increased any further the States 
imposed new taxes like turnover tax, additional sales tax, surcharges, and so on, 
making the system totally non-transparent. This distorted rate structure led to wrong 
classification of goods causing unfair assessments, the diversion of trade as well as 
shifting of manufacturing activities fi-om one State to another, providing incentives 
for evasion and avoidance and/generated pressures for exemptions and concessions 
(Naresh 1994). 
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(c) A plethora of incentives and exemptions 
Almost all the States provided large number of incentives to the industrial 
sector to promote industrialization. Also, concessions were given to certain goods, 
producers under political pressure and to encourage local business activity. These 
exemptions caused erosion of tax base and raised the rates of non-exempted goods. 
(d) Exclusion of the service sector 
In India, services were excluded from the tax base of both excises and sales 
tax. It narrowed the tax base and caused tax evasion. 
(e) Input Taxation 
The evolution of the tax structure in India has led to the taxation, not just of 
final goods but also of inputs also used in the production process. This has led to 
cascading and rising commodity prices. Although both Centre and States do provide 
some tax relief on inputs (the Centre through Modified Value Added Tax, MODVAT, 
the States by providing concessions and exemptions) but it has limited scope. 
(f) Barriers to Domestic trade 
The enforcement of these taxes resulted in hindrance to the free-flow of 
domestic trade. Trade across State borders was often subject to both Central Sales 
Tax (CST) as well as local sales tax, which created bias against inter-State trade as 
locally produced goods bear only local sales tax. This prevented India from being a 
common market and exploits its advantages. It, however, promoted smuggling of 
goods setting of trade centers across the high taxing States. 
(g) Faultv Administration 
The Indian tax administrative system exhibited features such as complex 
procedures, out-dated methods, confiising notifications and evasion. At times, field 
officials do not receive timely government notifications related to changes in tax rates 
and exemptions and dealers suffer a lot as a result. Surprisingly, there used to be 
approximately 700 exemption notifications in relation to the union excises alone. 
Also, there was a 7-year backlog of excise tax cases before the courts (Jain 1993). In 
cash of sales tax, the situation was even more serious. 
To overcome these problems, economists suggested different solutions. 
However, adoption of Value Added Tax (VAT) as prevalent in most West European 
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countries was considered to be a most important solution to the problems of Indian 
Commodity tax system. 
However, in India, the initial moves to implement VAT at the State level 
came in 1993. After a number of round of deliberations, finally, in 2004 VAT was 
implemented in almost all the States. 
In case of union excise duties, the reform process was started in 1986, with the 
introduction of MODVAT. Then in the Budget 2000-01, CenVAT finally replaced 
excise duties. 
The ideal scenario is of a Single VAT i.e Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
merging Central and State VAT. 
Objectives of the Study 
With the background of the foregone analysis the present study purports to: 
a) analyse the changes in the Indian tax structure with relation to 
indirect(commodity taxes) during the period (1970-2005). 
b) analyse the concept of fiscal federalism and the problems of commodity 
taxation in a federal system particularly in India. 
c) examine in detail the problems and possible reforms of the two main 
commodity taxes: Union excise duties and Sales taxes. 
Hypothesis 
The present study proposes the following hypothesis: 
"Tax Reforms would improve income buoyancy and thereby productivity of these 
taxes and in fiscal federalism contribution of shared taxes would increase in relation 
to own revenue overtime". 
Research Methodology 
In this study, an attempt has been made to examine the relative changes in the 
two major commodity taxes i.e. union excises and sales tax and for this purpose 
standard statistical techniques would be employed. 
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Estimation of Income Buoyancy 
Methodology 
Tax elasticity measures the responsiveness of a tax system to change in GDP 
and is defined as the percentage change of tax revenue exclusive of discretionary 
changes (legal changes in tax structure and tax base etc) resulting from a one percent 
change in GDP. Tax buoyancy is the percentage change in tax revenue (discretionary 
changes included) caused by a one per cent change in GDP. A value less than one 
suggests a low tax elasticity and ineffective discretionary changes, whereas a value 
greater than one implies that discretionary changes are improving the responsiveness 
of the tax system (Skeate, Copin, Boamah). 
Measurement of tax buoyancy does not pose any problem. However, 
computation of tax elasticity confronts intricate methodological difficulties. The 
elasticity of tax revenue is more stringently defined as the underlying revenue 
response, holding constant all parameters of tax policy. In developing countries, 
where tax policy parameters are changed every year and sometimes in the course of 
the year, the elasticity of tax revenue is virtually impossible to estimate with an 
appreciable degree of accuracy (Rajaraman,Goyal & Khundrakpam, 2006). To 
measure elasticity coefficient, it is necessary to eliminate from the actual tax revenues 
the effects of discretionary changes. This problem is dealt with by ahemative 
methods including - (a) use of dummy variables (b) constant rate base method, and 
(c) proportional adjustment method (Rao, 1979). In such a fiscal context, buoyancy 
coefficient may provide the alternative to estimate the revenue generating properties 
of the tax system. In this particular study also, we have calculated only the buoyancy 
coefficients for the two taxes. 
Estimation 
Estimation of elasticity and buoyancy is obtained by fitting a linear regression 
of tax revenue on national income/appropriate bases. The response coefficient from 
time series data is estimated by using the following revenue exponential function. 
Y = axb 
Or log y = log a + b log x 
Where 'y' is tax yield, 'x' national income, 'a' is a constant and 'b' the 
elasticity 
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In a least square fit of this logarithmically linear equation on time series data, 
the regression coefficient 'b ' signifies percent change in (y) that accompanies percent 
change in (x). For responsiveness of tax-to-base and base-to-income, the respective 
expression would be the following: 
Log y = log a + b log B and log B = log a + b log X 
Where B is the base of the tax. 
If coefficient b turns out to be more than 1, the responsiveness of the tax 
system will be considered relatively high and if it is less than 1, the same will be 
termed as relatively low. 
This method assumes that the buoyancy or elasticity is constant over the range 
of income considered, i.e., the proportionate response of the tax to an income change 
of 1 percent is the same irrespective of the level of income. It also assumes the 
existence of a significant correlation between y and x. An indication of this is 
provided by the statistic R2 which measures the goodness of fit of the functional 
relationship being measured. In the absence of a significant correlation between the 
two variables, the least square estimate of 'b ' will convey little meaning. There is no 
attempt to add other independent variables to the estimation equation. 
Sources of Data 
The proposed study is based on the data collected fi-om secondary sources. 
These secondary sources include different government publications like Reserve 
Bank of India Bulletin, Indian Public Finance Statistics, National Income Accounts 
Statistics etc. Various journals like American Economic Review, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Economic Journal, Indian Economic Journal, Journal of Public 
Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Public Finance Review etc. are referred 
to. Also references are downloaded from various web sites. Further, the reports of 
various committees formed by the Central government to reform the commodity taxes 
are also taken into consideration. 
Limitations of the Study 
1) In this study, only two indirect\commodity taxes are taken into account i.e. 
excise duties and sales tax. 
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2) Though Optimality concept is relevant and important but only it's theoretical 
concepts are discussed here. We could not compute the optimal tax structure 
for the two taxes under study for various reasons. However, it could have 
wide applications also. 
3) The accurate implications of the imposition of VAT could not be presented 
due to lack of data availability. 
' The words 'Centre', 'Union', and 'Federal' are used interchangeably in this study. 
^ According to a study conducted by Raja Chelliah and others for a group of 47 developing countries 
for the average of the period 1969-71, the average share of indirect taxes was 64% of the total tax 
revenue. As for developed economies, the share of indirect taxes ranged between 45%-50% of the total 
tax revenues. It is noteworthy that in India the proportion of indirect taxes stood at 78,8% in 1970-71, 
much higher than the international average of the developing world. 
' Tax collections (or receipts) of the Central Government are different from its tax revenues because 
parts of the proceeds from income tax, and union excise duties are transferred to state government 
under various tax sharing arrangements of the Constitution. 
'' Prohibition refers to legal ban on production and sale of liquor in the notified area. Obviously, the 
state excise would have no yield from this tax when prohibition is imposed. 
^ Until 1957-58, only Assam, Bihar, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal levied it. But since then all 
the other States have introduced this tax. 
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CHAPTER - II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, an overview of the taxation system practiced by the 
Central and State governments was attempted. In this Chapter, an attempt would be 
made to review some of the previous studies with their major findings. Since issues 
are related to both federalism and independent to Centre and State, the review tries to 
cover both. 
On Need for Fiscal Federalism 
According to Prasad (2003), in recent years the emergence of a number of 
political and economic changes has given rise to new awakening of interest to re-
examine the Indian Fiscal Federalism. On the economic front, a greater role assigned 
to the market in resource allocation and on the political front, the transition from a 
period of one party rule at the Centre and State levels to that of coalition government 
and locally dominated regional parties has given rise to confrontational politics 
between the Centre and the States. 
On Historical Underpinnings 
If we take into account the historical background of federalism in India Nayak, 
(1999), has given a vivid description of the system of federal finance in India, which 
has a long history behind it, dating back at least to 1870. With the take-over by the 
British Crown fi-om the East India Company in 1858 a highly centralized system came 
into being. The provincial governments were entirely dependent on annual allotments 
by the Central government for the maintenance of their administration. 
It is only after 1870 that the process of centralization was reversed, when the 
first step towards financial devolution was taken under the pressure of three 
successive budget deficits. However, the Government of India Acts of 1919 (based on 
the Montague-Chelmsford Report of 1918) and 1935 loosened the powers of the 
Government of India over the provinces and were the major step towards federation 
when the Centre and the provinces were allotted certain broad heads of revenue; the 
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former has customs, income tax, posts, salt and railways, whereas the latter had 
jurisdiction over land tax, excise, irrigation and stamps. 
The Government of India Act (1935) carried the principle of federalism 
further. It was further decided that the proceeds of certain central taxes such as 
income tax and export duties could be divided between the Centre and the provinces, 
with the rules of division to be left with the Centre. This scheme continued in 
Independent India, but now it is through the recommendation of the Finance 
Commission. 
As a prelude to the introduction of the 1935 Act, Sir Otto Niemeyer was 
appointed to make recommendations on the assignment of revenues and sharing of 
taxes. He kept two main objectives in view in making his recommendations. The first 
was to maintain the financial stability of the Centre. The second was to evolve a 
scheme of assistance, which would not only meet the immediate needs of the 
provinces, but also their future needs. Population was chosen the criterion for 
distribution of suppose, income tax. 
On the Constitution and Supremacy of the Centre 
From its very inception, the Constitution is loaded in favour of the Centre. The 
concept of strong Centre has been incorporated in the anatomy of the Constitution 
through a variety of devices, among which the following are noteworthy: supremacy 
of Union Legislative power, Union control over State legislation and also in case of 
emergency (both external aggression and financial), restrictions on States' taxation 
powers. 
Apart from the restrictions, the major and elastic sources of tax revenue 
belong to the Centre while relatively inelastic sources of revenue come under the 
purview of State governments. The rationale behind this Constitutional division of 
taxation powers between the Centre and the States is economic and administrative 
convenience. Taxes with inter-State base and those in the case of which all-India 
uniformity in rates is desirable to facilitate industry and trade are vested in the Central 
Government. While taxes which are location specific and relate to subjects of local 
consumption are with the States. 
The revenue instruments of Centre are excises, customs, income tax etc.and 
the sources of revenue for State governments are sales taxes, state excises, taxes on 
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land, agricultural income tax etc. As we have already seen in detail in the Chapter I 
that the Commodity taxes are the main sources of income for both Centre (56% of tax 
revenue) and States (97%) in the year 2003-04. Customs and excises respectively 
constitute 26%> and 49%) of tax revenue of the Centre while sales taxes and State 
excises constitute 60%) and 13% in 2003-04. There is a mismatch between 
constitutionally assigned revenue collecting powers and expenditure responsibilities 
of different levels of government in India. While the Centre is favourably entrusted 
with more revenue raising powers than required to meet its expenditure needs. States 
and local self governments are left with revenue raising powers much short of their 
expenditure needs. 
On sharing of certain Central Taxes 
There are certain provisions in the Constitution, which indicates some kind of 
flexibility in India's Constitution in terms of distribution of financial resources 
between different layers of the government. These provisions relate to the revenues 
from certain taxes and duties leviable by the Union but are totally assigned to or 
shared with the States to supplement their revenues in accordance with their needs. 
On mechanism of Transfers 
Recognizing the fact that the financial resources of the States may prove 
inadequate for undertaking welfare, maintenance and development activities the 
framers of the Constitution did make elaborate, albeit complex, arrangements relating 
to transfer of funds from the Centre to the States. These central transfers are effected 
through three main channels: -
1) Statutory transfers through the Finance Commission. 
2) Plan transfers through the Planning Commission. 
3) Discretionary transfers for Centrally Sponsored Schemes; relief fi-om natural 
calamities, and relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons. 
Bagchi & Sen (1989), who have taken a stock of the current situation of 
economic administration in India, also emphasizes the same fact that it is centralized, 
partly due to Constitutional provisions and partly due to extra-constitutional 
developments. They have suggested a framework of different possibilities for fiirther 
decentralisation. 
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According to them, the key to decentraHzation in India lies in decentralizing 
the planning process itself. Transfers of funds to States from Planning Commission is 
as important as transfer of federal funds to the States by the Finance Commission. 
Also, totally decentralized plarming, with mutually independent plans, may not be 
suitable or practicable for India due to large disparities between States and also within 
the States. 
In this framework, the process of decentralization is used as an aid to the 
planning process. It requires bodies at sub national levels to provide inputs for the 
formulation of plans and once plan is formulated, implementation work should also be 
shared by them. 
On Issues in Federal governance 
After going through the literature, which analyses the structure and the 
characteristic features of fiscal federalism, the next step is to make a study of the 
emerging fiscal and economic issues in the federal governance. 
Bagchi(2003)„ has done an evaluation of India's fiscal federalism for the past 
fifty years and a major question that is raised is whether the system of federal 
governance also yielded the economic benefits associated with federalism. The 
question, however, assumes relevance, as it is the economic virtues of federalism that 
have come to the fore in recent years, drawing even independent nations to join in 
economic combines while not surrendering their independence, the European Union 
being a prime example. In this paper, an attempt has been made to appraise the 
economic effects of the operation of India's fiscal federalism in the last fifty years 
from a broader angle i.e. how it has impacted on the efficiency of the public sector in 
performing its fiscal tasks and the performance of the Indian economy. 
According to Prasad (2003), the centralization process in the country has 
resulted in the structure where the Central government has a comparative advantage in 
raising revenues and sub-central governments in spending. Taxable capacities and 
unit cost of providing public services do vary across different jurisdictions due to 
historical and political factors. This has resulted in vertical and horizontal imbalances. 
The analysis of Indian fiscal federalism shows that the Constitutional assignments as 
well as the execution of federal fiscal arrangements have severely impacted on 
horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances. The imbalances have not only been high but 
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have also been increasing over-time. The growing imbalances have had adverse 
effects and the mechanism to resolve these imbalances has not worked satisfactorily, 
thus creating a serious problem in inter-government relationships. The Centre needs to 
provide a leadership role in fiscal consolidation, particularly in an era of intensively 
competitive politics and coalition governments. 
To overcome the horizontal and fiscal imbalances, a system of fiscal transfers is 
followed between the Centre and States. According to Nambiar (2003), an analysis of 
the total resource transfers from Centre to States reveal that the share of tax and 
grants are lowering in the recent years, but the share of loans was on the rise. It 
implies that the States are getting more and more indebted. This is considered to be 
yet another issue in the fiscal relation of the Centre and States. 
Another comparative study has been made regarding transfer of resources by 
different category of States as very poor, poor, middle, rich and very rich. Tax 
devolution more or less followed a progressive pattern that the per capita receipt was 
highest in the case of very poor States and reduces with the increase in the income 
level of the States. But grant devolution, on the other hand followed a different 
pattern. The highest per capita grant was received by the low-income States, which 
was 30% higher than the per capita receipt of very poor States on an average. 
Similarly, the high-income states received an average per capita grant more or less of 
the same size of the very poor States. Loans also followed more or less a similar 
pattern. Thus, what is required is that grants should also follow a progressive pattern 
in its devolution. 
Although the system of Centre-State transfers in India with the formation of 
the Finance Commission as its main principle, has often been praised but it has come 
under criticism on various points. 
Firstly, none of the Finance Commissions have made an objective assessment 
of the overall resource position of the Centre and total resources available to meet the 
demand {Mukhopadhayay D. 2003). 
Secondly, the gap-filing approach of the Finance Commission has disincentive 
effects on tax effort in the sense that the Centre relies on non-shareable resources (like 
the administered price mechanism). This not only distorts the pattern of resource 
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mobilization at the Union level but also leads to extravagant expenditure at the State 
level. 
The most serious deficiency of the transfer system is the unreasonable 
incentives it creates for efficiency and fiscal discipline among the States. The 
Eleventh Finance Commission came for particularly sharp criticism due to total 
neglect of efficiency in fiscal management and focus only on equity. (Bagchi & 
Chakrahorty 2004). 
According to Rao & Singh (2005), India's transfer system ".... on the whole 
has an equalizing effect, it is not designed to offset shortfall in fiscal capacity and cost 
disabilities fully." 
Chakraborty (2003) has prepared a 'fiscal effects' model using data for 15 
major States for the year 1990-91 to 1999-2000. He finds that aggregate fiscal 
transfers are a positive (and not negative) function of per capita income, suggesting 
that the mechanism of Centre-State transfers in operation in India has been very 
regressive. 
Another point of criticism, voiced particularly by the States has been that the 
transfers have not been adequate to bridge the vertical gap. Even though larger 
proportions of central revenues have been devolved to the States, but the transfer 
system has not been able to reduce the vertical and horizontal imbalances. In fact, 
fiscal transfers have led to fiscal stress all around. Thus, it is said that fiscal transfer 
system is in urgent need of reform. (Rao, 1997) 
Rao (2002) suggested that the last decade has seen a steady deterioration in 
State finances. To a large extent this deterioration has been caused by reduction in 
central transfers. The pay revision of State Government employees, fiirther worsened 
the fiscal imbalances in the States. There has been a steady deterioration in State's 
own tax revenues, significant drain on State's resources due to losses from public 
enterprises and increase in subsidies and transfers. 
Another important factor, which has affected the State's finances, has been the 
lending by multilateral lending institutions (World Bank and ADB) to States. 
Although the Centre guarantees repayments of these loans, the States are required to 
initiate fiscal reforms to improve their repayment capacity. However, while the loans 
have resulted in States' indebtedness, fiscal reforms undertaken by them have failed 
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to find solution to the States' problems. The deterioration in the fiscal position of 
States has resulted in making fiscal operations unsustainable, contributed to 
macroeconomic instability and constrained the provision of social and physical 
infrastructure. 
The situation of fiscal imbalances was more severe in special category States 
than in non-special category States. There was, however wide variations in the 
deterioration in the fiscal situation in different non-special category States. 
Rangarajan & Srivastava (2004),have compared Indian fiscal federal system 
with that of Canadian federal system and drawn some lessons from it. According to 
them, while comparing the Canadian system of inter-governmental transfers with the 
system of fiscal transfers in India, the following features may be highlighted: 
a) The Canadian system of fiscal transfers has two important features: 
equalization grants, which are constitutionally guaranteed, and the Canadian 
Health and Social Service Transfers (CHST). Together these transfers are able 
to eliminate to a considerable extent both vertical and horizontal imbalances. 
b) Vertical imbalance is corrected in most federations through tax assignment, 
revenue sharing and grants. India follows all the three routes, while in Canada, 
the emphasis is on tax assignment and grants. In Canada almost all tax bases 
are common to both levels of governments, but not in India. CHST is a special 
purpose grant in Canada to correct vertical imbalance. 
c) Incomes as well as population are concentrated in just a few provinces in 
Canada, namely Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta and Quebec. This 
facilitates a transfer system aimed at equalization. On the contrary, 
redistribution in India is more difficult because the share of population in 
States which have a high per capita income is smaller than the population in 
the States with low per capita incomes, which require transfers. 
d) Even after the determination of the actual transfers in any given year, 
calculations remain open in Canada for 4 years where amounts are adjusted in 
view of the revised data. In India however, this facility is not available, 
particularly for the Finance Commission transfers, although amounts of tax 
devolution automatically adjust with reference to the actual realizations of 
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Central taxes. In fact, most grants are fixed in nominal terms well in advance 
of the years for which those grants are to be given. 
e) In the Canadian system there is no autonomous body like the Finance 
Commission. Most of the decisions are arrived at through consultations and 
discussions. However, in India, apart from the Constitutionally mandated body 
like Finance Commission, there are other institutions also dealing with 
different aspects of Federal-State relations, like the Planning Commission and 
various Central Ministries and departments. So, the Indian system of transfers 
is fragmented, with several bodies being responsible for the transfers. 
On Reform Measures 
According to Coady (1997), economic theory can contribute to the analysis of 
fiscal policy and help policy makers and tax analysts determine the appropriate design 
of fiscal systems. Optimal tax theory has identified important features which one 
should attempt to incorporate into fiscal systems. The problem of tax reform is 
presented in terms of raising sufficient government revenue as efficiently and 
equitably as possible while also taking account of the administrative capability of the 
government. Domestic resource mobilization is one of the ways of financing 
expenditures; alternatives are foreign borrowing and printing money. However, these 
alternatives result in severe internal and external disequilibria and are not sustainable 
in long run. Therefore, an efficient and equitable domestic resource mobilization 
mechanism appears to provide the only viable long-run method of financing 
government expenditures. This case is further reinforced by the present high levels of 
interest rates and difficulfies in securing foreign borrowing. 
Bagchi & Sen (1989), have highlighted the problem of devolution of tax 
revenue from the States to local bodies, as it is not mentioned in the Constitution and 
it is left entirely to the States to decide how much to devolve. According to them this 
requires immediate attention. It is in this regard, two solutions are suggested by them. 
The first is to make a constitutional provision for local finance commission on the 
lines of the existing Finance Commission. Secondly, large infrastructure expenditure 
should be undertaken by either Centre or States or both of them and local bodies 
should be relieved of this responsibility. Rest of the Paper lays greater emphasis on 
providing more powers to local bodies both urban and rural. 
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To reduce vertical imbalances, Mukhopadhyay D.(2003), suggested reforms in 
both tax and expenditure policies at the state level. There should be a limit to 
decentralization of tax revenue as more decentralization may affect equity and 
efficiency adversely. 
Further, overlapping in the functions of the Planning Commission and the 
Finance Commission are to be avoided. Rao, suggested the "constructive federalism" 
and particularly "cooperative federalism"- a greater degree of consultation and 
partnership in our "layer cake" perspective of government functions 
However, the concept of cooperative federalism requires a combination of the 
criteria of autonomy fiscal discipline and inter-state equity so that a mutual trust and 
confidence between the Centre and the States and also amongst States themselves are 
fostered. Precautions have to be taken before preparing a room for cooperative 
federalism since the relationship between various levels of government is competitive 
indeed. 
According to Rao, the need of the hour is to formulate an effective fiscal 
reforms programme. In this direction most non-special category States have decided 
to publish their contingent liabilities. Some States like U.P, A.P, Karnataka etc. have 
brought out White Papers to increase public awareness of their problems. They have 
also tried to appoint Tax Reforms Committee and Administrative Reforms 
Committee, initiating legislation on fiscal responsibility. 
Bagchi (1999) and Srivaslav (1999)a have formulated a minimum programme 
to raise the non-tax revenue. Few suggestions are: -
a) Formula based central assistance as under the modified Gadgil formula should 
be given up and annual Plans should be discontinued. Instead, Planning 
Commission should help the States in drawing up their own plans, particularly 
weak States. 
b) Tax powers of the States should be enlarged for e.g by transferring the power to 
tax services to the States. 
c) All revenue transfers should be done only tlirough Finance Commission, leaving 
the Centre to make discretionary transfers only in abnormal situations. 
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d) Conditionalities can be attached also to loans. There should be a hard budget 
constraint on the states and a commitment on the part of the Centre to a 'no bail 
out' policy. {Bagchi 1999) 
e) Srivastava suggested an integrated normative approach towards all general-
purpose transfers (tax devolution and general grants) should be adopted. 
f) The secretariat of the Finance Commission should evolve a proper framework of 
projections of expenditure requirements and revenue capacities. 
g) Reduction of low priority non-merit subsidies and making the subsidy regime 
transparent, less input-based and better targeted. 
Gurumurthi (2003) has taken into consideration the changes in the vertical and 
horizontal system of tax sharing to reduce both vertical and horizontal imbalances. 
Earlier only selective Central taxes, namely income tax and union excise duties were 
shareable with States. The other two major taxes, namely corporate income tax and 
customs duty were not shareable at all. However, with the constitutional amendment 
of August 2000, all Central taxes have become shareable with states and 29% of the 
pool of Central taxes (on net basis) are to be shared with the States; this percentage is 
subject to review by the Finance Commission (FC) every five years. Twelfth FC, for 
the first time has reviewed this percentage. It was felt that this system could help to 
increase the rate of tax devolution to the States (as a percentage of gross tax revenue 
of the Centre) which was stabilized for a long fime. It could also help to make the 
Central tax structure more equitable and simple and in bringing about some stability 
to the fiscal policies of the Central government, if the percentage is fixed for a 
minimum period of suppose 20 years. 
Finance Commissions in the past have recommended different formulae to 
redistribute the shareable tax revenue among the States by choosing different 
economic indicators. The formulae for redistribufion of income tax and union excise 
duties have also been different. The Eleventh FC followed the same pattern but also 
introduced a new element called 'fiscal discipline', and changes in the weights for 
certain vital economic indicators. The weightage assigned to distance factor has 
increased from 62.5% as against 60% in the Tenth FC but a change in populafion 
from 20%(TFC) to 10% and tax effort from 10%(TFC) to 5% were drastic and 
unnecessary. 
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On Other Federal Issues 
According to Murty (1995), in the Indian federation, since the fiscal system 
does not coordinate the fiscal decisions of different levels of government it has 
resulted in various inefficiencies some of which are given as follows: 
a) A conflict has developed between the fiscal objectives of Centre and State 
governments. 
b) A problem of overlapping of tax bases of central excise duties and sales taxes 
has emerged which caused cascading problem. Any unilateral decision by 
Central and State governments about commodity taxes may effect the revenue 
of both the governments. 
c) Widespread taxation of inputs by both Centre and States without giving credit 
to taxes levied by Centre while fixing taxes by the States and vice versa 
resulted in cascading problem and rising commodity prices. 
d) Autonomy of State governments to fix tax rates has resulted in fiscal 
competition and the States provided incentives to reduce their relative tax rates 
so that each one of them can attract business and investment at the cost of the 
others. 
e) Both Central and State taxes were affected by the complexity of rates and 
bases which had caused difficulties in administration and resulted in large 
scale of tax evasion. 
0 Incomprehensive tax base for the taxation of domestic goods and services had 
resulted in more reliance on trade taxes as an important source of revenue to 
central government. 
The Domestic trade taxes Report(1994), has highlighted these problems and 
has considered the system of domestic trade taxes operating at that time as 
archaic, irrational and complex. 
g) Another serious shortcoming of the Indian tax system as mentioned by Jain & 
Jain (1983), has been that differential tax treatment accorded to the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors which has violated the principle of 
horizontal equity. Under the Indian Constitution, only the State governments 
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are empowered to tax agricultural income and excluded from the ambit of 
central income tax, continues to this day. 
According to Chelliah (1994), tax reform has been an integral part of the 
structural adjustment programme that has been undertaken by several developing 
countries. Two major developments have contributed to the motive and impetus for 
tax reform. The first, is the realisation by policy makers and tax administrators that 
the economic effects of taxation had to be given due consideration otherwise resource 
allocation gets distorted and economic growth adversely affected. The second is the 
awareness, on the part of economists and tax designers that the administrative 
implications had to be kept in view since a theoretically perfect tax structure would be 
of no avail if it carmot be administered effectively. As we shall see later on, these 
aspects are definitely incorporated in the reform measures suggested by various tax 
committees. 
According to Chelliah, the three criteria on which a sound and practicable tax 
system should base are equity, economic efficiency and administrative ease. This 
requires a simple and transparent tax system. 
The system of commodity taxes must be such that its burden will fall on the 
consumption of different individuals and the distribution of the burden can be pre-
determined as well as measured. At the same time, the commodity tax system should 
not adversely affect productive activities. The VAT fulfills this description. A fully 
retail sales tax will be equivalent to a VAT but suffers from the disadvantage that it 
concentrates the entire burden of the tax at one stage, whereas under the VAT the 
government collects the tax in instalments at various stages of production. VAT is a 
multi-point tax system under which rebate is given to tax paid on inputs at earlier 
stages. 
If the VAT with full setoff for taxes on inputs (including capital goods) is 
levied at a single rate it will act as a proportional tax on consumption. Such a tax is to 
be supplemented by selective excises on consumption at somewhat higher rates. With 
such a structure of indirect taxes superimposed by a broad based income tax, would 
constitute a fair, simple and progressive system of taxation with no adverse effects on 
production. 
37 
The VAT will be levied on a fairly comprehensive base covering most goods 
and services. It will fall on imports as well as on domestically produced goods so that 
they are put on par. VAT will have only one or two rates; that would make it easy to 
administer and besides tax would be generally neutral. Non-neutrality where needed 
in the social interest will be introduced through special excises outside the VAT 
system. Thus the VAT will have the merit of being a comprehensive consumption tax 
which would treat equally those with equal consumption. 
Bagchi (1995), has made the observation that the programme of tax reform 
initiated by the Union Finance Minister since 1991 recognizes the need for moving 
over to a system of VAT to remedy the ills of the present system and move the tax 
structure towards promoting competition and efficient allocation of resources in the 
economy consistent with equity and revenue need of the government. The task is 
formidable in a federal country, for the constraints of e federal polity carmot be 
wished away. Nevertheless, every attempt has to be made to strike a balance between 
autonomy of the States on the one hand and efficiency, equity and simplicity on the 
other. Tax coordination is the avenue to achieve such a balance. 
Murty (1995) has also suggested that the ultimate aim of commodity tax 
reforms in India should be a comprehensive VAT covering value added by all 
business enteiprises from the manufacturing to the retailing activities. The tax should 
have consumption base and follow the tax credit method to compute the net tax 
liability of a business firm. The tax liability of international and inter-state flows has 
to be calculated using the destination principle. 
The two main commodity taxes of the Central and State governments are 
union excises and sales tax. Due (1985) and Sury (1988) had explained in detail the 
importance, relative significance, structure and problems associated with both these 
taxes. 
According to Sury, excise duties comprise the single largest source of tax 
revenue for the Central government. In 2003-04, they accounted for 49% of the 
Centre's total tax collections. In 1947, excise taxation in India was highly selective in 
terms of commodity coverage and after 1954 there was increase in commodity 
coverage, culminating in the introduction of a generalized system of excise taxation in 
1975. 
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By virtue of the taxation powers set forth in Entry No.84 of List I of the 
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Central government is authorized to impose 
excise duties on goods manufactured or produced in India, except alcoholic liquors 
and narcotics which are imposed by the State governments. However, the Central 
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 is the primary Law under which duties are levied on 
different goods. 
Rates of excise duty approved by the Indian Parliament are termed as statutory 
or tariff rates. However, the government enjoys the power to exempt, by notification, 
any excisable goods from the whole or any part of duty leviable on such goods. In 
exercise of this power, the executive periodically determines and announces the 
effective rates of duty. As far as the nature of tariff is concerned, in the early days of 
the excise system, the emphasis was on specific duties due to administrative reasons. 
However, the emphasis shifted to ad valorem rates during inflationary periods 
(particularly in the 1970's). In the 1980's, however, the trend toward ad valorem rate 
not only has halted but has also reversed as a result of the unprecedented spurt in 
litigation concerning disputes over classification and valuation of goods for purposes 
of excise levies. To combat tax avoidance and evasion, the basis of duty has been 
changed from ad valorem to specific on a number of commodities. 
As far as the problems related to the excise taxation are concerned, one of the 
major problem is of multitude of rates which are subject to frequent revisions. The 
rate of taxes varied from 10% to 400%. 
The other problem is related to the taxation of inputs which then resulted in 
cost and profit escalations and also promoted vertical integration in industries to the 
disadvantage of the small scale sector. The introduction of Modified value added tax 
(MODVAT) in the Long Term Fiscal Policy Statement as on 1^ ^ March 1986 grants 
excise relief to inputs. The MODVAT scheme provided for immediate and complete 
reimbursement of the excise duty paid on components and raw materials which are 
used in the manufacture of finished goods. The MODVAT is designed to operate as a 
cost-saving device by allowing the manufacture immediate credit for duty paid on the 
inputs and the consequent reduction of the interest costs. It is claimed that MODVAT 
will check excise evasion because credit of input duty cannot be claimed unless actual 
production is declared to excise authorities. The introduction of MODVAT scheme is 
a positive measure in the reform of indirect taxation in India. 
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Acharya (2005), in his article has sketched the story of India's tax reform from 
the mid 1970's to the present and finds that enormous progress has been made in the 
last 30 years in the field of excise dufies based on economic efficiency, equity, built in 
revenue elasticity and transparency. 
According to Virmani (2001), the tax reform in the 1990's was also 
widespread. In 1991, the Narsimha Rao\Manmohn Singh Congress government made 
comprehensive tax reforms one of its main reform planks. The Tax Reform 
Committee (TRC) chaired by the country's leading public finance authority, Raja 
Chelliah, was swiftly established and it quickly gave an Interim Report (December 
1991); followed by a two-part Final Report (August 1992 and Januaryl993). Taken 
together, these 3 volumes of the Chelliah Committees Report (GOI 1991-93) 
constitute the finest treatment of tax policy and reform issues in India in the past 30 
years. The details of this report will be discussed in Chapter VI. 
However, not all the TRC recommendations were implemented fully or 
exactly as originally envisaged. During Congress government regime (1991-96) 
MODVAT was extended to capital goods and petroleum products, the bulk of excise 
taxation was shifted from specific to ad-valorem rates, the number of excise rates was 
substantially reduced and number of special exemption notices were cut by half The 
budget was also innovative in introducing taxation of an initial set of services. 
The government changed in 1996 and United Front government (Chidambram 
as Finance Minister) continued the reduction of excise duty rates. 
NDA government came to power in 1998 and finance minister Yashwant 
Sinha presented the budget. He made very major progress in the budget 1999-2000 by 
moving the excise tax structure towards a single rate manufacture's VAT when 11 
excise rates ranging from 5 to 40% were clubbed into just three rates (8, 16 and 24%). 
In addifion, two non-Modvatable additional excise rates (6 and 16%) were levied on a 
handftil of luxury consumer goods like cars, air conditioners. In the following budget 
for 2000-01, Sinha conflated the three excise rates into a single Central VAT 
(CenVAT) rate of 16% with special additional excise rates (at 8, 16 and 24%) for a 
few commodities mainly consumer luxuries. Also the number and scope of 
exemptions and preferential rates had been reduced to certain extent. However, in the 
area of tax administration, the TRC'S recommendations had been observed largely in 
the breach. 
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Tax policy changes continued in the new millennium. But to some extent they 
seem to have lost the vision and coherence of the TRC. It may be due to the advent of 
new views advocated in some fresh government reviews and reports on tax policy. 
The first of these, the Shome report of the Advisory Group on Tax Policy and Tax 
Administration for the Tenth Plan (GOI, 2001a), was broadly in the TRC tradition and 
provided the very useful service of highlighting the agenda for the future. Shortly 
thereafter came the Kelkar reports of Task Forces on Direct and Indirect Taxes (GOI 
2002a, 2002b). While they contained much good advice, especially on revamping of 
tax administration, they were criticized on certain points also. In particular, the 
recommendation to move to a dual rate structure in excise and customs was criticized 
by Mukhopadhya 2002 and Acharya 2003. 
Continuing our discussion about the trends in excise taxation, the 2003-04 
budget of Jaswant Singh focused on a triple rate (8, 16 and 24%) excise structure and 
foiled to draw the crucial distinction between an unique CenVAT rate and (additional) 
special excises. This was not in conformity with the TRC model and also the 
international practices which had been ushered in by the Yashwant Sinha budgets for 
1999-2000 and 2000-01. That model (and budgets) clearly laid importance on a single 
CenVAT of 16% (for all goods which are in production chain with other goods) 
supported by additional special excises on a small number of luxury consumer goods 
and items such as tobacco. Earlier budgets had retained intermediate rates of 4, 8 and 
12 % as temporary rates for few commodities that were to be gradually raised to the 
full CenVAT rate of 16%. In contrast, the 2003-04 budget viewed the 8% rate as a 
permanent feature and went on to reduce the rates on some items form 16 to 8%. 
Even the recent budgets by Chidambram failed to project the important 
distinction between a near universal 16% CenVAT rate and additional selective 
excises on consumer luxuries. Without such a structure of the excises there is grater 
chance of getting a regressive indirect tax structure. Recent budgets have granted 
excise exemptions to various products like computers, toys, tractors, hand tools and 
mosaic tiles affecting the VAT chain. 
Yet another problem faced by the excise system is the variety of exemptions 
and concessions granted through government announcements to manufacturers using 
labour intensive technology, cottage and village industries, handicrafts and leather. 
According to Virmani complication in the excise taxes can be minimized only by 
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switching over to a single, 'general VAT rate' and reorienting the administration 
towards cross checking. 
According to Due (1985) and Sury (1988), sales tax is the most controversial 
and intricate aspect of the Indian tax system. Under the Constitution, the right to levy 
sales tax is allocated to the State government. Each State is, therefore, empowered to 
collect tax on the sale of goods within its territory according to its own rules. 
Different State governments impose sales tax on a wide range of commodities at 
different rates with different procedures and rules for its collection. The Central 
government also enters the picture in so far as it prescribes the ceiling for sales tax on 
goods in inter-State commerce. In the case of 3 important commodities, i.e textiles, 
sugar and tobacco, additional duties of excise are imposed in lieu of sales tax, the 
proceeds of which are distributed among the States. 
Sales tax, in its modem form, was first imposed by the Province of Bombay in 
1938. Since then it has growai considerably in depth and coverage, and forms the 
backbone of State's tax revenues. The relative significance of sales tax in the tax 
structure of the States is 60.4% in the year 2003-04. 
Sales tax may be a single-point, double-point and\or multi-point levy. Single 
point is the main type of sales tax imposed on most commodities in all States. Single 
point may either be levied at the first stage of sale, i.e at the manufacturer's level or at 
the final stage of sale, i.e at registered retailer's level. Multi-point sales tax, a kind of 
general turnover tax, is imposed on some commodities in a few States, i.e. Kerala, 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. A few commodities are subject to 
double-point sales tax in Maharashtra and Gujarat. 
The rate structure of sales tax is highly complicated in view of different lists of 
exemptions, a large number of nominal rate categories in different States and a 
diversity of concessions and administrative procedures in the States. These variations 
have caused disparities in the effective rate of sales tax on similar commodities in 
different States. 
Discussion generally arises about the appropriate stage of sales tax adopted by 
the States. As already noted, single-stage levy at the manufacturing level is the 
predominant form of sales tax in most States. If sales tax is levied at the 
manufacturing level, no functional difference between sales tax and the excise duty 
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exists except in nomenclature. However, sales tax at the retail stage is the most 
satisfactory method because it avoids the cascading or pyramiding effects of taxation. 
Given revenue can be realized by applying a lower tax rate because of the 
enlargement of the tax base at the retail stage. Again, the desired change in the ratio of 
tax to consumer expenditure can be achieved more effectively in case of retail stage 
sales tax. Furthermore, sales tax at the retail stage can be evidenced separately from 
the price of the goods and thus made known to the final consumer, increasing tax 
consciousness among the taxpayers. Lastly, expected changes in the rates of retail 
sales tax do not lead to changes in the inventory position of the firms. 
However, retail-stage sales tax has its own problems, the main one being the 
large number of taxpayers operating as small shopkeepers in scattered retail outlets. 
Therefore, from an administrative viewpoint, sales tax at the wholesale stage or 
manufacturing level is preferable because the number of taxpayers is small and 
readily identifiable. But the problem of cascading reemerges as we move away from 
the retail stage. 
The rates of sales tax are prescribed by the Central government based on 
certain classifications. Thus, goods are either "declared goods"(goods of special 
importance) or "non-declared goods", a person may be a registered or a non-
registered dealer. However, the tax is collected and appropriated by the State 
governments. 
The maximum prescribed rate of sales tax on "declared goods" in a State is 
4% of the sale price and is not leviable at more than one stage. In the case of inter-
State sales of such goods to registered dealers, the rate of tax is same but for non-
registered dealers it is 8%. If "non-declared" goods are sold to a registered dealer in 
the course of inter-State trade, the ceiling rate is 4% or the rate applicable to internal 
sales of the concerned goods, whichever is lower. However, on inter-State sales of 
"non-declared" goods to non-registered, the rate of CST is 10% or the rate applicable 
to the sale of such goods inside the exporting State whichever is higher. 
As far as the taxation of services are concerned, successive finance ministers 
have expanded the domain of the tax providers and input tax rebate principles were 
gradually introduced. Manmohan Singh had introduced service taxation at 5% on 
three services in 1994 and raised less than 0.5% of Central government revenues 
through this instrument in that year. Ten years later, in 2004-05, service taxation had 
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been extended to over 70 services and the revenue yield accounted for nearly 5% of 
gross central revenues. 
Following the recommendations of the 'Govinda Rao' Expert Group on 
Taxation of Services (GOI 2001), credit for taxes paid on inputs to all services for 
service inputs. At the same time he raised the rate of service tax from 5 to 8%. In the 
next budget, Chidambram extended the credit of service tax and excise duty across all 
goods and services and also the service tax rate to 10% to move towards the path of 
full integration between CenVAT and services taxation. 
In the words of Due, possible general reform of the State sales taxes is much 
more difficult than reform of the Central excises. 
With regard to the prevailing cascading type sales tax Gurumurthi (1999), 
suggested it to be substituted with VAT. Rao has said that transition to VAT is 
necessary not only to impart efficiency to the tax system but also to enhance revenue 
productivity. 
However, a number of conceptual and operational issues have to be sorted out 
before shifting to VAT. These include treatment of declared goods, AED items, inter-
state sales and purchases. Besides, VAT that is a destination based comprehensive tax 
on goods and services, it is necessary to enable the States to levy taxes on services. 
This requires the Constitution to be amended to provide concurrent power of taxing 
services to States. 
Also, a series of sales tax reforms are required. They include setting of floor 
rates so that inter-state competition could lead to convergence of the actual rates to 
floor rates. This could result in simplification and harmonization of the sales tax 
system. Simplification of the tax system, strengthening the administrative and 
enforcement machinery, introduction of self-assessment scheme, creating a robust 
information system and computerization of tax administration are important steps that 
would improve voluntary compliance of the tax. 
According to Purohit (1999), over the years, commodity taxes have been used 
extensively in such a way that there is considerable overlapping of tax on the same 
base. This has caused cascading and pyramiding effects, promoted vertical integration 
of firms and has not fulfilled the criterion of neutrality. It is, therefore, suggested that 
the system of commodity taxes be reformed to adopt a system of VAT. 
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The empirical estimates presented in the paper suggest that the State VAT 
would not only give more revenues to the developed States but would also benefit 
others due to the fact that the tax would now be distributed on the basis of 
consumption and on destination principle. 
In addition, the existing Countervailing Duties (CVD'S), and the tax on 
services should be made shareable. The proposed pollution taxes could also form part 
of the shareable pool. This group of taxes should help achieve horizontal equity. 
Finally, the efforts must be made to restructure State finances through 
introduction of VAT to replace sales tax, levy of State excise on the Maximum Retail 
Price (MRP) base, rationalizing stamp duty and registration fee and introducing 
profession tax and environmental taxes. 
Rao & Sarma (1997) have indicated that the need for co-ordinated 
development of commodity taxes in the Indian federal polity has shifted the focus to 
reforms in the State's sales tax systems. The reason is that attempts to reform sales 
taxes, however, have not been always in the right direction, and, in addition have met 
with resistance from traders. The paper, has set out a strategy and stages of reform 
towards evolving the VAT which is less distortionary and more acceptable to traders. 
They have suggested various stages of reform. The first stage of reform is to 
rationalize the existing tax rates on the lines suggested by the State Finance Minister's 
Committee and extends the tax beyond the first point by setting off the tax paid at the 
previous stage. The second stage of reform involves the extension of the sales tax on 
services and it requires constitutional amendment. It would be ideal to give concurrent 
powers to the States to levy tax on services. In the third stage, all forms of tax reliefs 
and incentives should be eliminated. The fourth stage involves further rate 
rationlisation into one or at the most two rates to ensure revenue neutrality. 
However, they recognized that a full-fledged VAT can't be achieved unless 
inter-State sales tax is brought down and eventually all such sales are either zero-rated 
or set-off. 
In April 2005, after much of deliberations by the State's Finance Ministers 
Committee and pressure of the government, the remaining States agree to switch over 
to VAT replacing the existing retail sales tax system. But Bagchi(2006) suggested that 
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even after two decades of reforms, a full fledged VAT which was considered 
necessary for the economy to function efficiently and smoothly is not adopted. 
Neither CenVAT, the current name for excise duties levied by the union 
government based on the VAT principle nor the VAT's that have come into operation 
in the majority of the States since April 2005 bear all the attributes associated with a 
good VAT. So the announcement by Union Finance Minister Chidambaram in Budget 
2006, speech to introduce a national Goods and Services Tax (GST) from 2010 has 
been enthusiastically welcomed by many, especially corporate businesses. 
Kelkar (2006), Rao (2006) and Srivastava (2007) have raised doubts and 
issues about the form of GST that the Finance minister is contemplating. According 
to Srivastava (2007), in the last decade much has already been achieved on the road to 
reforming the commodity tax system. He, however suggested that four critical steps 
remain a) The CST, currently being levied at 4% needs to be abolished, b) There is a 
need to determine a suitable GST rate, which should be much lower than the sum of 
core rate of CenVAT at 16% and State VAT of 12.5%, which relate to the taxation of 
goods, c) States need to be enabled to tax services and the service tax rate should be 
same as that for goods, d) The Centre should be enabled to tax value added in the case 
of goods upto the retail stage. 
It is contemplated that these changes would lead to a comprehensive and 
unified system of taxation of goods and services, which exactly is what GST is, as 
prevalent in many countries. 
Summary & Conclusion 
In reviewing the relevant literature on fiscal federalism and commodity taxes 
(Union excises and State sales tax), certain issues may be highlighted. The fiscal 
system in the country is unable to coordinate the fiscal decisions of both levels of 
government i.e Central and State governments. It had resulted in conflicts between the 
two levels of government. Also, problem of fiscal imbalances and overlapping of tax 
bases has emerged. The solution as envisaged by economists lies in harmonizing the 
two main taxes of Union and State government (i.e excises and sales) in the ultimate 
form of GST. The Union Finance Minister Shri. P. Chidambaram in his Budget 
(2006) speech has announced of his intent to introduce GST from 2010. Though a lot 
has been done in this direction but still much more needs to be done. 
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CHAPTER - III 
THEORY OF INDIRECT TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter I, taxes (especially indirect \ commodity taxes) play a 
key role in financing to discharge the responsibilities by a government. However, the 
prevailing indirect tax structure suffers various deficiencies. The conservative 
economists have shown a keen interest in having a uniform structure of indirect 
taxation and even the govemment's policy reflect this view. A uniform tax policy is 
generally based on equity and efficiency considerations but there exists a trade-off 
between these two important objectives. From the efficiency point of view, a 
differentiated structure has greater distortionary effects. The other objective is of 
equity between consumers. A uniform tax (general sales tax or VAT) at a single rate 
would be fair than a non-uniform tax that results in discrimination against people 
purchasing heavily taxed goods out of their preferences. So in this section both equity 
and efficiency considerations of a uniform tax policy are discussed separately. 
The next section undertakes the study of theoretical principles guiding the 
federal fiscal arrangements in federalist countries. A number of comprehensive 
definitions of fiscal federalism are given, which also exhibits the benefits\merits of 
adopting federal principles in a fiscal system. Moreover, the economic theories of 
fiscal federalism are also explained in the light of three main functions of a 
government in a federal system i.e stabilization, redistribution and allocation. 
in India, the federal fiscal arrangements are mentioned in the Constitution 
from where both Central and State governments derive their powers and functions. 
However, discrepancy has emerged in the powers and functions of both these levels of 
government since financial powers are concentrated in the Central government and 
responsibility with the States. Common tax base of two levels of government is 
another problem faced by the federal system. To mitigate these discrepancies inter-
governmental or fiscal transfers are done through Finance Commission, Planning 
Commission and central transfers to States. 
Another problem faced by the federal system is of Overlapping of tax and 
expenditure functions among different governmental units. The solution lies in 
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harmonizing the taxes levied by two governments at the same base. The uhimate 
recourse to the problem is the adoption of Value Added Tax in India. 
Features of Indirect Tax Structure 
The Indian Indirect tax structure exhibits certain features, which need to be 
questioned. In case of indirect taxes, commodities are taxed at different rates. This 
results in various inefficiencies and distortions in the tax structure. These include tax 
evasion, tax competition etc. To overcome this drawback in the indirect tax structure, 
various economists have shown interest in having a uniform structure of indirect 
taxation based on efficiency or distributional grounds. 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) have listed following criteria to appraise the 
quality of a tax structure: 
1) The distribution of the tax burden should be equitable. Everyone should be 
made to pay his or her "fair share". 
2) Taxes should be chosen so as to minimize interference with economic 
decisions in otherwise efficient markets. Such interference imposes "excess 
burdens" which should be minimized. 
3) Where tax policy is used to achieve other objectives, such as grant investment 
incentives, this should be done so as to minimize interference with the equity 
of the system. 
4) The tax structure should facilitate the use of fiscal policy for stabilization and 
growth objectives. 
5) The tax system should permit fair and non arbitrary administration and it 
should be understandable to the tax payer. 
6) Administration and compliance cost should be as low as is compatible with 
the other objectives. 
The various objectives are not necessarily in agreement, and where they 
conflict, tradeoff between them is needed. Thus, equity may require administrative 
complexity and may interfere with neutrality. Corrective use of tax policy may 
interfere with equity and so forth. 
Equity is considered to be a basic criterion for tax structure design. It is agreed 
that the tax system should be equitable that each taxpayer should contribute his 'fair 
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share' to the cost of government. Though there is no such agreement about how the 
term 'fair share' should be defined. But there are two important approaches in this 
regard: Benefit Principle and Ability to Pay Approach. 
According to the Benefit principle, an equitable tax system is one under which 
each taxpayer contribute in line with the benefits which he receives from public 
services. The other approach, the Ability to pay requires that given total revenue is 
needed and each taxpayer is asked to contribute in line with his ability to pay. 
Equity principle includes both horizontal and vertical equity. The requirement 
of equal taxes for people in equal positions is also referred to as " horizontal" equity, 
and the proper pattern of unequal taxes among people with unequal incomes is 
referred to as "vertical" equity. 
The optimal use of scarce resources involves two basic issues. One is to secure 
efficiency and the other is to secure a state of just distribution. In terms of Pareto-
efficiency, the proposition is that there is a welfare gain when the position of any one 
individual can be improved without hurting that of another. But since there exists an 
efficient solution corresponding to each and every state of distribution. Here the 
problem of distribution is one of evaluating a change in which someone gains while 
someone else losses. 
The optimal solution requires making distributional adjustments through a set 
of taxes and transfers assessed in line with the individuals' potential welfare, whether 
taken in income or in leisure. 
Theory of Commodity (Indirect) Taxation 
According to conservative economists there is a definite preference for a 
uniform rate structure and even the government's policies reflect this view. However, 
a uniform tax policy is based on equity and efficiency considerations but there exists a 
trade-off between these two important objectives. From the efficiency point of view, a 
differentiated structure has greater distortionary effects. The other objective of 
uniform system of taxation is that of equity between consumers. A general sales tax or 
value added tax on all expenditure at a single rate would be fair, as everyone would 
pay the same tax on all their expenditures. However, non-uniformity in tax rates 
causes excess burden for those people who are purchasing more heavily taxed 
commodities out of their preferences. 
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It is advisable to discuss equity and efficiency considerations separately to 
analyse these arguments for uniform taxation. There are two sections; in the first 
section focus is on Partial Equilibrium analysis, the Ramsey tax model and Pareto 
welfare improvements and Tax reform. To explain this model, all individuals are 
assumed to be identical and they are treated identically also. Here we are concerned 
with the efficiency objective as to whether form the allocational stand point a uniform 
tax is preferable to a differentiated structure. The second section, deals with optimal 
taxation in Many-person economy and Horizontal equity. Here the distributional 
considerations are introduced and the balance between the equity and efficiency is 
considered. 
The term 'optimal taxation' for welfare economists is the one, which 
minimizes the aggregate deadweight loss (excess burden) for any given tax revenue or 
level of public expenditure. The theory has then gradually been extended to take 
account of distributional considerations. 
From an efficiency point of view, an ideal tax system is one, which is 
consistent with a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. The classical solution to the 
problem is to advocate lump-sum taxes, which are clearly neutral with respect to all 
marginal evaluations made by consumers and producers. Although lump-sum taxes 
can be envisaged in the context of a once-and-for-all levy, it is much more difficult to 
imagine such taxes as a permanent system. If the public sector levies lump-sum taxes 
each year in such a way that the elasticity of the tax payment with respect to the 
taxpayer's income exceeds one everywhere, taxpayers will soon discover that they do 
in fact have a progressive income tax system and adjust their actions accordingly. 
However, even if lump-sum taxes are ruled out, there are still taxes, which are 
consistent with Pareto-optimality. Pigou (1920) argued that indirect taxes could be 
used to improve the efficiency of the market allocation of resources in the presence of 
externalities. Thus taxation need not be distortionary by the standard of Pareto 
optimality (Sandmo, 1976). But this assumption is not so realistic as public sector 
cannot raise all its tax revenue from neutral or pigovian taxes and thus arises the 
second-best problem of making the best of a necessarily distortionary tax system. This 
is the problem with which the optimal tax literature is mainly concerned. 
The literature on the treatment of the problem has an interesting history. 
Although the early history of the subject goes back at least to 19"^  century writers on 
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public utilities, the first analytical formulation and solution of the problem appears in 
the celebrated article by Ramsey (1927). Ramsey gives credit to Pigou for suggesting 
the problem, and Pigou (1947) himself gave a very good, although simplified, 
treatment of it in his book on public finance. Ramsey's main concern was to find the 
commodity tax rates that maximize a representative consumer's utility, given the 
government's revenue requirement. Ramsey has explained his model assuming all 
individuals to be identical. With an efficiency objective in view, it was examined 
whether from the allocational standpoint a uniform tax is preferable to a differentiated 
structure 
But this analysis was not taken into consideration in further readings by 
different economists. Nor did it have any impact on the analysis of the welfare 
economics of the second-best, which began with the article by Lipsey and Lancaster 
(1956-57). Among French economists the subject received more attention; important 
analysis was contributed by Boiteux (1951-56) and many further developments were 
made by Kolm (1969-70). Around 1970 there began a general revival of interest in the 
subject, with publication of articles by Baumol and Bradford (1970), Lerner (1970), 
Dixit (1970) and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971); of these, the Diamond-Mirrlees 
article in particular represents a major generalization and extension of the Ramsey 
formulation. Diamond & Mirrlees have however, argued that the problem of 
optimality arises in case of an economy where consumers have diverse taxes, abilities 
and endowments and not in an economy where all consumers are identical as 
explained by Ramsey. They have taken (though separately) the many-person model 
where distributional \ equity considerations are introduced and balance between the 
equity and efficiency aspects is considered. 
Partial Equilibrium Analysis (Endnotes are explained in Annexure A.3.1) 
Uniform rates are not in fact necessarily desirable from an efficiency 
standpoint. This can be demonstrated by simple partial equilibrium analysis, where 
there are no cross-price effects and therefore relevant income derivatives are zero. 
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a) Single Commodity 
Supply curve with tax 
Supply Curve (assumed 
perfeclly elastic) 
Quantity X |^  
Figures.]: Excess burden from tax on good k. 
Let us assume that the supply of good k is perfectly elastic at price p^, so that 
the equilibrium in the absence of taxation is at point E in Figure 3.1. The effect of an 
ad valorem tax at rate 4 is to raise the consumer price from pk to (1 +tij. The after-tax 
equilibrium is at point B in this partial equilibrium framework the distortion caused by 
the tax is often measured by the loss of consumer surplus over and above the revenue 
raised, the "excess burden". 
The excess burden is thus the additional cost of raising given revenue through 
distortionary taxation. In economics, an excess burden (also known as deadweight 
loss) is a loss of economic efficiency that can occur when equilibrium for a good or 
service is not Pareto optimal. In other words, either people who would have more 
marginal benefit than marginal cost are not buying the good or service or people who 
would have more marginal cost than marginal benefit are buying the product. 
If we take the area ABECD as a measure of the loss of consumer surplus, the excess 
burden is represented by the shaded area BCE. 
Area BCE = Area BEFGC - Area CEFG 
where X" denotes the equilibrium quantity before the tax is introduced, X'^ that after 
the tax is introduced. The excess burden is therefore zero for infinitesimal taxes (i.e., 
evaluating at 4 = 0)} 
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Causes of deadweight loss include monopoly pricing, externalities or taxes or 
subsidies. The term deadweight loss may also be referred to as the "excess burden of 
monopoly" or the "excess burden of taxation". 
For example, consider a market for pens where the cost of each pen is Rs 10 
and that the demand will decrease linearly from a high demand for free pens to zero 
demand for pens at Rs 10. In a perfectly competitive market, producers would have to 
charge a price of Rs 10 and every customer whose marginal benefit exceeds Rs 10 
would have a pen. However, if only one producer has a monopoly on the product, 
then they will charge whichever price will yield the highest profit. For this market, the 
producer would charge Rs 60 and thus exclude every customer who had less than Rs 
60 of marginal benefit. The deadweight loss is then the economic benefit forgone by 
these customers due to the monopoly pricing. 
Conversely, deadweight loss can also come from consumers buying a product 
even if it costs more than it benefits them. To see this, let's use the same pen market, 
but instead it will be perfectly competitive with the government giving a Rs 3 subsidy 
to every pen produced. This Rs 3 subsidy will push the market price of each pen down 
to Rs 7. Some consumers then buy pens even though their benefit to them is less than 
the cost of Rs 10. This unneeded expense then creates the deadweight loss. 
There are two important concepts of deadweight loss due to Hicks and 
Marshall with a distinction. The latter is related to the concept of consumer surplus, 
such that it can be shown that the Marshallian deadweight loss is zero where demand 
is perfectly elastic or supply is perfectly inelastic. On the other hand. Hicks analysed 
the situation through indifference curves and noted that when the Marshallian 
Demand Curve exhibits perfect inelasticity, the policy or economic situation which 
caused a distortion in relative prices will have an income effect and that this income 
effect is a deadweight loss. 
b) Multiple Commodities 
Now let us turn to a situation of many commodities. We know that the 'excess 
burden' of taxation represents an efficiency loss, which must be compared with any 
perceived gains arising either from income redistribution or the non-transfer 
expenditure carried out by the government. An important property is that, under 
certain assumptions, it increases disproportionately with the tax rate. This result 
53 
provides the basis of a general presumption in favour of a broad-based and low tax 
rate system: any exemptions which reduce the tax base inevitably raise the tax rate 
required to obtain given amount of total tax revenue. 
Suppose now that the government chooses the tax rates (Ij, ...., l^ on different 
goods (Xi, ...., Xn) which have prices (pi, ...., p„), in such a way as to raise a specified 
revenue with the minimum total excess burden. The revenue condition is properly 
seen in terms of the government's purchasing a fixed amount of real commodities 
(government spending). With fixed producer prices we can treat it as a financial 
constraint expressed as: 
^ - E hPkK=R, 
where RQ is the required level of revenue.'^  
A solution satisfying these first-order conditions involves therefore the tax rate 
on good k being in inverse proportion to the price elasticity of demand. In the extreme 
case when a good demanded is completely inelastic (or a factor supplied by 
households completely inelastic) the excess burden is zero and all revenue, or as much 
as feasible, should be raised by taxing this commodity. Apart fi-om this, the optimal 
tax structure can be uniform only where all goods have the same elasticity of demand. 
In general, the best way of raising a given revenue is by a system of taxes, under 
which the rates become progressively higher as we pass from uses of very elastic 
demand or supply to uses where demand or supply are progressively less elastic. 
This finding, although typically reported in public finance texts, is often 
regarded with considerable skepticism. Musgrave (1959) relegates it to a footnote and 
comments that the theorem is arrived at within the framework of the old welfare 
economics of inter-personal utility comparison. It belongs to the welfare view of the 
ability-to-pay approach. However, Musgrave's own analysis is a special case of that 
described above. Musgrave's conclusion that a general ad valorem tax is preferable to 
a system of selective excises imposed at differential rates assumes a fixed supply of 
labour. The argument of the previous paragraph indicates that in this case all revenue 
should be raised by taxing labour; and, ignoring saving, this is equivalent to a uniform 
excise tax. Other writers have expressed reservations about the strength of the 
assumptions. But this result may be dismissed with the comment that such restrictive 
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li the early-twentiethy / 
assumptions have to be made in order to derive a solution, that they would appear to 
have little practical significance. However, he offers nothing in their place. 
The assumptions underlying the partial equilibrium framework are indeed 
restrictive, requiring in effect that there exist no income-effects and thgt cigss-price 
elasticities are all zero. ••'•^'» ' ' < • 
The Ramsey Tax Model 
The theory of optimal commodity taxation began with 
century economist Frank Ramsey (1927), who considerea^he"p«)blem-'(5f" i-
government with a given budgetary requirement and the ability to s^^^Si^fenftax 
rates for different commodities (food, clothing, tobacco, and so on). Ramsey 
formulated^ the problem of optimal taxation by asking the question: How can we raise 
a given amount of revenue with the least amount of distortion? In other words, how 
should a government set its tax rates across a set of commodities to minimize the 
deadweight loss of the tax system while meeting its budgetary requirement? To solve 
this problem, he formulated a model. 
The Model 
Since the initial aim is to focus on efficiency considerations, it is assumed that 
all consumers are identical, and face identical tax rates, and that the objective of the 
government is to maximize the welfare of a "representative" individual. On the 
production side, it is assumed that there are fixed producer prices for all goods and a 
fixed wage rate w for labour. Labour is to be the only factor supplied by households, 
and they have no other source of income. Since the producer prices are fixed, we can 
without loss of generality, set them at unity, so that the consumer price of good k is 
given by (^^= 1 ^ti). 
The structure of the problem is that the government is maximizing welfare 
subject to the demand and supply functions of individuals, which are themselves 
based on solving a constrained maximization problem. The representative consumer 
supplies L units of labour (where L is measured as a fraction of the working day) and 
consumes X-, of good i{i = 1, ..., n). He is assumed to maximize U(X, L) subject to the 
budget constraint 
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It may be noted that there is assumed to be no tax on wage income, but if there is no 
other source of income for the consumer this involves no loss of generality. 
Equivalence between Wage Tax and Commodity Taxes 
Now since we know the government needs to raise revenue by taxing either/or 
labour (L) and commodities (X). So there is bound to be some relation between these 
two tax bases.'* 
The government revenue remains also unaffected. A tax on wage income is 
therefore equivalent in this model to a uniform tax on all goods. This depends on the 
fact that there is no other source of income (such as profit income) and that we cannot 
tax the consumer's labour endowment (i.e., leisure). What is required is that the 
demand functions be homogeneous of degree zero in consumer prices. The demand 
functions do not have this property if the consumer receives lump-sum transfers (pays 
lump-sum taxes) in nominal units, or where there are profits from the production 
sector. 
Indirect Utility Fimction 
The government aims then to maximize individual welfare subject to the 
revenue constraint and the individual conditions for utility maximization. The 
problem may conveniently be treated in terms of the indirect utility function V(q, w). 
by using Langrangean and Slutsky relation following can be derived:^ 
Y,(iS,,=-aX, foTk = I. ...,n (3.1) 
where S^^ is the derivative of the compensated demand curve and 
Samuelson gave the following interpretation of the equation. The left hand 
side is the change in the demand for good k that would result if the consumer were 
compensated to stay on the same indifference curve and the derivatives of the 
compensated demand curves were constant. In fact, it is not possible for the latter 
condition to be satisfied for all commodities, but for small taxes it is approximately 
true that the optimal tax structure involves an equal proportionate movement along the 
compensated demand curve for all goods (since 6 is independent of k). The 
importance in this formula of the compensated derivatives accords with intuition: the 
income-effect would arise with any form of taxation, and the distortion stems from the 
substitution-effect. We may note that multiplying (3.1) by 4 and summing gives 
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ZI^A/,=-^^o (3.2) 
The left-hand side can be shown to be negative (using the negative semi-definiteness 
of the Slutsky matrix), so that 9 has the same sign as government revenue. 
Lumpsum Tax 
This is a tax not dependent on the behaviour of any taxpayer. A further 
interpretation may be given for 9 by examining the effect of allowing the government 
to levy a lump-sum tax T. Welfare rises and 9 measures the benefit expressed in 
terms of revenue from being able to switch from the (optimal) indirect tax system to 
lump-sum taxation. 
At this point we may note the consequences of relaxing the assumption of 
fixed producer prices. Suppose that production takes place under constant return to 
scale. The government revenue constraint is replaced by a production constraint: 
wL = F{X„...,X„)+R„ (3.3) 
where w is fixed labour is again the numeraire and the right hand side gives the labour 
requirements of the private sector, F(X), and government revenue i?„, expressed in 
terms of labour.'' 
This general formulation does not yield much in the way of concrete results. 
Equation 3.1 does not, for example, suggest which goods should be taxed more 
heavily, and the two-good example cannot readily be extended. In order to obtain 
more definite results, Ramsey himself made a number of special assumptions on the 
demand side equivalent to the partial equilibrium analysis. From this it might appear 
that we have to choose between definite results based on highly restrictive 
assumptions and more general models yielding only limited conclusions. 
Partial Welfare Improvements and Tax Reform 
According to Ahmed and Stern (1984), there are a number of ways to evaluate 
a tax system. One is to specify a model of the economy and its initial equilibrium 
together with value judgement, embodied in some social welfare function, and then 
ask whether it is possible to reform taxes so as to increase social welfare. Obviously, 
if we are at an optimum with respect to the social welfare function, then no improving 
reform is feasible. A second approach is to ask whether there is a set of value 
57 
judgements under which, given the model of the economy, the initial state of affairs 
would be deemed as optimum. That is the inverse optimum problem. The value 
judgements may then be used in a number of ways. One might infer that these are 
indeed the value judgements of the government and use them in appraising other 
decisions. Or if the computed value judgements were seen as objectionable, then they 
could be employed to criticize the existing state of affairs, in the sense that it could be 
seen as optimum only with respect to disagreeable values. Thirdly, we can seek to 
discover Pareto improvements in order to avoid using a, possibly controversial, social 
welfare function. The literature on optimal taxation has been criticized for directing 
too much attention at characterizing the optimum and not considering the process by 
which it can be attained. There is a distinction between tax design, or tax laws being 
written de novo on 'a clean sheet of paper, and tax reform, which takes as its starting 
point the existing tax system and the fact that actual changes are slow and piecemeal. 
We now consider therefore whether we can identify changes in tax rates that represent 
a partial welfare improvement in that, although falling short of the optimum, they 
represent a step in the right direction. 
Partial Welfare Improvements 
As is now well known from the literature on second-best, this is a difficult area. 
The question is why tax reform? The reasons may be different depending on the 
country. For example, as Jha (1998) has noted: 
(a) There was extreme discontent with the existing tax system in most of the 
countries. This took several forms. On the one hand, it was felt that, high 
marginal tax rates were having serious disincentive effects on savings, labour 
supply and entrepreneurship. On the other hand, they were providing 
considerable avenues for tax avoidance and evasion and considerable energies 
and resources were being diverted to making up tax shelters. 
(b) It was also felt that apart from diverting resources from work and savings to 
tax avoidance, high marginal tax rates had not achieved the social and 
economic objectives they had been designed to meet. 
(c) At the same time there was concern that governments were taxing and 
spending too much. 
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In real life it is rarely possible to reach optimal tax solutions immediately with 
desired efficacy. Reforms that may appear to move in the correct direction can turn 
out on closer inspection to reduce welfare. Intuition can be very misleading. 
Nonetheless, the optimum tax results discussed in the previous sections provide some 
insights. For this purpose, we go back to the dual formulation of Ramsey problem. In 
that case we were in effect evaluating possible changes in policy in terms of their 
effect on the indirect utility function. 
What happens however if we are not at the optimum? Is it possible to reach 
straightforward conclusions about directions for welfare improvement? We consider 
first a shift from distortionary taxation. Suppose that the government is able to raise 
revenue by other means and as a result R can be reduced (dR < 0). Does it follow that 
dV> 0? The answer is not necessarily affirmative. 
The negative result just described is illustrative of those in the second-best 
literature, which led to a general pessimism. Some particular rules that were at one 
time thought to be intuitively plausible by some economists turned out to be wrong, 
and this failure received a great deal of publicity. On the other hand, this pessimism 
does not seem warranted. Even though it is not true, as we have seen that any move to 
lump-sum taxation is necessarily welfare-improving, there are many directions in 
which tax changes may be welfare-improving. The issue is one of characterizing the 
directions of feasible welfare-improving change. 
In order to illustrate the possibility of constructive rather than negative 
second-best results, we may note that it can be shown that under rather general 
conditions a proportionate reduction in the distortion raises welfare. To see this 
intuitively, suppose that all taxes are reduced proportionately with a compensating 
adjustment in lump-sum taxation, T, to maintain overall revenue. If the income-effect 
were such that the individual became worse off, which could only happen if T rises, 
this implies that the excise revenue collected from him goes up as his level of welfare 
falls. If we rule out this apparently perverse case, then the individual must be better 
off 
Another example of a "constructive" second-best result is the following. In the 
context of a simple model, with two consumption goods and labour, the latter being 
the untaxed numeraire, they show that, subject to one qualification, beginning with an 
initial situation of uniform taxes, welfare can be increased by raising the tax on the 
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good "more complementary" with leisure, while lowering the other tax so that revenue 
is unchanged. 
The relation between optimal taxation and tax reform can be considered 
further. For a number of reasons policy-makers may be unwilling, or unable, to make 
large changes in the tax structure. The reasons include the fact that our knowledge of 
the relevant production and demand parameters is typically limited to the 
neighbourhood of the current position, and even here there may be considerable 
uncertainty. (A factor working in the opposite direction is that there are fixed costs to 
tax reform - which would point to infrequent changes.) In view of this, in a number of 
ways the problem may be characterized as one of choosing from neighbouring 
equilibria - or of designing the optimal tax change subject to a constraint on their 
overall magnitude. 
This raises the question of the process of tax reform, where there is a clear 
parallel with the literature on planning algorithms. At each point we need to ask 
whether there is a feasible, welfare-improving step which can be made; and we need 
to ask whether the sequence of "tax reforms" converges and, if so, what are the 
characteristics of the limiting solution. Among the general features of their results are 
the difficulties posed by the basic non-convexity of the set of equilibria (already 
discussed in Ramsey problem) and the demonstration that inefficiency in the 
production sector may be necessary temporarily in the process of tax reform. If the 
process of tax reform is subject to a constraint of the kind described, and is required to 
be welfare-improving, then the condition of production efficiency that characterizes 
the full optimum may not apply on the route to the optimum. 
Horizontal Equity 
It is possible that the government may not achieve re-distributive goal by 
maximizing the social welfare function. In this case horizontal inequity is not ruled 
out. This is also one of the Ramsey tax problems. It may be possible to raise social 
welfare by taxing identical individuals at different rates. It is for this reason that the 
specification of the problem in terms of each individual facing identical tax rates is an 
assumption, not an implication of welfare maximization.* On the other hand, it may 
not be an unreasonable assumption. But, the most appealing interpretation of 
horizontal equity may be that it imposes certain prior constraints on the instruments, 
which the government can employ. The constraint that all individuals face the same 
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rates of indirect tax may well appear reasonable in this context, and thus provide a 
justification for this assumption. 
The introduction of differences in tastes makes the problem even more severe. 
This is because the social welfare function approach evaluates taxes in terms of the 
individual's ability to derive utility from goods and leisure, in contrast to the criterion 
of "ability to pay", which bases taxation on opportunity sets. When the only 
differences are those in ability to produce, then maximizing social welfare function 
leads to redistribution from those with "better" to those with "poorer" sets. There is no 
conflict between it and the ability-to-pay approach. But this may arise as soon as 
tastes differ. Suppose individual 1 has a higher productivity, so that his budget 
constraint lies outside that of individual 2. The ability to pay criterion would indicate 
that individual 1 paid more tax, but there are obviously numberings of their 
indifference curves, which lead to the opposite result with the social welfare 
function. 
Suppose that the government were to adopt this version of horizontal equity; 
what would be the implications for the optimal tax structure? It is popularly believed 
that it would require uniform taxation. If two individuals are identical in all respects 
except that one likes chocolate ice cream and the other likes vanilla, a system that 
taxes chocolate ice cream at a higher rate is felt to be horizontally inequitable. This is 
not however necessarily correct. Horizontal equity does not imply uniform taxation 
where the elasticity of demand differs between the goods in question. The horizontal 
equity implies in fact the elasticity of demand for a good, and the taste differences 
affecting the consumption of goods only. The condition for horizontal equity is not 
necessarily, therefore, uniform taxation; only if the price elasticity is the same - as of 
course it may be in the chocolate-vanilla ice cream case - would uniform tax rates be 
horizontally equitable. 
Tax Reform 
Tax reform is the process of changing the way taxes are collected or managed 
by the government. Tax reformers have different goals. Some seek to reduce the level 
of taxation of all people by the government. Others seek to make the tax system 
more/less progressive in its effect. Still others may be trying to make the tax system 
more understandable, or more accountable. Many organizations have been setup to 
reform tax systems worldwide, often with the intent to reform Income Taxes or Value 
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Added Taxes or Property Taxes into something considered more economically liberal. 
Others propose tax systems that attempt to deal with externalities. Various tax 
proposals have been presented. Among these have been the Flat Tax, Fair Tax, Value 
Added Tax, and many others. 
There are widely recognized indicators of good tax policy to analyze proposed 
changes. These ten guiding principles are equally important, and should be considered 
both separately and together when evaluating the current system and reform 
proposals. 
(a) Simplicity.' The tax law should be simple so that taxpayers understand the 
rules and can comply with them correctly and in a cost-efficient manner. 
(b) Fairness.- Similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly. 
(c) Economic Growth and Efficiency: The tax system should not impede or 
reduce the productive capacity of the economy. 
(d) Neutrality: The effect of the tax law on a taxpayer's decisions as to how to 
carry out a particular transaction or whether to engage in a transaction should 
be kept to a minimum. 
(e) Transparency: Taxpayers should know that a tax exists and how and when it is 
imposed upon them and others. 
(f) Minimizing Noncompliance: A tax should be structured to minimize 
noncompliance. 
(g) Cost-Effective Collection: The costs to collect a tax should be kept to a 
minimum for both the government and taxpayers. 
(h) Impact on Government Revenues: The tax system should enable the 
government to determine how much tax revenue will likely be collected and 
when. 
(i) Certainty: The tax rules should clearly specify when the tax is to be paid, how 
it is to be paid, and how the amount to be paid is to be determined. 
(j) Payment Convenience: A tax should be due at a time or in a manner that is 
most likely to be convenient for the taxpayer. 
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FISCAL FEDERALISM 
Introduction 
There is no coherent theory of Fiscal Federalism but instead there is a series of 
theoretical federalism developments. There are various models analyzing equity and 
efficiency implications arising from fiscal location both of consumers and producers, 
inter-jurisdictional competition and cooperation and multi-jurisdictional community 
(Musgrave,1959). A number of propositions on fiscal federalism are suggested by 
political scientists like Riker, Wheare and others. But our focus is only on economic 
theories. 
What is Fiscal Federalism? 
The term fiscal federalism is defined as the application of the theory of public 
finance in a multi-level public sector organization. It implies a fiscal system which 
provides for distribution and division of governmental powers, functions and 
responsibilities between the central government and the government of the individual 
states of which the federation is composed. Fiscal federalism then also refers to a 
hierarchical structure of autonomous Governments, in which each person is, 
simultaneously, a citizen of more than one Government. (Tresch 1981) 
From economists' perspective, all governments are more or less federal; and 
federalism should not be understood in a narrow constitutional sense. In the words of 
Livingstone, "Essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional 
structure, but in the society itself" 
The principles of fiscal federalism helps to achieve the basic functions as 
mentioned by Musgrave & Musgrave- allocation, stabilization and distribution of 
resources to achieve maximum social welfare of the society in a multi-level public 
sector organization. 
Rao and Sen (1996) however considered fiscal federalism as an optimal 
institutional arrangement for providing public services. It combines the merits of 
decentralization with the benefits from economies of scale. However, federalism and 
decentralization are considered as "inextinguishable powers" 
A revival of interest in fiscal federalism all over the world can be attributed to 
the following four factors: 
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(a) The emergence of the European Economic Union and its success as a distinct 
regional entity within a large common market underlies the benefits of fiscal 
decentralization. 
(b) Over centralization has been cited as one of the important reason for the 
decline of the former Soviet Union. Developments in other countries such as 
Canada, China, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia have forced a review of multilevel 
finance (Arora 2002). 
(c) The growing losses incurred by the public sector enterprises have questioned 
the efficiency of the Central Government. Economists all over the world have 
argued for a greater role of the market forces. 
(d) Macro economic imbalances in several countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
India and Nigeria during 1980s necessitated liberalization of their economy as 
part of the structural adjustment programme indicated by IMF & World Bank. 
In India this process started in 1991 with the opening of the economy and 
allocational role of the State with regard to the fiscal system was passed to the 
market. 
Federalism is thus formulated to fulfill the goal of social welfare maximization 
when the public services are made available efficiently. This requires that the basic 
functions of budget policy i.e. allocation, distribution and stabilization are provided to 
various levels of governments but with economic efficiency. The basic problem of a 
federalist system involves the jurisdictional control of more than one government over 
any one person. This problem emerges in both the cases of population, which has 
mobility and where it is immobile. Even if we assume a non-mobile population it is 
easy to see potential inconsistencies arising if each government simply tries to follow 
the single government decision rules of public sector theory. For e.g, one government 
may try to transfer income from person 1 to person 2, whereas a second government 
attempts just the opposite. Or one government may encourage expansion of some 
decreasing cost utility, which is generating ever-increasing pollution externalities on 
the citizens of a neighbouring government. 
A mobile population however multiplies the complications, as people move in 
response to desirable or undesirable governmental policies. Income redistribution is a 
commonly used example of a potential problem in this regard. If wealthy residents of 
town A are asked to provide social services to the poor they may well move to some 
other town B, which has no such policy of income redistribution. This is often 
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referred to as the "competition" problem, in that the policies of any one goverrunent 
naturally compete with those of other governments in terms of attracting and 
maintaining a constituency. 
According to Tresch (1981), federalism then requires an addition to public 
sector theory which tells us how to sort out the various legitimate allocational and 
distributional functions of govenmient in order to avoid both inconsistencies and the 
problems associated with intergovernmental competition, while at the same time 
following the goal of social welfare maximization. 
Economic Theories of Federalism 
As we have already seen that public finance in federal system follow\ fiilfills 
three main functions of stabilization, redistribution and allocation. 
Stabilisation function: It is primarily a central function and local governments have 
some role to play. 
Redistribution function: This function is also a central function with local 
governments playing some role again. 
Allocation function: It is predominantly a sub-central function. Here public services 
are provided according to the varying preferences of the people. 
The question that is raised is how do we maximize welfare in assigning 
allocative functions? Social welfare maximization in assigning allocation functions 
can be explained by using some models. These models are: -
(a) Breton's perfect mapping model. 
(b) Olson's fiscal equivalence model. 
(c) Oates' decentralization theorem. 
(d) Tiebout's hypothesis. 
Breton's Perfect Mapping Model 
Breton (1995) has highlighted the work of Salmon (1987) which examines the 
interaction between incentives of goverrmient decision makers and the existence of 
competition among governments. The argument is that competition among 
governments creates incentives for their decision makers and it leads to lower prices 
and higher welfare for consumers. The idea is that citizens of a jurisdiction can use 
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information about the goods provided elsewhere to evaluate the performance of their 
own government in the manner of a contest or tournament (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). 
Therefore, competition among governments not only affects policies to attract 
or keep citizens, but it also interacts with electoral incentives. Accordingly, 'each 
government has an incentive to do better than governments in other jurisdictions in 
terms of levels and qualities of services, of levels of taxes or of more general 
economic and social indicators'. Empirically, whether this happens (in the Indian 
context) depends on 'the possibility and willingness of citizens to make assessments 
of comparative performance...and the impact these assessments have on the well 
being of politicians' (Salmonl987).Breton argues that the 'Salmon incentive 
mechanism' is quite important in understanding the diffusion of policies and 
programmes among jurisdictions in federations. To the extent that mobility costs 
restrict 'voting with one's feet' in India, electoral incentives are more important, and 
performance measures that also looks at relative performance can strengthen or refine 
electoral incentives. 
Olson's Fiscal Equivalence Theorem 
Olson has posed the problem regarding the principles that guide the 
development of a rational pattern of jurisdictional responsibility, on the Central 
government or a systematic reliance on local governments. Olson's approach analyses 
the necessary conditions for the allocative efficiency in the provision of collective 
goods by considering stabilization and income redistribution functions as most 
appropriate to Central governments. 
The analysis is based on certain assumptions, many of which are dropped later 
on. The first assumption is that the government, authorities and other institutions 
produce only collective or public goods, which are defined as goods which do not 
exclude non-purchasers from their consumption. 
A second assumption is that every collective good affects some clearly 
delineated group or area, which can be as large as the entire population of the earth or 
as small as the population of the smallest community. A third assumption is that there 
is no complementarity in production among different public goods, in the sense that 
government that provides one collective good at lower costs than a unifunctional 
government could have. 
66 
Based on these assumptions Olson has developed a "pre-model" and not a 
"model" and has hope that it inspires economists to construct elaborate and realistic 
models based on less restrictive assumptions. 
According to Olson, it is highly likely that a great discrepancy between the 
boundaries of a collective good and those of the jurisdiction that provides it leads to 
different problems. In every case, one or more of the following three logically 
possible relationships between the "boundaries" of a collective good and the 
boundaries of the goverrmient that provides it, will apply: 
(a) the collective good reaches beyond the boundaries of the government that 
provides it; 
(b) the collective good reaches only a part of the consistency that provides it; 
(c) the boundaries of the collective good are the same as those of the jurisdiction 
that provides it. 
In the first two cases where the boundaries of a government and a collective 
good it provides do not coincide, there are systematic forces that work against 
allocative efficiency. In the first case, these forces create external economy and in the 
second situation intemality arises. According to Olson, the third situation is a Pareto-
optimal solution when there can be a match between those who receive the benefits of 
a collective good and those who pay for it. However then this requires a separate 
governmental institution for every collective good with a unique boundary. Olson has 
defined this match as "fiscal equivalence". 
According to Olson, both the "centralizing" and "decentralizing" ideologies 
are wrong and leads to inefficiencies. If there are several levels of government, this 
large number of governments can reduce the disparities between the boundaries of 
jurisdictions and the boundaries of collective goods. Thus, there is a need for both 
centralized and decentralized government in the same framework. Moreover, federal 
subsidies and grants to State and local governments should rise as they could mean 
that they are the most efficient purveyors of some types of collective goods. Although 
Olson has not transformed this theory to policy but has concluded that "the existing 
network of governments and subsidies has many faults, but is nonetheless probably 
better than most of the diverse arrangements that have been proposed to replace it". 
Oates Decentralisation Theorem 
Oates (1972) has presented an "ideal model where each level of government, 
possessing complete knowledge of the tastes of its constituents and seeking to 
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maximize their welfare, would provide the Pareto-efficient level of output...and 
would finance this through benefit pricing." This Gates calls it a case of Perfect 
Correspondence in the provision of public goods. 
Following Gates, assume that there are two natural sub-groupings A and B, 
within the total population such that all individuals within a subgroup have identical 
preferences, but that tastes vary across A and B. Suppose in addition that society 
produces two purely private goods, X and Y that are both consumed by all members 
of the society. However, despite the fact that Y is a purely private good, it happens to 
be provided by a goverrunent, either nationalMocal. Assume, finally, that the 
distribution of income is optimal, so that each subgroup can be viewed as containing a 
single individual. Under these assumptions social welfare maximization can be 
presented as follows: 
Max :U^(X^Y^) 
( X^ , Y^ , X^ , Y^ ) 
s.t.U" ( X* ,^ Y^ ) = U 
F (X^+X'^; Y^+Y^) =0 
The first-order conditions for this problem are: 
MRS^X^.Y"^ = M R S V . Y ^ =MRTX,Y (i) 
Moreover, with different tastes ,X^ ^ X^ and Y^ ^ Y^ in general, at the optimum. 
Given the model as it stands, it obviously makes no difference whether a 
single national government provides y^ and y^ according to 1 or whether each sub 
groupings forms its own government and individually satisfies: 
MRS^x^.Y^ = MRTx,Y (2) 
MRS'^X'^.Y'^ = MRTx,Y (3) 
Suppose, however, the national government were constrained to offer equal amounts 
of Y to each subgroup so that y^ =y^ with national provision of Y. Since, in general, 
y'^  ^ y^ at the social welfare optimum, this would represent an additional binding 
constraint on the formal general equilibrium model, implying a lower level of social 
welfare at the optimum. Then the first order conditions become: 
MRS^X^.Y'^ = MRS'^ x'^  ,Y^ = MRTx,Y + hf^i Fx (4) 
Where 
X2 = The Lagrangian multiplier associated with society's production 
possibilities, F ( ) = 0. 
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A3 = The lagrangian multiplier associated with the new constraint, y^ = y^. 
Decentralization theorem can also be explained with the help of the Figure 3.2. 
Suppose there is a public good that has two be allocated between two jurisdictions and 
the demand curves of the two jurisdictions are Di and D2. The economies of scale are 
assumed to be constant and so Price P is also constant and P=MC and it is the supply 
curve also, as shown in the Figure 3.2. With Di and D2 demand curves for the two 
jurisdictions, Q\ and Q2 are the respective quantities produced by the two jurisdictions 
and the equilibrium pints are A and E. 
Suppose the Central government comes into picture and centralizes the 
solution by providing the goods themselves. In that case, the overall demand curve D 
will be taken into account and optimal point will be Qc. So overall demand curve D is 
an average of the two demand curves Di and D2. 
It is observed that the centralization process has resulted in welfare loss for 
both the jurisdictions. For jurisdiction 1 new demand curve means less amount of 
quantity to be produced and causes loss of welfare for them. There is loss for 
jurisdiction 2 also because of its existing inefficient system resulting in low 
production. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis are that the closer the two 
demand curves Di and D2 of the two jurisdictions are, less will be the welfare loss. So 
when tastes and preferences are different for different jurisdictions, centralization 
leads to inefficiencies/less welfare. And, the closer the two Di and D2 jurisdictions 
are, less will be the need for federalism. 
However, the results can be different if there are economies of scale. Than the 
question is raised as how to determine optimal jurisdiction when economies of scale 
are not constant. 
This can be explained with the help of the next Figure 3.3 on Optimal 
Jurisdictions. In the Figure 3.3, y-axis shows the welfare of the society as the size of 
the jurisdiction on x-axis increases. In scale economies, welfare gain increases as 
jurisdictions become larger and larger but to a point only. The curve OA shows the 
welfare gains from cost saving method used but these returns are first increasing, then 
remains constant and finally diminishing returns arises as the size goes on increasing. 
The curve OB shows welfare loss when the preferences are just added up, as the size 
of the jurisdiction is made larger. OL shows the net welfare gain to the society. 
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Tiebout Model 
The Tiebout model, also known as Tiebout sorting, Tiebout migration or 
Tiebout hypothesis was a concept developed by economist Charles Tiebout in his 
article "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure"(1959). It's an example of Public 
Choice theory model. Tiebout describes municipalities within a region as offering 
varying baskets of goods (government services) at a variety of prices (tax rates). 
Given that individuals have differing personal variations on these services and 
varying ability to pay the attendant taxes, individuals will move from one local 
community to another until they find the one which maximizes their personal utility. 
The model states that through the choice process of individual's jurisdictions, the 
residents will determine an equilibrium provision of local public goods in accord with 
the tastes of residents, thereby sorting the population into optimum communities. The 
model has the benefit of solving two major problems with government provision of 
public goods: preference revelation and preference aggregation. 
The Tiebout model relies on a set of basic assumptions. The primary 
assumptions are that consumers are free to choose their communities enjoying perfect 
mobility and perfect information. This essentially means that they can move from one 
community to another community at no cost, and that they know everything they need 
to know about services provided by local governments. The Tiebout model has been 
shown to be the most accurate in suburban areas with many different independent 
communities. Moving between communities in these areas tends to have the lowest 
costs, and the set of possible choices is very diverse. In areas subject to rural flooding, 
Tiebout sorting explains why more affluent residents live in communities protected by 
river levees, while poorer residents tend to live without those expensive and rarely 
utilized protections. 
Fiscal Federalism in India 
The Constitution of India formulated over fifty years back after India gained 
Independence; to govern the country is still in operation (For a brief history refer to 
Annexure A.3.2). It is basically federal in nature with certain unitary features due to 
which it is at times also called quasi-federal. The federal form of government 
witnesses Constitutional division of functions and powers between two levels of 
government i.e Central and State level. Since 1992 another level of government -
Panchayats and Municipalities came into existence. In federal governments, inter 
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governmental fiscal relation or fiscal federalism, which implies the demarcation of 
revenue and expenditure functions among different layers of government has gained 
wide attention. 
Fiscal Federalism, thus, can be defined as an optimal institutional arrangement 
where principles of economics are applied for the provision of public services in a 
federal system. The basic issues dealt by fiscal federalism are (a) assignment of 
function and sources of finance between governmental levels, (b) evolving 
mechanism and policy instruments to resolve fiscal imbalances, arbitrate inter 
governmental spillovers and foster harmonious and yet competitive inter 
governmental relationships (Rao and Sen, 1996). In recent years, fiscal federalism has 
evolved wide interest in almost all parts of the world in both federal as well as unitary 
forms of governments across developed and developing countries. 
However, the study of fiscal federalism in a developing mixed economy like 
India assumes additional significance. In developed economies market plays a 
significant role in the development of the economy and government intervenes in 
providing public services and in case of market failure too. In contrast, in India the 
government has taken over the main responsibility of allocating resources in 
accordance with the policies of social welfare maximization formulated by the policy 
makers. The emphasis on multi level physical planning requires financial planning as 
well. Besides, given that historically, colonial considerations did not necessarily 
enable resource allocation across different regions according to their endowments, 
fiscal federalism in the Indian context is perceived to play a more dynamic economic 
role than what is seen in many of the other federations.(Hicks 1969, Scott 1964). 
In India the process of economic planning followed after Independence 
resulted in the centralization of economic power with Central government as the main 
authority. The government followed various regulations and controls in the field of 
agriculture, industries, infrastructure, foreign sector, banking etc. resulting in a low 
profile role of the State governments. However, sincel991 when the liberalization 
process started the Center-State financial relafions also witnesses far-reaching 
changes. Market system was assigned a greater role in economic activity and as a 
result economic powers and functions of the central government were decentralized. 
The State and Local governments assumed greater role in resource allocation, market 
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regulation along with production and distribution of public services produced 
according to the preference of the residents of respective jurisdictions. 
The issues of fiscal federalism and decentralization have assumed greater 
importance since 1990s.Many countries on the path of liberalization and globalization 
considered less concentration of power in the hands of Central government as a 
remedy for all the ills of the developing countries. Decentralization of governmental 
functions allows better matching of public goods supply to local needs, tastes and 
preferences and thus increases social welfare. Also, mobilization of resource at the 
State/local level reduces financial burden of the Central government. 
Assignment Problem: Division of Tax and Expenditure Functions 
The theory of fiscal federalism can be viewed by taking into consideration the 
assigrmient of function and powers between the Centre, State and local governments. 
Assignment of power means transfer of functions and power from a higher level to a 
lower level of government. The assignments of functions [includes revenues (taxes) 
and expenditure] divide the areas of activity of different governmental units. Such 
fragmentation (both vertical and horizontal) of functions and powers has certain 
advantages. It provides fiscal autonomy to each level of government: Centre, State or 
local, to carry out the functions assigned to them on a more efficient line. Also it 
reflects voter's preferences. More decentralized the government greater is the 
opportunity of meeting politic-economic aspirations and expectations of people at 
various levels. However, such a division of revenue and expenditure functions must 
be guided by the principles of efficiency, equity, economy, adequacy and elasticity, 
autonomy, responsibility and fiscal discipline to maintain politico economic 
equilibrium among them. According to Hyman (1999) " In a normafive sense, the 
problem of fiscal federalism is to find the efficient pairing of responsibilities for 
deciding how much of and what kinds of government provided goods and services to 
produce with geographically defined subsets of the population." However, the sharing 
of functions and powers in a multi-level governmental system requires guidance from 
political, social and economic circles along with legal and constitutional institutions. 
In the Constitution, as already pointed out, the Central government enjoys 
both overwhelming and overriding powers. Most of the productive and broad based 
taxes including taxes on income and wealth from non-agricultural sources, 
corporation tax, excise duty on manufacturers (excluding those on alcoholic liquors, 
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opium, hemp and other narcotics) and customs duty have been assigned to the Centre. 
The State can levy a broad based sales tax but the Centre has the power to levy union 
excise duty on virtually the same base and thus can affect the revenue of the States to 
some extent. Further, Centre restricts States' power to borrow from the market. Thus, 
financial powers are concentrated in the Central government and responsibility with 
the States. With a view of this Constitutional arrangement, it can be rightly said that 
Indian Constitution exhibits "a federation with a strong centralizing tendency". 
The total amount of expenditure and revenue raised by the Central and State 
governments is summarized in Tables 3.1 & 3.2 (For details refer Annexure A. 3.1). It 
is seen that in aggregate the States got about 55.8% of total revenue receipts but incur 
about 61% of total expenditures in 2003-04. The major taxes levied exclusively by the 
Centre consist of excise duties 37%, corporation tax 26%), customs duty 19% and 
income tax 17%) of total tax revenue in 2003-04. (Table 3.2). Among the State taxes, 
the revenue from sales tax constitutes almost 31%. Other State taxes individually 
constitute around 10% of total tax revenues. Although on an average, the States incur 
61% of total expenditures, their actual spending is much lower since they have to 
spend on central sector and centrally sponsored schemes and the outlay on all such 
schemes as also the matching requirements are decided entirely by the Centre. 
Table 3.1: State's share in Total Expenditure 
Year 
1970-71 
1975-76 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
Source: Goven 
Combined exp. 
(Rs. b) 
57.17 
118.47 
237.11 
560.31 
1229.5 
2456.35 
4853.88 
5364.7 
5851.07 
6539.77 
nment of India M 
State's total exp. 
(Rs. b) 
43.41 
65.22 
141.36 
313.62 
678.6 
1404.99 
2719.66 
3054.43 
3177.8 
3976.52 
inistry of Finance, Ind 
State's share 
(%) 
75.93 
55.05 
59.62 
55.97 
55.19 
57.2 
56.03 
56.94 
54.31 
60.8 
ian Economic 
Statistics (Various Issues) 
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Since the major sources of tax revenue were put in' charge of the Cenft-al 
government, the Constitution did realized that the resource of the States would/be 
inadequate to carry out their functions. Accordingly, it prpvi'dedJor j h i s ^ m ^ s o r y 
sharing of Income tax receipts (according to Article 270), sharing^efefisf^e duties 
(Article 272) between the Centre and the States and grants-in-aid of the revenue to the 
States (Article 275). However the total share of the States as well as its allocation 
among them are determined by an independent quasi-judicial body, the Finance 
Commission appointed by the President of India every five years (or earlier). 
However, the centralization of economic power in the hands of the Centre is 
justified on various grounds. The economic and political situation present at the time 
of Independence necessitated a strong Centre. According to the Sarkaria Commission 
on Center-State Relations, 1988 "The primary lesson of India's history is that, in this 
vast country, only that polity or system can ensure and protect its unity, integrity and 
sovereignty against external aggression and internal disruption, which ensures a 
strong Centre with paramount powers, accommodating at the same time, its traditional 
diversities. This lesson of history did not go unnoticed by the framers of the 
Constitution. Being aware that, notwithstanding the common cultural heritage, 
without political cohesion, the country would disintegrate under the pressure of 
fissiparous focus, they accorded the highest priority to the ensurance of the unity and 
integrity of the country". Also there exist wide valuations economically and 
industrially among different States of the country. This required a regional balanced 
development and a coordination of the efforts of different States, which could be 
effectively implemented by a financially and otherwise strong Centre. 
The Constitutional allocation of taxation powers in favor of Central 
government is based on economic and administrative rationale. Taxes, which have an 
inter-State base and where uniform rates is desirable to facilitate trade and industry 
are assigned to the Centre. Taxes, which have a local base and benefits regional 
jurisdiction, are with the States. Broadly speaking, taxes on production with some 
exceptions are levied by the Centre and taxes on sale and purchase by the State 
governments. The distribution of taxation powers between the Centre and the States is 
meant to minimize tax problems in a federal setup such as double taxation, tax rivalry 
among States, duplicate tax administration, excessive compliance costs and tax 
evasion. 
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The centralization of economic power in India is not merely an outcome of 
constitutional assignments. The public sector was expected to play a major role in the 
development of the economy after Independence. The heavy industry based import 
substituting industrialization strategy with a dominant public sector necessarily 
augmented the economic powers of the Centre. While public sector allocation was 
determined by the Plarming Commission various physical controls like rationing of 
foreign exchange, exchange rate regulations, industrial licensing policy were 
introduced to expand the role of the public sector. Though the States were allowed to 
prepare their plans but in accordance with national objectives and norms. In addition, 
the States' priorities were also influenced by a number of centrally sponsored schemes 
and shared cost programmes. In the words of Chelliah (1991), " there are 
few parallels of such tremendous concentration of power in a few hands. This 
economic power consists of not only the rights conferred by ownership, but also the 
right to control every major aspects of economic activity in the country. The feeling 
of helplessness and near subjugation experienced by the States, especially those at the 
periphery of power, arises from the spectre of overwhelming economic power wielded 
by the Centre". 
Thus, financial powers are concentrated in the Central government and 
responsibility with the States. The grievances of the States has been that the Centre is 
encroaching on the areas exclusively in the State list allotted to them under the 
Constitution and playing a dominant role in the sphere allotted to them for concurrent 
jurisdiction. They have become dependent on the Centre for meeting their financial 
requirements. About 60-65% of the resources of the States comprise transfers of the 
Central government in the form of statutory and non statutory transfers i.e. tax 
revenue devolutions, loans, plan assistance, grants and non-plan assistance of various 
kinds. 
Even the statutory transfer of revenue by way of shared taxes and statutory 
grants involves Central influence. These transfers are made on the recommendations 
of the Finance Commission, which is appointed by the Central government. Its terms 
of references and guidelines are determined by the Centre and not all its 
recommendations are accepted. 
The above-mentioned assignment system of tax and expenditure functions has 
resulted in fiscal imbalances and fiscal overlapping in these functions, which may be 
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vertical (between the Centre and the States) and horizontal (inter jurisdictional 
imbalance or inter State difference in budgetary receipts and expenditure arising out 
of differential per capita fiscal capacities). 
Fiscal Imbalances 
Fiscal imbalance refers to the mismatch between own revenue raising capacity 
and expenditure needs at different governmental units. In a federal form of 
government, usually, there are two types of fiscal imbalances; the imbalances at 
different levels of the government (inter-governmental) are known as vertical fiscal 
imbalances while those at different units of the same level of government (inter-
jurisdictional) are known as horizontal fiscal imbalances. 
According to Rao and Sen (1996) fiscal imbalance can be measiired in simple 
terms taking into account actual revenues and expenditures. 
li = Ei - Ri 
Where I = the extent of imbalance 
E= expenditures incurred 
R= revenues raised by the concerned unit of government itself 
with the subscript i representing the unit of government concerned. Such a measure, 
of course, has to be normalized to make it comparable across governmental units. The 
comparable measure would then be 
li = Ei - Ri = I - Ri / Ei (1} 
Ei 
However, the above measure has a condition attached to it. If it is interpreted 
as a measure of fiscal independence then equation (1) needs to be modified to take 
into account the extent to which the concerned unit of government actually controls 
the fiscal variable. 
Although Bird (1973) believed that the measures of fiscal imbalance are not 
quite successful since all aspects of a particular problem carmot be numerically 
explained. But according to Rao and Sen (1996), perfect matching of revenue sources 
and expenditure responsibilities is not possible and some sort of fiscal imbalance 
makes aware of higher or lower degree of matching of revenue and expenditure 
policies. 
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Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
Vertical fiscal imbalance is usually given primary importance in discussions of 
fiscal imbalances probably because it takes into account the most crucial issue of 
federal finance - that of mismatch in the assignment of taxing powers and expenditure 
responsibilities between two levels of government. In India there is a fairly high 
degree of vertical imbalance. Vertical imbalance is caused to a certain extent by 
"centralization" of revenue sources. The constitutional arrangement of assigning 
higher expenditure responsibilities to the States and relatively less revenue sources 
has resulted in vertical imbalance. The Central government in India controls monetary 
policy and deficit financing which has also given rise to vertical imbalance. Effective 
Central dominance on the expenditure pattern of the State, with importance given to 
centrally sponsored plan schemes and traditional areas of the States like agriculture, 
rural development etc causes further imbalance. 
Apart from these reasons of vertical imbalances, there are certain traditional 
reasons also like uneven distribution of natural resources, economies of scale in tax 
collection costs and tax avoidance when taxed by regional governments. Even the 
States have failed to raise sufficient revenues to finance their increasing expenditure. 
Agricultural taxation as a State tax, for example has not been levied by the States at 
all. Tax competition among States for more and more investment has resulted in less 
revenue for all the States. States then require federal transfers and consequently 
higher Central taxation causing vertical imbalance. Administrative convenience has 
often prevailed over economic considerations and has resulted in narrower tax bases. 
All this clearly reflects the erosion of State autonomy and fiscal independence in 
India. (Rao & Sen, 1996). 
Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance 
Indian economy also witnesses horizontal fiscal imbalances on a large scale 
and is yet another reason cited for vertical imbalances. The horizontal imbalances 
have arisen mainly from inter-State disparities in revenue capacity and effort as well 
as in expenditure needs. In India, most of the States are relatively homogenous and a 
few hill States (seven north eastern states, Sikkim, Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal 
Pradesh) form a distinct category called the 'special category' States. These special 
category States are characterized by small industrial and unorganized sectors and the 
cost of providing various public goods and services is relatively high in these States. 
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As a result, their revenue capacity is low compared to their expenditure; leading to 
fairly high degrees of fiscal imbalance. Even the relatively homogenous States show 
wide disparities in their level of social and economic development and their fiscal 
situation also shows wide differences (Rao & Sen 1996). 
Inter-State tax exportation is yet another factor which causes horizontal 
imbalances in the economy. The States with a strong industrial base and supplying 
products to other States are able to export a significant portion of their tax revenue 
through the taxes built into the cost of these products and also through the origin 
based central sales tax (CST). This results in perverse transfer of resources from the 
less developed, net importer States to the others. The higher ability of high-income 
States to put up the required fiinds for obtaining matching transfers also has enhanced 
horizontal imbalances. 
Fiscal imbalances both vertical and horizontal affect the harmonious 
coordination of Central, State and local governments. In absence of a coordinated 
approach among the different levels of government affects the proper functioning of 
the economy. So the need arises to reduce fiscal imbalances at both inter 
governmental and interjurisdictional level. In this regard, inter governmental or fiscal 
transfers are undertaken by the Central government as an instrument to resolve these 
imbalances. 
Inter-Governmental or Fiscal Transfers 
Inter-govemmental transfers imply transfer of revenue from the federal 
government to the unit government to carry out their constitutional functions. Inter 
governmental transfers aims at a Pareto-optimal condition where income is 
redistributed among sub-Central governments in such a way to make anyone better off 
without making someone worse off 
This implies a redistribution of income among unit governments in such a way 
that benefits to the poor and small units are sufficient to maintain their interest in the 
federation while sacrifice by the big and rich units is not considered by them to be 
greater than the benefits accruing from federation. These fiscal transfers are employed 
by the Centre to influence the pattern of spending of unit governments or to 
implement its expenditure plans through these unit governments as agencies. 
However, the volume and distribution of transfers depends on political and historical 
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factors as much as economic objectives which are considered being the sole 
consideration. 
Fiscal Transfers are recommended to fulfill the following objectives: -resolve 
vertical and horizontal imbalances; fiscal equalization; correcting spillovers; 
Mechanism of Inter-Goverimiental Transfers 
In most of the federations two common forms of fiscal transfers are 
undertaken - the general-purpose transfers and specific purpose transfers. A general-
purpose transfer from the Central to sub-Central units is done to resolve vertical and 
horizontal imbalances. These are unconditional transfers, which tries to offset the 
fiscal disadvantages arising from lower revenue capacity and higher unit cost of 
providing public services. Specific transfers, on the other hand, are intended to set the 
prices right to ensure optimal provision of sub-Central services having spillovers (Rao 
and Sen, 1996). 
In India, however, there are three types of transfers from the Centre to States. 
First, the transfers recommended by the Finance Commission; second, the plan 
transfers by the Planning Commission; and the third, transfers for several Central 
sector and centrally sponsored schemes formulated by various union ministries. 
The Finance Commission Transfers 
The Terms of Reference - Under Article 280 of the Constitution, the President 
appoints the Finance Commission every five years or earlier to make 
recommendations as to the following matters: -
(a) " the distribution between the Union and the States of the net proceeds of taxes 
which are to be or may be divided between them and the allocation between 
the States of the respective shares of the proceed; 
(b) the principles which should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of the 
States, out of the Consolidated fund of India and the sums to be paid to the 
States which are in need of assistance by way of grants-in-aid of their 
revenues under Article275 of the Constitution; 
(c) the measures needed to augment the consolidated fund of a State to 
supplement the resources of the panchayats/municipalities on the basis of the 
recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State; 
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(d) any other matter referred to the Commission by the president in the interest of 
sound finance. Under this sub-clause, the Finance Commissions have been 
asked to examine and make recommendation on matters such as the 
distribution of certain assigned taxes like estate duty on non-agricultural land, 
grants in lieu of tax on railway passenger fares, additional excise duties in lieu 
of sales tax on sugar, textiles and tobacco, to assess States' indebtedness and 
suggest corrective measures to be taken and to review the policy and 
arrangements in regard to financing of relief expenditures by the States 
affected by natural calamities and recommend appropriate remedial measures. 
During the preparation of the report of Eleventh Finance Commission (2000-
2005), two important developments took place, which had a bearing on the work of 
the Commission. Firstly, an additional term of reference was added. It was as follows: 
"In particular the Commission shall draw a monitorable fiscal reforms programme 
aimed at reduction of revenue deficit of the States and recommend the manner in 
which the grants to States to cover the assessed deficit in their non-plan revenue 
account may be linked to progress in implementing the programme." 
The second important development was the 80"^  Amendment to the 
Constitution, which provides for sharing of the net proceeds of all union taxes and 
duties with the state. This has changed the Article 269, which provided for levy and 
collection of some taxes by the government assigned to the States. The 80"^  
Amendment also changed the terms of reference relating to Article 269(Report of the 
11 "^  Finance Commission) 
So far, eleven Finance Commissions have made their recommendations and, 
by large, their recommendations have been accepted by the government. Yet, the 
working of these Commissions, the design of the transfers formulated by them and the 
approach and methodology adopted by them in making their recommendations are 
severely criticized. However, the main criticisms are: (i) those relating to attempts to 
restrict the scope of the finance Commission through the Presidential terms of 
reference: (ii) those on the approach and methodology employed by the commissions 
and implications of the transfer scheme evolved by them. 
The Plan Transfers: - Plan transfers from the Centre consist of grants and loans given 
to the States. In earlier years, these were distributed largely at the discretion of the 
center. However, since 1969, the plan assistance has been allocated on the basis of 
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the' Gadgil formula' approved by the National Development Council modified from 
time to time. The latest modification in the formula was done in December 1991. 
According to this, 30% of the funds available for distribution is kept apart for the 
special category States. Assistance is given to them on the basis of plan projects 
formulated by them and 90% of the transfer is given by way of grants and the 
remaining part as loans. The remaining 70% of the total funds available for the major 
States is distributed with 60% weight assigned to population, 25% to per capita SDP, 
7.5% on good fiscal performance and the remaining 7.5% to special problems of 
states. For the major States, the assistance is given by way of grants and loans in the 
ratio of 30:70. 
The Planning Commission makes five year plan investments for each of the 
sectors and the States. With this background and estimated resource availability, the 
States than formulate their respective annual plans for each year which is approved by 
the Planning Commission. However, transfers given to the States for plan purposes, as 
also their grant loans components are determined independently of the required plan 
investments, their sectoral composition, resources available with the States and their 
fiscal performances. 
Various studies have shown that the statutory transfers have an equalizing 
tendency but the non-plan loans tend to be disequalising. Consequently, after the 
statutory transfers and non-plan loans from the Centre, it is seen that high-income 
States have larger per capita resources than the poorer States. This is further enhanced 
by transfers for State plan and centrally sponsored schemes and in the end, average 
per capita plan outlay in the high income States is almost twice as much as in the 
middle and low income States (Rao & Sen, 1996). 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes: - Another major item of Central transfer to States is 
the schemes launched by the Centre and implemented by the State governments with 
Central assistance. In fact, these transfers are widely criticized as they are at the 
discretion of the Centre and the conditions imposed by the Centre including the 
contents, coverage, expenditure pattern and staffing of such schemes affects States' 
own priorities and policies. In response to these criticisms and States' objection, the 
National Development Council (NDC) appointed a committee to review these 
schemes, which recommended lowering of these schemes in terms of both number 
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and coverage. This will help in consolidating number of schemes into specific 
purpose transfers and will provide more powers to the States in use of these funds. 
In India, fiscal transfers have played an important role in resolving 
imbalances. Transfers from the Central government constitute a significant part of 
State finances. The Table 3.3 (For details refer Annexure A.3.2) shows that in 2003-
04 they finance about 20% of the States current expenditure; their share in States' 
total revenues is 35% and almost 17.4% of the revenues collected by the Central 
government is transferred to the States by way of tax devolution and grants. The 
figures show that the transfers are growing at a slower rate than the revenues collected 
by both the Centre and the States. The design and implementation of fiscal transfer 
schemes suffer from a number of important weaknesses lowering the success rate of 
these schemes. Firstly, the existence of multiple channel of transferring central 
resources resulted in wasteful duplication in functioning. Lack of coordination on the 
part of Finance and Planning Commissions has affected the main objectives of these 
transfers. 
Table 3.3 Transfer of Resources from Centre to the States 
Year 
1970-71 
1975-76 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
States 
total exp. 
(Rs. b) 
43.41 
65.22 
141.36 
313.62 
678.6 
1404.99 
2719.66 
3054.43 
3177.8 
3976.52 
Net transfers 
to States 
(Rs. b) 
17.37 
34.48 
88.17 
202.92 
376.97 
656.99 
984.28 
1065.43 
979.36 
800.66 
Share of 
transfers in 
exp. (%) 
40 
52.86 
62.37 
64.7 
55.55 
46.76 
36.19 
34.88 
30.82 
20.13 
States 
total 
revenue 
(Rs. b) 
23.01 
51.72 
104.56 
220.87 
446.8 
933.2 
1686,62 
1808.73 
1964.94 
2307.1 
Share of 
transfers in 
revenue 
(%) 
75.49 
66.66 
84.32 
91.87 
84.37 
70.4 
58.36 
58.9 
49.84 
34.7 
Share of 
transfers in 
central 
revenue (%) 
31.5 
27.1 
34.6 
34.3 
32.1 
31.7 
26.1 
25.4 
22.1 
17.4 
Source: Same as in Table 3.1 
Second, again the absence of a clear and coordinated approach for distributing 
unconditional transfers to the States has affected the applicability of these transfers. 
The general purpose transfers given by the Planning Commission is totally 
independent of the planning process as it does not take into account either the States 
85 
required plan outlays on the resources available to them. In case of specific purpose 
transfer too, the designing of the schemes in terms of the services chosen for 
equalization, its grant-loan components of assistance appears to be ad-hoc. 
The specific purpose transfers given by the Commission too have not been 
clearly designed to ensure minimum level of services in all the States or to offset 
spillovers.Also the lack of correspondence between revenue raising and expenditure 
decisions has resulted in inefficient fiscal management at both Central and State 
levels. The institutional system for making fiscal transfers to the States should follow 
an integrated coordinated approach. The two Commissions should not only avoid 
duplication of work but also that they should not adopt two sets of assumptions 
regarding the States' revenues and expenditures. 
Fiscal Overlapping and Harmonization of Tax System in Indian Federation 
Another problem faced by the Indian tax system is of Fiscal overlapping. It 
implies concurrency in tax, expenditure and regulatory functions among different 
governmental units. The main reason for the occurrence of fiscal overlapping in any 
federation is the sharing of common functions by inter-governmental units. To carry 
out these functions various policies are to be formulated and it requires concurrent 
jurisdiction. Even when there is no need for a joint jurisdiction and Constitution 
clearly mentions the functions, there may still be serious overlapping due to economic 
interdependence between vertical and horizontal governmental units. Fiscal 
overlapping can be vertical - between different levels of government; Centre and 
States or horizontal among different units within each level. 
Vertical Fiscal Overlapping 
In the Indian context, various functions regarding tax and expenditure policies 
results in disharmony between the Centre and the States not only due to Constitutional 
arrangements but also because of interdependence in the fiscal operations between 
them. For example, fiscal policy pursued by the Central government has its impact on 
the budgetary position of the States. An expansionary fiscal policy is generally 
financed by large deficits, which results in inflation in the economy. This constraints 
the ability of the States to raise revenues but increases their expenditures, as a result 
States' lower their expenditure on social and economic infrastructure. 
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Centre's policies affect the functioning of the States in some other ways also. 
It reduces transfers to States, increases administered prices of goods and services 
particularly of inputs and capital goods such as petroleum products, coal, steel etc., 
withdraws operations in a concurrent activity making state responsible to spend on 
these activities also. In order to do so States' curtail their expenditure on social 
activities. 
Just as Centre's polices affects States' working, the policies pursued by the 
latter may affect the provision of public services by the former. Centre has expanded 
its role in several areas like population control and family planning, forests, 
education, trade and commerce; originally placed in the State list but were brought 
into the concurrent list (through constitutional amendments) as the States were unable 
to perform the functions allocated to them efficiently. It also resulted in several 
Central sector and centrally sponsored schemes wherein the Centre influences States' 
allocation to the aided functions. 
Another area where the interdependence between the Centre and the States has 
created problems is in the exercise of the States' borrowing power. When the States 
are not able to complete their expenditure requirements due to low productivity from 
capital projects, they have been using their borrowed funds to finance capital 
requirements along with current budgetary deficits as well. Increasing difficulty in 
debt servicing by the States over the year forced the Centre to periodically write off 
the loans, which in effect meant transferring the burden from the State taxpayers to 
the national taxpayers. 
The allocation of taxes between Centre and States has also caused vertical tax 
overlapping. Various issues related to this includes sharing of certain taxes involves 
incentives for the collecting agency, taxing same base by different levels of 
government requires efficient means for coordinating the policies of these levels of 
government. As far as adverse incentive effects of tax sharing is involved, various 
Finance Commission over the years have increased the shares of income tax 
(85%)and excise duty (45%) going to the States. As a result the Centre's (collecting 
agency) incentive to raise more revenues from these taxes has been affected .The 
Constitution has provided for compulsory sharing of tax revenue to augment State's 
revenues. In this regard, States have preferred tax sharing to grants since they are 
fixed in percentage terms and are not affected by inflationary trends in the economy. 
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Grants, on the other hand, once recommended for five years remains the same and 
their value may diminish in case of high inflation. 
Horizontal Fiscal Overlapping 
Inter-State tax disharmony is yet another source of fiscal imbalance in the 
Indian federation. In India, the States collect about 30% of aggregate total revenues of 
the Centre and the States taken together and incur about 55% of total expenditures. 
Thus, the revenues raised by the State governments form quite a significant 
proportion of total revenues and therefore, the method of raising these revenues and 
their consequences would have important allocative and equity implications. States' 
finance 43%of their expenditure from their own tax revenue sources and depends 
upon central transfers for the remaining 57%. The table 3.2 shows the share of States' 
own revenue in their current expenditures (or fiscal independence) has declined from 
45.1% in 1970-71 to 41.1% in 2003-04. 
A major characteristic of the State tax systems in India is that sales tax 
contributes the maximum amount of revenue for the States out of the three major 
indirect taxes - sales tax, taxes on transport and State excise duty. (Table 3.3) Since 
revenue from sales tax plays a major role in the States' fiscal operations, it is 
necessary to analyze the nature of disharmony in the levy of sales taxation. Such 
inter-State tax disharmony has resulted in changes in tax rates on one hand and giving 
concessions to attract new investment on the other. 
A major consequence of sales tax competition is the differences in the tax 
rates. This situation has arisen when the States have tried to lower the tax rates on 
commodities with high elasticity of demand to increase tax revenue by encouraging 
cross borders purchases and raising the prices of commodities of inelastic demand and 
exported out of the States. Also the tax system followed by the States is not uniform -
some States levy tax at the point of manufacture, some at the last stage of sale while 
some continue to levy a multi-point tax on certain commodities. 
Inter-State competition is also present in case when sale tax concessions are 
given to attract investment in the particular State. This also causes variations in tax 
rates. In addition some States also levy surcharge on sales tax over and above the 
general sales tax. Also the administrative and enforcement machinery is not same in 
different States causing changes in tax rates. 
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Tax exportation to other States is yet another cause of inter-State disharmony. 
The reason for passing the tax burden includes the stage of levy of tax which may be 
origin or destination, due to narrow bases the cascaded taxes on inputs and capital 
goods add on to the inter-State sales tax (central sales tax CST levied at 4%) and the 
effective rate on inter-State export will be higher than 4%. Along with the CST levied 
by the States, octroi, is yet another tax on the entry of goods into a local area for 
consumption, use or sale, which acts as a fiscal impediment to inter-State trade. 
Thus, the above analysis underlines the need to initiate various measures to 
minimize resource distortions and inequity arising from inter-State tax overlapping 
(disharmony) in the levy of sales taxes in the Indian federation. These various 
measures discussed in the next section include: - Destination based taxes to replace 
CST and taxes on inputs, minimizing tax disparities, rationalization of sales tax, 
harmonization of commodity taxes levied by different governmental units. 
Harmonization of Tax Systems in India 
As already discussed above, vertical and horizontal overlapping of taxes has 
resulted in a complicated and non-transparent tax system with differences in tax rates, 
causing inter-State tax competition and tax exportation, which then results in 
inequitable resource allocation. Tax overlapping has occurred due to Constitutional 
assignment of tax powers, economic interdependence in various functions of different 
governmental units. Also protection provided to domestic industries from foreign 
competition through licensing policy has cast its ill effects on the inter-governmental 
fiscal relations. 
Disharmony in the levy of commodity taxes can be either vertical; between 
Centre and States or horizontal; among the States. Vertical and horizontal tax 
harmonization, therefore, is an important policy issue, particularly in a growing and 
liberalizing economy like India. Gates defines tax harmonization as "....a cooperative 
effort to secure a system of taxation that minimizes excess burden and yields a 
desirable pattern of incidence (Gates, 1972). Full harmonization then requires 
complete uniformity and for minimizing excess burden and controlling the pattern of 
incidence can be achieved only when the tax powers are centralized (Rao and Sen, 
1996). So the definition by Gates proposes cooperative strategy to reduce excess 
burden but it implies centralization of taxes as a feasible option. 
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In a federal government, tax system should be harmonized keeping in mind 
the fiscal autonomy of State and sub-units and following the principles of a sound tax 
system. Several countries have successfully harmonized their system on the following 
lines: broadening the base, uniform and lower tax rates, reduce cascading and achieve 
simple and transparent tax system. It is feasible, therefore, to follow their experiences 
which requires that tax system should aim at raising maximum revenue with least cost 
which simplifies the system and reduces tax rate differences, cascading of taxes 
should be minimized by avoiding taxes on inputs and capital goods and this reduces 
resource distortions also. 
In a fiscal federation, the States should be allowed to change the standards of 
public services provided by them in accordance with the preference of the residents 
and to provide these services, they can vary the tax rates as well. In case of a conflict, 
mutual negotiation and agreement between the Centre and the States and among the 
States should be achieved to harmonize commodity taxes in a federation. " In fact the 
emphasis in the Indian context needs to be placed not on the extent of tax 
harmonization, however defined, but on the process and institutions to facilitate 
it..."(Rao& Sen, 1996). 
Although, it is advocated that States should be given fiscal autonomy but it 
should be ensured that they do not gain at the expense of other States. So the power to 
levy taxes should be destination based and those commodities, which have origin 
based taxes are to be transferred into destination based. The Central government on 
their part should ensure that all States are regulated by the same polices so that they 
are placed on a level playing field in competition with one another. 
Vertical Tax Harmonization 
Indian tax system follows the principle of 'separation' of tax powers between 
the Centre and the States in contrast to 'concurrent' powers assigned to the two levels 
of government in other federations. But separation of tax bases can be done only in 
the de jure sense since interdependence of the tax bases makes it impossible to 
separate the tax sources in a de facto sense causing an inefficient tax system (Rao& 
Sen, 1996). In the vertically overlapping commodity tax system, two factors are 
important to avoid inefficiency - first, commodity taxes levied at the manufacturing 
point, be it by the Centre or States is inefficient. Second, vertical coordination in the 
tax base has to be achieved by harmonizing the tax base through agreement and 
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providing authority to lower level of government, which ensures greater efficiency 
and accountability. 
A possible arrangement for the Indian tax system to achieve vertical 
harmonization is to allow both the Centre and the States to levy the tax upto the retail 
stage, specifically by levying value added taxes. The tax bases should include 
consumption of not only goods but also services. Also taxation of inputs and capital 
goods should be refunded. The States can add on their own rates to the Central rate on 
the tax base determined by the Centre. This step harmonizes the tax base and tax rates 
can also be altered. However, such an arrangement faces a criticism that it reduces the 
powers of the states. 
Horizontal Tax Harmonization 
Various economists like Brenan and Buchanan (1980), Breton (1987) etc. 
have advocated inter-jurisdictional tax competition as a necessary step to check the 
growing monopoly power of the government to tax its citizens. It also results in a 
cost-efficient provision of public services for the consumers. This requires equal 
power to all the States rich or poor to mobilize resources. Also, origin based taxes are 
preferred against destination based which results in tax exportation to non-residents. 
In India tax competition has resulted in inter-State tax exportation by lowering the 
rates of commodities with high elasticity of demand and taxing inter-State sale of 
goods. The horizontal tax harmonization must concern itself with simplification and 
rationalization of the tax system, converting the existing origin-cum-destination type 
commodity taxes into pure destination type consumption taxes and getting rid of sales 
tax incentives for industrialization. 
Tax Harmonization: Towards A Value Added Tax 
Adoption of Value Added Tax (VAT) as prevalent in most West European 
countries is considered to be a most important solution to the problems of Indian 
commodity tax system. In fact, almost all-successful tax reforms are associated with 
the introduction of VAT and by now 140 countries had comprehensive VAT. In 
federal economies, to initiate tax reforms, the prevailing tax system should be made 
simple, transparent, board based and States should be given more fiscal powers. 
The existing taxes on commodities and services can be converted into VAT 
when certain conditions are fulfilled. This requires that commodity taxes are extended 
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up to the retail level, broad based taxes are included, no taxes should be paid on 
inputs, capital goods and inter-State sale of goods and revenue generated by Centre 
and states should at least remain the same as before the tax reforms. This requires levy 
of concurrent VAT by both Centre and States. It has a number of advantages also. 
"Besides making the tax system efficient, this will safeguard the fiscal autonomy of 
the States, and when inter-State transactions are zero-rated, will get rid of tax 
exportation as well. (Rao& Sen, 1996) 
However, such a system required a coordinated effort on the part of Centre 
and States. Through negotiations they can form a uniform tax base for both the levels 
of government, but a State could levy different tax rates for providing a higher level 
of public services. But this needs an amendment in the constitution allowing the 
Centre to levy tax at stages subsequent to manufacturing and to allow the States to 
levy the tax on consumption of services in addition to those on goods allowed 
presently. 
The international experience regarding levy of VAT by sub-national levels of 
government is not quite heartening. In Brazil, sub-national VAT is levied but has not 
proved to be successful in eliminating inter-State tax exportation. However, the 
system of VAT followed by the European union, where inter country transactions are 
zero-rated, present a good example of successfiil levy of VAT at sub-Central levels. 
However in India, the initial moves to implement VAT at the State level came 
in 1993 with the then finance minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, in his budget speech 
stated the need to reform the outdated States sales taxes by replacing them with the 
VAT. The States became interested with the idea only when a presentation was made 
by the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi in May 1994 before 
a conference of chief ministers for consideration. Small groups of chief ministers and 
finally an empowered committee of finance ministers were formed to examine the 
alternatives and select an acceptable design of VAT and to workout a schedule for its 
implementation. After a number of round of deliberations a deadline was set for the 
transition. But a final decision could not be reached. Then the date was set April 
1,2003. But hindrances occurred again at the last moment as traders and several States 
protested angrily. The date was shifted forward to Junel, 2003. Sixteen States seem to 
be ready and in one State Haryana, VAT has been actually introduced. But the union 
finance minister Jaswant Singh declared that VAT couldn't be implemented unless all 
States were prepared for it. Thus, another golden chance of reforming the commodity 
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tax system was lost. Finally, all except one State (Uttar Pradesh, who is also now 
ready to adopt VAT with the change in the Government recently) have adopted the 
system in the year 2005. 
However, the actual reform process in case of excise system began with the 
introduction of MOD VAT in 1986. MODVAT ushered in a new era in the system of 
excise taxation as it permitted instant credit to manufactures on the duty paid on 
inputs and intermediates and affected the cascading effect of excises on the final 
products. 
Then in the 1996-97 Budget, 3 new rates were introduced i.e. 8%, 13%, 18% 
in place of 11 ad-valoren rates ranging from 0% to 50%. Then in the Budget 1999-
2000 a new 3 rate structure was adopted i.e. a central rate of 16%, merit rate of 8%) 
and demerit rate of 24%). 
Finally in 2000-01 Budget, the three rates converged to single rate of 16% 
known as CenVAT. MODVAT scheme would now be known as CenVAT scheme. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis on the theoretical aspects of fiscal federalism and 
indirect taxation brings out certain noteworthy things. An ideal tax system (especially 
indirect taxes), as desired by the economists and government at each level, requires 
uniformity in its structure based on equity and efficiency considerations. However, 
the partial equilibrium analysis demonstrates the non-desirability of uniform rates. 
When the tax is imposed, the price gets distorted and causes efficiency loss. Then to 
increase efficiency in the tax system, the equity consideration is affected in the 
process. Various models are considered in this regard. The Ramsey tax model with an 
efficiency objective in view, has examined whether the uniform tax is preferable or 
not. In case of lumpsum tax, welfare rises. But on the issue of commodity wise 
variation no solution could be derived. The answers may however, be obtained by 
relaxing and varying different assumptions. 
But the equity objective doses not imply uniform taxafion when the elasticity 
of demand differs between the goods in question. So only if the price elasticity were 
the same that uniform tax rates would be horizontally equitable. 
Apart from uniformity in the tax system, another desirable dimension is of 
harmonization of broad taxes (like union excises, sales tax, service tax etc.) in a 
federal country. A common GST on a comprehensive base is the fiscal solution as 
suggested by different economists. 
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CHAPTER-IV 
INDIRECT CENTRAL TAXES: A CASE OF UNION EXCISE DUTY 
Introduction 
As we have already seen that the total tax revenue so generated by the two 
tiers of government, is unequally distributed; 67% is raised through the taxes assigned 
to the Centre and 33% through the taxes allotted to the States (2003-04). Some of the 
important taxes with the Centre yielding substantial revenue are union excise duty 
(yielding of the total combine revenue of the Centre and States), customs duty, 
corporation tax and personal income tax. The States have sales tax, State excise and 
taxes on vehicle as the important taxes. For our analysis we've taken into 
consideration union excise duty and sales tax as important commodity taxes for 
Centre and States respectively and a detailed study is done on both these taxes. 
In this Chapter, a detailed analysis is done of the Excise taxes: one of the most 
important taxes assigned to the Central government. First of all a study is done of the 
meaning, and brief history of excise taxes. Then the principles, on which the taxes are 
based and their objectives are taken into account. 
In the next section, an effort has been made to examine and analyse the excise 
duties in Indian context. Along with the Constitutional provisions, a detailed historical 
account of the excise taxes including changes in the rate structure, policy formulations 
etc. are examined. The different types of excise duties and their administrative 
structure are also discussed. A further step has been taken to highlight the fiscal 
importance of the excise taxes. Then, the major problems affecting the growth of 
excise revenue are also discussed. Various efforts are made by the government to 
overcome these problems and they have succeeded also, to certain extent by 
converting excise taxes into CenVAT. Finally, a brief outline of the present structure 
is also done. 
Meaning of An Excise Tax: 
The Chambers ICf" Century Dictionary defines excise as a 'tax on certain 
home commodities and on licenses for certain trades.' The Webster's Dictionary gives 
a more detailed description of excise as any duty, toll or tax; an inland duty which is 
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imposed or levied on the manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities within the 
country and includes a tax upon a pursuit or a trade or occupation. ' 
Originally, the term 'excise' was used only as the tax on commodities (which 
is generally an indirect tax, of which the burden falls on the consumer); but it latter 
came to be applied to duties or fees levied upon makers of or dealers in excisable 
commodities and finally to various taxes levied for permission to practice or conduct 
certain sports, trades, occupations etc. 
An excise duty may be levied on raw materials or at an intermediate stage of 
their production or when the articles are ready for consumption. An excise tax at the 
initial stage is disadvantageous to producers since it is collected at the beginning of 
the production process often long before the goods are sold. A solution to this 
problem includes granting of tax credits by the goverrmient, of the production process. 
However, taxation at the raw material stage may be beneficial too, since the 
manufacturer may be driven to improve the productive process in order to increase the 
yield per unit of raw material and thus escape a part of tax burden. If the finished 
product is exported, the tax on raw material is refunded on the basis that in such cases 
a more efficient producer gets back more than he actually paid. 
Professor Sherias maintains that taxes should be levied in accordance with the 
canon of convenience. From this point of view an excise tax should be levied at an 
intermediate stage of production or on the finished product. The advantage of this 
type of levy is that the period for which the manufacturer advances the tax is 
considerably shortened. It also gives tax collector an opportunity to check the quality 
of the commodity and impose higher rates on better quality products. Also tax 
collection is convenient to administer, in case. According to some economist excise 
taxes are also equitable in their effects. 
The history of the development of excise taxation in the countries of Europe 
and in the United States of America reveals that the two main features responsible for 
the introduction of the system of taxation had been (i) the urgent necessity of revenue, 
mainly to finance wars which were so common during that period of European history 
and (ii) the existence of suitable conditions consequent upon the growth of the trading 
and commercial class. Modern system of excise taxation was first introduced into 
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Holland in the 16 century, which was the leading financial and trading nation of 
Europe. 
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Principles of Excise Taxation 
The system of Excise taxes has passed through various phases, shifting from 
one principle to another before taking the present form. The various principles and the 
problems associated with those principles are as follows: -
a) In the earlier times excises were levied on all goods of consumption, justifying 
on the ground of equity. It was thought that, "maximization of equity 
demanded nothing less than this comprehensive procedure"(Singh 1977). 
According to Dutch theorists, the greater the number of taxed articles the more 
perfect is the method or system of taxation. But, however, "popular sentiments 
by no means agreed with this idea of theorists and statesmen", observes 
Bastable(1905). 
The system of 'general excise' became very unpopular. It is said that a system 
of general excises is proportional to the total income of the taxpayers. But for 
a number of reasons the system of general excise is not proportional to the 
total income of the taxpayer. Most of the expenditure of the rich class on 
personal services like those of servants, drivers, cooks etc. is not taxed. Also, 
there is a problem of double taxation where raw material and finished goods 
are simultaneously taxed. Thirdly, there is administrative difficuhy in 
supervision and collection of all goods spreading over a wide geographical 
area. 
b) In view of the above a general system of excise taxation came, in course of 
time, to be confined only to a few levies like those on liquor, wine, beer and 
tobacco products. But since increased rates on few classified products cannot 
yield revenue on a scale required by the developing countries, the need is felt 
for the extension of the list of dutiable products. This extension is desirable 
both from the point of view of productiveness and equity. However, a 
judicious selection of the goods has to be made before bringing them under 
excise tax net to secure a fair distribution of the charge in accordance with the 
general principle adopted as a guide. 
Traditionally, goods are classified into necessities, comforts and luxuries and 
the question that arises is which class of goods is best suited for excise tax. The 
general consumer does not favor taxation of necessities, as it will greatly affect the 
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maximum poor population. The other view is the taxation of luxury goods consumed 
only or mainly by the rich. Though, from the point of view of equity, taxation of 
luxury goods is most desirable but it is not so from the view of revenue productivity. 
The burden of such taxation falls predominantly on the rich consumers and their 
income forms a small part of the total national income. So the revenue, thus generated 
from this source is not quite significant. 
The final option therefore left bears the main burden of excise taxation i.e. "on 
the intermediate class of goods that forms the staples of consumption"(Suryl988). In 
other words the commodities to be taxed requires the characteristics of both a 
necessity and a luxury good, that is they must combine the quality of wide use and 
that of a certain degree of dispensability simultaneously. In case of such commodities 
revenue generation is quite large and elastic and less burden on the consumer. Some 
example of these commodities includes tobacco, liquor, tea, coffee, sugar etc. As the 
standard of living of people improves the tendency grows to restrict the taxes to the 
very few but lucrative goods of consumption. Like in all developed economies of the 
world at present, liquor and tobacco are the two most important sources of excise 
revenue followed by petroleum or gasoline excise. But, since in developing countries 
three fourths of the population consumes no luxuries, imposing excise duties on 
commodities of mass consumption can only generate revenue. 
Impact of Excise Taxation: 
Excise duties have come to acquire a prominent role in the tax structure of any 
country. The impact of excise duties can be analysed in two ways - its direct effect 
and the indirect effect on the economy. Excise taxes directly influence the pattern and 
direction of production and consumption. As the excise taxes are raised on the 
commodities, the prices of the goods and commodities also increase simultaneously. 
At higher prices consumption of these goods reduces (unless they are necessity goods) 
and due to lower demand the production of these goods also goes down. 
Excise duties (as a part of taxation policy) indirectly help in achieving a 
number of economic objectives also. These objectives include not only economic 
growth, but also full employment, stable prices, efficient allocation of resources, a 
satisfactory distribution of income and a proper balance of payment. 
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Acceleration of Growth 
To achieve a higher per capita income the rate of national growth product 
must exceed the rate of growth of population. However, tax policy affects only the 
rate of growth of national product and not the population. In this context Due's 
development model of effects of taxation on the attainment of a higher rate of national 
product is used. According to this model the rate of economic growth in terms of an 
annual increase in per capita real income (Y/N) is a function of: a) the rate of capital 
formation i.e. annual increase in total capital stock (k); DK= I (Investment), b) the 
incremental capital output ratio DK/DY, 3) the rate of technological change (t), c) the 
rate of increase in quality and quantity of natural resources labor and entrepreneurial 
ability(r), d) modification in the institutional environment (v). 
Taxation plays an important role in effecting these determinants of growth 
thereby economic development. It also permits the financing of the government 
expenditure without the ill effects of other methods of financing. Excise taxes enter 
into the development model in the form of higher prices for consumption goods 
relative to the prices paid to the factors. 
Distribution of income 
As far as income redistribution is concerned, indirect taxes like excise whose 
incidence is generally regressive will have less impact upon after tax pattern than 
highly progressive income taxation. Excises, if administered reasonably well, may in 
fact be more equitable than direct taxes that are poorly enforced. 
Resource allocation 
Indirect taxes, in comparison with the direct taxes, exert more influence on the 
allocation of resources into priority uses. Selective use of excise taxes with high rate 
of taxation may reduce the production of goods not essential for development. On the 
other hand exemption from excise duty or low duty may encourage production of 
goods considered essential for development. 
Taxation and Stability 
There are contradictory statements whether excise taxes are inflationary or anti 
inflationary. Some theorists view that excise taxes caimot check inflation since they 
raise price and are hence inflationary. But it is improbable because in such price rise 
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the government absorbs the proceeds where as in the inflationary price rise they 
accrue to the producers. 
It is however often said that excise taxes have greater anti inflationary 
potential than income taxes because the former being regressive reduce consumption 
more than the latter. It is so because rich class consumes proportionately less of their 
income than those in the lower class. 
It is also said that excise taxes provide a special anti-inflationary advantage 
since they discourage consumption expenditure and promote savings. Consumer can 
escape these taxes by declining consumption of the taxed commodities. 
Excise taxes also affect wage rates. As excise taxes raise the price of 
commodities, trade union may demand higher wages. A wage price spiral situation 
may arise which reduces the anti-inflationary effects of excise taxes and while 
aggravating inflationary pressure. 
Excise Duties in India 
Constitutional Provisions 
By virtue of the taxation powers vested in the Constitution under Entry No. 84 
of List I of the Seventh Schedule, the Central Goverrmient is authorized to impose, " 
duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except 
(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; (b) opium, Indian hemp and other 
narcotic drugs and narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations 
containing alcohol or any substance included in sub paragraph (b) of this entry."^ (for 
details refer to Annexure A.4.1) 
Historical Account of Excise Taxes 
The system of excise taxation was in existence, though in an undeveloped 
form in the period even before Arthashastra of Kautilya (4"^  century B.C.). Among 
the items subject to excise duty were gold, medicinal roots and herbs, honey, meat, 
grass, firewood and even cattle. The system of taxation developed in the Arthashastra 
continued and was built upon, right through the Mughal times. Excise duties on such 
items as dairy products, cloth, sugar, salt, indigo, tobacco, leather etc. were levied 
during the Mughal period and under early British rule. The excise on salt was 
important source of revenue throughout the period of British rule. 
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The beginning of the modern excise system taxation in India is generally said 
to have been made in 1894, with the levy of a duty at the rate of 5 percent ad valorem 
on cotton yarn of above 20 counts and the extension in 1896 to fine cloth. These 
measures were aimed at protecting the imported British cloth. The levy was opposed 
strongly by the Indians and it gave a momentum to the Swadeshi movement, resulting 
in the boycott of foreign cloth. The duty on cloth was abolished in 1926 but 
reimposed only after independence in 1949. 
The year 1934 is considered to be a landmark in the development of central 
excise duties since, in that year; they took a definite shape in the fiscal system of the 
country. Duties were levied on sugar, matches, mechanical lighters and steel ingots. 
They were imposed mainly as a revenue measure to check the decline in the revenue 
of the Government of India because of the Great Depression. 
The First Five-year Plan started in 1951 and additional revenue was needed to 
achieve the investment targets and meet the expenditure on social welfare schemes. 
Therefore, a high-powered Taxation Enquiry commission (TEC) was appointed under 
the chairman ship of Dr. John Matthai (1953-54). 
Consequent upon the recommendations of the TEC, the history of excise 
taxation in India since 1954 is one of the increasing commodity coverage. Cement, 
footwear, paints and varnishes, paper, refined diesel oils, motorcars etc.were brought 
under the excise net. By the beginning of 1954, only 19 commodhies were subject to 
excise duties and between 1954-56, the number of products subject to excise had 
more than doubled. 
The budget of 1957-58 would be remembered for introducing additional 
excise duties in lieu of sales tax on tobacco and its products, textiles and sugar under 
the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957. The 
proceeds are paid to the States. 
In 1963, selective surcharges were levied on the central excise duty with a view 
to raise revenue exclusively for the Centre, which was then engaged in a major 
military build up as a result of the Chinese invasion. The surcharge or special excise 
duties were levied at varying rates of 10%, 20% and 331/2% on most items except 
sugar, cycle parts, cotton fabrics, footwear, matches, some iron and steel items and 
patent and proprietary medicines. 
100 
The process of covering more and more items under the excise system reached 
its height when Tariff Item No.68 was introduced in 1975-76'*. In 1978, the Jha 
Committee gave its recommendations including need for avoiding the cascade effect 
of duties, expansion of the area of sales tax reforms and abolition of octroi levies. 
In 1984, V.P. Singh as the finance minister announced a Long-term Fiscal 
Policy. Other major developments include reduction of direct taxes on individuals and 
corporations, introduction of MODVAT from 1st March 1986. MODVAT ushered in 
a new era in the system of excise taxation as it permitted instant credit to 
manufacturers on the duty paid on bought out inputs and intermediates and thereby 
affected the rising incidence of the cascade effect of excise and countervailing duties 
on the final products. In the budget 1987-88, MODVAT was extended to most 
excisable commodities. The underlying objective of MODVAT was to minimize the 
cascade effect and at the same time achieve revenue neutrality. To avoid a fall in 
revenue following MODVAT, the rates had been suitably adjusted upwards in 1986-
87 budget and more rates were adjusted and raised in 1987-88. 
MODVAT Scheme: Features 
MODVAT scheme provides for instant and complete reimbursement of excise 
duty and additional duty of customs (countervailing duty) paid on the components and 
raw materials when used in the manufacture of the final products. Articles, which 
were not used as inputs in the manufacturing process, were not eligible for credit 
under this scheme. Where the same input was used for different finished products, 
some of which were not dutiable, the credit of duty was allowed only for that part 
attributable to inputs that are used for the manufacture of dutiable finished products. 
MODVAT scheme was claimed to have the following advantages: 
a) It aims at making levies transparent so that the effective rates of taxation on a 
particular commodity can be known. This information will be helpful in undertaking 
meaningful studies of excise incidence, which may be used to control excise burden 
on different commodities. It also seeks to avoid cascading effects associated with a 
traditional turnover tax. 
b) MODVAT scheme not only encourages the small-scale sector but also exports by 
making them more competitive in the international market. MODVAT scheme was 
claimed to encourage indigenisation because full set off was available when 
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indigenous inputs were used. However, no credit of basic and auxiliary customs duties 
was permissible on imported materials and components. It was also claimed that 
MODVAT would check excise evasion because credit of input duty cannot be 
claimed unless actual production was declared to the excise authorities. MODVAT 
scheme would also help to reduce number of disputes, arising on account of 
classifications requiring lower or higher rates of duty, because the duty element on a 
large number of components would become irrelevant for manufactures in view of 
set-off 
The year 1986 was a landmark in the evolution of excise taxation in India. In 
that year, a new internationally accepted harmonized system of commodity 
classification was introduced in place of the then existing antiquated system 
introduced by the British. 
In the 1996-97 Budget, it was proposed that the Excise structure which had 11 
ad -valorem rates ranging 0-50% should be reduced to 4: 0, lower rate on mass 
consumption, single normal rate and higher rate on luxury items. This promise was, 
however, fulfilled in the 1997-98 Budget when three new rates were introduced: 8%, 
13%, and 18%. Also, Maximum Retail Price (MRP) based excise levy was introduced 
in this budget. 
The objective of the 1998-99 Budget was to introduce greater transparency in 
the excise system through a significant rationalization of rates. The ultimate objective 
was to move towards a Central Value Added Tax (CenVAT) system, which can then 
be merged with a generalized VAT. 
To rationalize the rate structure, a new 3-rate structure was proposed in the 
Budget 1999-2000, a central rate of 16%, merit rate of 8% and demerit rate of 24%. 
To establish a single rate Central VAT (CenVAT) at the Centre, the three rates 8%, 
16%, 24% converge to 16% CenVAT in the 2000-01 budget. MODVAT scheme 
would now be known as CenVAT scheme. 
In the budget 2000-01, certain measures were also proposed for streamlining 
and simplification of the excise system. From 1^ ' July 2000, all statutory records in 
excise would be dispensed with and excise department would rely upon the 
manufacturers' records. From P' April 2000, excise assesses would be allowed to pay 
the excise duties in fortnightly installments and it was further liberalized to pay duty 
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at the end of the month in the 2003-04 budget. To make the valuation mechanism 
simple, it was proposed to replace the existing section 4 of Central Excise Act, which 
was based on the concept of 'normal price' by a new section based on 'transaction 
value' for assessment. 
Various Types of Excise Duties 
There are various types of excise duties imposed by the Union Government 
under different Acts of Parliament as given in the Constitution. See also Armexure I. 
The important duties in operation were the following: -
1. Basic Excise Duty: - Central excise duty is levied under Section 3 of the Central 
Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The duty levied under this is known as basic excise duty. 
The basic excise duty may be fixed with reference to the value, weight, volume, unit, 
length or area of the excisable goods. These details are given in the Schedule of the 
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. 
2. Additional Duties in Lieu of Sales Tax: - These duties are imposed under the 
Additional Duties of Excises (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, which 
provides for the levy and collection of additional duties on sugar, tobacco, cotton 
fabrics, rayon or artificial silk fabrics produced or manufactured in India. These duties 
aie in addition to the duties payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and 
replace, by agreement with State Governments, the sales tax levied by them on those 
commodities. The proceeds of these additional duties of excise are distributed among 
the states in accordance with the principles of distribution formulated and the 
recommendations made by the Finance Commission from time to time. 
3 Cesses: - These are levied under separate enactments on certain commodities 
and the revenue is used for specific purposes. For example, handloom cess is levied 
on fabrics to raise funds for developing khadi and other handloom industries and for 
promoting the sale of khadi other handloom cloth. Cesses are also levied under 
various Acts on tea, jute, indigenous crude oil, paper, sugar, bidis, automobiles, 
vegetables oils and television sets. 
Duties on different commodities are levied under the Central Excises and Salt 
Act, 1944. Under Section 37 of this Act, a set of rules known as the Central Excise 
Rules, 1944, has been framed to implement the provisions of the Act. Another set of 
rules under the same section deals exclusively with the valuation of the excisable 
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commodities and is known as Central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 1975. The Act and 
the Rules are amended from time to time. Broadly speaking, the Act embodies 
substantive law, and the Rules contain both substantive law and procedural matters. 
Although the Central Government is empowered to levy duties on agricultural 
products also, but it has avoided doing so in view of the administrative difficulties 
involved. Therefore, the excise system has remained confined mostly to the products 
of the industrial sector with the exceptions of tea and coffee. 
Administration of Excise Taxation 
There is elaborate administrative machinery for the collection of excise duties. 
At the apex level is the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC), which is a 
statutory board forming part of the Department of Revenue in the Ministry of Finance. 
The Board, consisting of a chairman and five members works under the control and 
direction of the Union Finance Minister. 
At the field level, imder the CBEC there are 34 Commissionerates of Central 
excise and each of the Commissionerate is headed by a Commissioner of Central 
excise that is assisted by a number of Additional Commissioners and Deputy 
Commissioners. They are in turn assisted by a Superintendent of Central Excise and a 
number of Inspectors who are in fact responsible for the proper assessment of central 
excise duties, generation of the statistical information and ensure that the laws and 
procedures are properly followed. 
There are different procedures to assess and collect excise duties. For details 
refer to Annexure A.4.2. 
Fiscal Significance of Excise Taxes 
India is one of those developing countries where indirect taxation occupies a 
dominant position in the overall tax structure of the country. In the sphere of Central 
Government only two indirect taxes are of significance from revenue point of view 
i.e. union excises and customs. Table 4.1 shows that if we compare both direct and 
indirect taxes, the share of indirect taxes in total tax revenue of the Central 
government is substantially higher as shown in Chapter I also. In 1970-71, the share 
of direct taxes was just 5.04b out of 24.5b and that of indirect taxes 19.5b. In 2003-04, 
this share for direct taxes reached 1034b. 
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Table : 4.1 Relative Growth of Union Excise Duties vis-i-vis other Taxes of the Central 
Government of Fndia - Selected Years 
Rs.(b) 
Tax Structure/Year 
A+B Total tax 
collections 
A.Direct taxes of 
which 
(i) Corporation tax 
(ii) Income tax 
B Indirect taxes of 
which 
i)Custom duties 
ii)Union excise 
duties 
1970-71 
24.51 
5.04 
3.7 
1.14 
19.47 
5.24 
13.68 
1975-76 
60.1 
14.62 
8.62 
4.8 
45.47 
14.19 
29.88 
1980-81 
93.88 
19.83 
13.11 
5.04 
74.04 
34.09 
37.22 
1985-86 
211.8 
37.55 
28.65 
6.63 
174.24 
95.25 
73.3 
1990-91 
430.42 
69.09 
53.35 
12.56 
361.32 
206.44 
141 
1995-96 
819.39 
222.91 
164.87 
43.18 
596.48 
357.57 
221.76 
2000-01 
1366.58 
496.51 
251.77 
237.66 
872.64 
341.63 
497.58 
2001-02 
1336.6 
477.07 
251.33 
221.06 
865.11 
283.4 
544.7 
2002-03 
1594.25 
830.9 
461.72 
368.65 
1331.75 
448.51 
823.1 
2003-04 
1869.82 
1050.91 
635.62 
413.87 
1331.16 
486.3 
907.7 
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Indian Economic Statistics 
(Various Issues) 
Table 4.2 presents the growth of excise revenue (%) to the total tax revenue of 
the Central government. The share of excise taxes in 1970-71 was 56%. This share 
however, reduced and was just 27% in 1995-96. Then, there is a increase in the share 
and in 2003-04 it reached to 49%. 
Table: 4.2 Revenue from Union Excises as percentage of Total Tax Revenue of the 
Central Government (Rs. b) 
Year 
1 
1970-71 
1975-76 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
Central Excise Revenue 
(Net Receipt) 
2 
13.69 
29.88 
37.23 
73.3 
141 
221.76 
497.58 
544.69 
823.1 
907.2 
Total Net Tax Revenue of the 
Central Govt. 
3 
24.51 
60.1 
93.88 
211.8 
430.42 
819.39 
1366.6 
1336.62 
1594.25 
1869.82 
(2) as % of (3) 
4 
55.85 
49.72 
39.66 
34.61 
32.76 
27.06 
36.41 
40.75 
51.63 
48.54 
Source: Same as in table 4.1 
A comparison is also done of the two important central taxes i.e excises and 
customs in the Table 4.3. The table shows the changing pattern of the two indirect 
105 
taxes. In 1970-7,1 the share of excise revenue in the total indirect tax revenue of the 
Central government was as high as 56%. Since then, however, this tax has lost its 
importance and its share has reduced to 27% in 1995-96. On the other hand, customs 
have emerged as the most important single source of revenue of the Central 
government with its share increasing from 11% to 60% in the same period. During 
this period customs occupied major position as a source of revenue and excise lagged 
far behind. However, a reverse trend is seen in the later years when the share of 
customs revenue reduced to 33% in 2000-01 and the share of excises is raised to 63%. 
In the year 2003-04, there was a rise in the share of both union excises and customs 
revenue to 68%) and 38%. 
The same trend is seen when we compare both the taxes with the total net tax 
revenue of the central government. In 1970-71, excise duties accounted for a 56 % of 
the total Central tax collections: Rs 13.68 b out of Rs. 24.51 b and the share of 
customs duties was a modest 21%; Rs. 5.24 b. Within a span of 25 years, the 
proportionate share of customs shot up to Rs. 357.57 b in 1995-96 out of Rs. 819.39 b 
(44%)) and that of excises was just Rs. 221.8 b (27%)). But by 2000-01 onwards the 
situation changed and again the share of excise revenue (45%) was more than the 
customs revenue (25%)) in the year 2004-05. 
Table: 4,3 Structure of Central Indirect Taxes 
Year 
1 
1970-71 
1975-76 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05(R.E) 
Total net tax 
revenue of 
the central 
govt. (Rs.b) 
2 
24.51 
60.1 
93.88 
211.8 
430.42 
819.39 
1366.6 
1336.62 
1594.25 
1869.82 
2258.04 
Total 
Indirect 
Taxes (net 
receipts) 
(Rs.b) 
3 
19.47 
45.47 
74.05 
174.24 
361.33 
596.48 
872.64 
865.11 
1331.76 
1331.16 
1492.57 
Customs (net 
receipts) 
(Rs.b) 
4 
5.24 
14.19 
34.09 
95.25 
206.44 
357.57 
341.63 
283.4 
448.51 
486.29 
562.5 
Union 
Excises (net 
receipts) 
(Rs.b) 
5 
13.69 
29.88 
37.22 
73.3 
141 
221.76 
497.57 
544.69 
823.1 
907.2 
1007.2 
(4) as % 
of (2) 
6 
21.38 
23.61 
36.31 
44.97 
47.96 
43.64 
25 
21.2 
28.13 
26 
24.91 
(4) as % 
of (3) 
7 
26.91 
31.2 
46 
54.67 
57.13 
59.94 
39.14 
32.75 
33.68 
36.53 
37.69 
(5) as % 
of (2) 
8 
55.85 
49.72 
39.66 
34.61 
32.76 
27.06 
36.41 
40.75 
51.63 
48.54 
44.6 
(5) as % 
of (3) 
9 
70.31 
65.71 
50.27 
42.06 
39.02 
37.17 
57.02 
62.96 
61.8 
68.15 
67.48 
Source: Same as in 4.1 
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Nature of The Excise Revenue Growth 
A number of factors are responsible for a change in relative importance of the 
excise taxes. Excise being a tax on production requires the existence of indigenous 
industries. Before independence indigenous industries were not so developed and 
therefore the excise revenue was not important. There were two main factors mainly 
held responsible for the spread of modern tax system from the 16"^  to 18"' century's 
i.e. (i) urgent necessity of revenue mainly to finance wars (ii) the existence of ripe 
conditions due to the growth of trading and commercial classes. 
Later on, with the policy of rapid industrialization followed under the five-
year plans since 1951-52, increase in excise revenue came about due to 
1) extension of commodity coverage 
2) changes in rate structure and 
3) increase in the production of excisable goods 
Simultaneously, a large number of new and important industries began to 
develop and it was accompanied by import substitution and drastic curtailment of 
imports of luxury and semi-luxury goods. These factors provided both the base on 
which new excise taxes could be levied and the necessity to tap this source fully to 
finance the ever-increasing plan expenditures. Meanwhile, the fiindamental change in 
the nature of our foreign trade made the growth of customs revenue more difficult. 
Buoyancy «&EIasticity of Union Excise 
The next step is to examine the growth of excise revenue in relation to the 
growth of national income. The growth of revenue from any tax may be viewed in 
two ways. One is the increase in tax receipts as a result of every increase in national 
income without any change either in the tax rates or in its coverage. It is called built-
in- flexibility of the tax. In the second case, changes in tax rates and coverage of the 
tax, which are also discretionary changes, are also taken into consideration. In this 
case the growth in the tax revenue is the result of a process of both widening and 
deepening of the tax. Changes in the tax yield flowing from the combined effects of 
automatic responses as well as discretionary changes, which when linked to every 
increase in national income, is known as the buoyancy of the tax. It is computed by 
dividing percentage change in actual tax yield by percentage change in national 
income. 
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With tax parameters held constant (i.e. discretionary changes being removed), 
automatic or buiU-in changes in the tax yield resulting from variations in the national 
income measure the elasticity or built-in flexibility of a tax or a tax system. It is the 
ratio of percentage change in tax revenues (adjusted for discretionary changes) to 
percentage change in national income . 
Buoyancy coefficient compares the actual growth of tax revenue with the 
growth in national income. It helps in assessing the overall success of government 
measures to increase tax revenues. The elasticity coefficient, on the other hand, 
indicates the inherent responsiveness of a tax system to changes in national income. It 
reflects how far the revenue potential of a given tax system has been realized. 
Before imposing a tax, the selection of tax base and their rate structure needs 
to be so designed as to impart reasonable degree of elasticity to the tax system. This is 
so because in case of weak elasticity attribute of the tax system, government may 
have to resort to frequent changes in tax laws, which in turn may cause legal 
complications, reduce administrative efficiency and prove to be politically 
inexpedient. 
The reason for relating tax yield to national income is the fact that most taxes 
are either based on or in some ways related to production, income, expenditure, 
wealth or transactions which all tend to increase with the growth in national income 
(Bretherton 1937). However, taxes should be so devised as to grow automatically with 
increases in national income. It is more appropriate and informative if tax yield is 
related to precise approximate bases upon which the tax yield is levied along with 
national income. 
Table 4.4 shows the buoyancy and growth rates of excise duties calculated by 
the above mentioned procedure for the different periods. Firstly, a broad period of 
1970-2004 is taken to analyse the overall situation of excise duties in India. Then, 
decadal periods are taken into consideration starting from 1970-80, then 1980-90, 
1990-2000, and 2000-04. Another classification is done on the basis of the broad 
reform measures initiated by the government during the period 1970-2004. MODVAT 
(modified value added tax) system introduced from 1^ ' March 1986, ushered in a new 
era in the system of excise taxation. MODVAT was initiated to minimize the 
cascading effect of the excise duties and also to generate revenue. So the period is 
divided as Pre-MODVAT and Post-MODVAT. 
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Table 4.4 Bouyancy and Growth rate of Union Excise Duties of different 
Period 
Buoyancy 
Growth Rate 
1970-2004 
0.89 
12.3 
1970-80 
1.07 
12.8 
1980-90 
1.04 
14.7 
1990-2000 
0.67 
9.8 
2000-04 
2.44 
25.5 
Pre-MODVAT 
Period: 1970-80 
1,07 
12.8 
periods 
Post-MODVAT 
Period: 1980-04 
0.94 
13.5 
Source: Same as in table 4.1 (Fore details see Armexure A.4.3) 
As far as the buoyancy rates are concerned, the overall period of 1970-2004 
shows a buoyancy of less than 1 (0.89). If we see the decadal periods we get the true 
picture which shows that the except the period of 1990-2000 when the rate is 0.67, in 
all other periods rate was more than 1. Even in the pre-MODVAT period the rate of 
buoyancy is greater than 1 but in the post-MODVAT period it is 0.93 i.e less than 1. 
The study of growth rate also exhibits the same situation. In the period 1990-
2000 (9.8) the growth rate is lower comparatively to other periods (12.8, 14.7, 25.47). 
This analysis shows that generally the buoyancy and growth rate are moving 
simultaneously i.e. if one is increasing the other is also increasing and vice-versa. But 
this has not happened when pre-MODVAT and post-MODVAT periods are 
considered. The buoyancy rate has declined from pre-MODVAT period to Post-
MODVAT period from 1.07 to 0.94. But in case of growth rate there is actually 
increase in the grow t^h from 12.82% to 13.46%. 
Excise Tariff Structure 
Once the commodities for excise taxation are identified, the next step is to 
formulate a tariff structure for various commodities. The nature of excise tariff and 
the issues related to it are now described. 
Statutory and Effective Rates 
Rates of excise duty approved by the Parliament are termed as statutory or 
tariff rate. However, the Government enjoys the power to exempt, by notification, any 
excisable goods from the whole or any part of duty leviable on such goods. In 
exercise of this power the Government determines and notifies from time to time the 
effective rates of duty. The rationale for granting such powers to the executive is that 
during the period intervening two consecutive budgets, necessary adjustments might 
be made to regulate exports, consumption, and prices of different commodities. 
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However, the delegation of this power to the executive has led to frequent changes in 
excise rates, creating an unstable atmosphere for trade and industry and problems for 
the administration. 
Moreover, since the notifications are technically not rules, there is no 
obligation to place them on the table of the House. Consequently, the Parliament does 
not always have the information on the variations made in the rates approved by it, 
The determination of the effective rates of duty by the executive leads to decline in 
the parliamentary control over the excise system. Duty changes should be discussed 
and legislated in sessions of Parliament, which are held regularly at short intervals. 
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Specific and Ad Valorem Duties 
In the early days of the excise system of independent India, the emphasis was 
on specific rates due to administrative reasons. However, the emphasis shifted to ad 
valorem rates when the economy started experiencing frequent inflation rates. The 
1970's saw a big shift from specific rates of duty to ad valorem rates on cement, 
vegetable products, electric fans, paper, cotton fabrics, paints, varnishes etc. 
However, beginning with the 1980's, the tendency to shift to ad valorem rates 
not only stopped but also reversed due to the disputes over classification and 
valuation of goods for purposes of excise levies. As a measure to combat tax 
avoidance and evasion, the basis of duty was changed from ad valorem to ad valorem-
cum-specific rate or specific rate on a number of commodities. Important 
commodities where the shifts took place and in the particular year were: flat glass, 
aluminium metal (1982), paper aerated waters, motor cars, cigarettes, sugar (1983), 
paper boards, tyres for buses and trucks (1984), gases, tubes and flaps of tyres and 
color television sets (1985). 
The balance further tilted in favor of specific duties as the policy of 
conversion from ad valorem rates to specific rates continued right up to 1990-91. The 
Tax Reforms Committee, 1991, observed that the share of revenue from specific-rated 
items has increased fi-om about 46 % of the total revenue in 1981-82 to 65% in 1986-
87 and about 70% in 1990-91. The Committee examined the advantages and 
disadvantages of ad valorem and specific rates of duty and concluded, " the 
advantages of having ad valorem duties far outweigh the administrative benefits 
derived by switching over to specific duties. In a system of comprehensive taxation 
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with a wide coverage of MODVAT, it would be necessary to have by and large only 
ad valorem duties in order to ensure a rational system of taxation."(TRC,1991) 
Following the recommendations of the committee, a modest switch over to ad 
valorem rates was made in the 1992-93 budget. 
At present, important commodities, which bear only specific rates, are 
cigarettes, coffee, tea, sugar, beverages, mineral fuels, mineral oils, silk man-made 
staple fibres and iron and steel. Ad valorem rates of duty are imposed on organic 
chemicals, pharmaceutical products, leather, footwear, ceramic products, tools and 
implements, machinery and mechanical appliances, electrical machinery and 
equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured articles. A few commodities like cotton 
fabrics, paper and paper boards, are subject to ad valorem-cum-specific rates of duty. 
Issues involved in the system of Excise Taxation 
As already discussed in the earlier chapter, union excise duties, as a major 
component of commodity taxes, suffered from various types of inefficiencies. These 
inefficiencies had resulted from structural and administrative system followed by the 
tax authorities. This had given rise to certain problems for the assesses and 
inconsistencies in the policies and procedures. These problems were: -
i) The Extended System 
The system was not integrated but an 'extended' one, wherein the taxes were 
levied at the different stages of production. The final product, the inputs, 
intermediates and raw materials, the packaging material etc were all subject to excise 
duties. The duties had been raised on most occasions, but reduced only rarely. There 
was no single levy as the "excise duty"; but there was the basic excise duty, the 
special excise duty, the auxiliary duties of excise, the additional excise duties on 
specified textiles, the additional duties of excise and customs in the case of the whole 
range of P.O.L products, the various cesses and, of course, the additional duties of 
excise in lieu of sales tax. These different levies made it inconvenient and time 
consuming for the assesses to calculate the exact amount under each head and the 
total duty payable. Also, most of the listed products bear at least two of these levies 
and some, like the textiles, the P.O.L levies and products, 3 or 4 different levies and 
cesses. 
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ii) Taxation at the Manufacturer level 
Although the Constitution had distinctly defined excisable goods as goods 
manufactured or produced in India and sales tax as tax on sale or purchase of goods. 
But the two taxes had come to overlap as the sales tax were levied on manufacture 
and importers to avoid problems in administering taxes levied it at the retail level. 
iii) Definitional Irregularities and Problem of Valuation 
Excise taxation implied taxation at the manufacturer level, but the term 
"manufacturing" is quite difficult to define as goods might had undergone a change 
of form due to a variety of processing activities performed after their initial 
production or manufacturing. 
In taxation at the manufacturer level, determination of manufacturing value 
also was equally troublesome. Manufacturers often sold their products through their 
own distributors or wholesalers and sometimes directly to the customers. In 
determining the value at the manufacturer level adjustments had to be made for trade 
margins at different trade levels. Then came the question whether costs of after-sale 
service, advertisement and selling, organization expenses come under manufacturing 
cost. The Supreme Court ruled in a leading case that the post manufacturing expenses 
to be added to the assessable value; only the durable and returnable containers were 
exempted and the value of all other packing was added (Union of India Vs Bombay 
Tyre International). Even after such rulings, determination of excisable value had 
continued to present acute problems. 
iv) Multiplicity of Rates 
The excise rate structure was provided by the Schedule of the Central Excise 
Tariff Act, 1985, which included goods ranging from toys to nuclear reactors .^ The 
Schedule was divided into 20 sections covering 96 chapters. Goods falling under each 
chapter were divided and sub-divided into numerous headings and sub-headings. The 
statutory rate of duty applicable in respect of each item was shown against the 
appropriate commodity heading / sub heading. These statutory rates were modified, if 
necessary, by Government notifications to determine effective rates of duty. 
Prior to tax reforms initiated in 1991, excise taxation in India was an 
interesting example of the multiple of rates, which were subject to frequent revisions. 
Various considerations contributed to the complexity of excise rates. 
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Commodities such as sewing machines, water coolers and bicycles, though on 
the tariff list, were completely exempted from the payment of duty. However, a 
number of other commodities were subject to a wide range of excise rates. The rate of 
duty on necessities of life like food products (cheese, butter, vegetable oils), 
pharmaceutical products, and footwear ranged from 10 to 15 per cent ad valorem. 
Rates of excise duty on semi-luxuries like washing machines, tape recorders and 
refrigerators and colour televisions ranged from 25 per cent to 40 per cent ad valorem. 
Luxury items like cosmetics and air-conditioners suffered a high rate of duty ranging 
from 100 to 110 per cent. 
Most capital goods like machine tools, cranes, agricultural, textile and printing 
machinery, etc were subject to duty ranging from 15 to 20 per cent ad valorem. 
Tobacco items were and continue to be conspicuous by high rates of duty. 
Successive upward revision of excise duty on cigarettes had all along remained a 
notable feature of tobacco tariff in India. In the 1997-98 budget, excise duty on 
various categories of cigarettes was increased ranging from Rs 20 to Rs 70 per 
thousand. 
Broadly speaking, necessities of life were either exempt or paid a low rate of 
duty, semi-luxuries were moderately taxed, and luxuries and tobacco products stood 
out distinctly as high-rated tariff items, capital goods were subject to a relatively low 
rate of duty. 
v) Taxation of Inputs and Capital Goods 
Input excises (raw materials, components and other intermediates) enhanced 
costs and profits and therefore increased the prices of goods much more than the 
amount of excise collected. Moreover, if excises were imposed on inputs as well as 
the finished goods for which these inputs were used, a gap emerges between the 
nominal rate of tax and the cumulative rate of tax. This phenomenon made the excise 
system complicated and hindered the proper evaluation, particularly on equity 
criterion. 
Still further, excises on inputs may promote vertical integration in an industry, 
a trend that is harmful to the growth of small-scale sector. Lastly, input excises 
impose inequitable burden on different economic classes by not discriminating 
between essential and non-essential uses of a product. 
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It was generally argued that capital goods, being instruments of industrial 
production, should be available at the minimum possible prices. Every increase in the 
capital cost was reflected in the final prices of the manufactured product. Since the 
resources available for investment were rather limited, any levy on capital goods 
reduced the real investment to that extent. It also pushed the cost of investment and 
slowed down the process of modernization and technology up gradation. 
vi) Exemptions and Concessions 
As in other countries, exemptions and concessions were an integral part of the 
Indian excise system. Excise preferences and reliefs were given to promote a wide 
range of socio-economic objectives. If wisely used, such tax preferences could 
become an effective tool of economic change on desired lines. 
Exemptions were necessary to ensure progressivity in the structure of 
commodity taxation. Excise preferences were justified to induced entrepreneurs to 
undertake activities, which they would have otherwise avoided, e.g. adopting labor-
intensive techniques of production. Concessions were designed to promote enterprises 
considered vital by the society though it was controversial as to which activities were 
vital and required governmental support. Exemptions were also used as a corrective 
mechanism to stabilize demand, production, and profits of different industries. Excise 
rates were raised to cover the excess profits and downward to boost low demand for 
idle industries. Excise tariff was also used for export promotion, employment 
generation by providing concessions to the small scale industries. 
However, excise exemptions narrowed the tax base and therefore reduced 
governmental revenue. They interfered with the designing of the excise system and 
led to complexities in the excise law, which in turn caused tax evasion and litigation. 
They also obscure the evaluation of excise system, particularly from equity angle. 
Excise concession to a particular industry resulted in similar demands by other 
industries, causing unsettling effects on producers, consumers, and the administration. 
Some of the goods exempted from the excise duties were technical, 
educational and research institute, goods of welfare of defence personnel, goods 
donated to the National Defence Fund or to the Ministry of Defence etc. 
114 
vii) Controlled use of MODVAT System 
To tackle the cascading effects of input taxation of excises, a modified system 
of value added tax (VAT) or MODVAT was introduced in 1986-87. At that time, a 
full fledged Value Added Tax (VAT) could not be adopted as the Indian excise 
system was quite complicated with large number of excise rates and any major change 
wouldl affect the system drastically. Under the MODVAT scheme, credit of the 
excise duty and additional duty of customs (countervailing duty) was paid on inputs 
when used in the manufacture of the final products. However, there was restrictive 
use of MODVAT facility since the scope of the provisions of law was not readily 
accepted. Purchases, which from the economic angle clearly pertain to the 
manufacture of the commodities, were often denied MODVAT credit on technical 
grounds. 
viii) Exclusion of Services 
The excise taxes were levied on goods only, excluding the services from its 
base. Services form an integral part of manufacturing and the distinction between 
goods and services had minimized. 
In response to these inefficiencies, the government, time and again initiated 
various reform measures. However, a detailed study of these reform measures is done 
in the Chapter VI. The result of these reform measures was implicit, in the shift from 
union excise duties to a Central VAT (CenVAT). 
The prevailing structure includes (i) CenVAT (present name of excises), (ii) 
special excise duty, (iii) additional excise duty in lieu of sales tax, (iv) additional duty 
of excise on textiles and textile articles, and (v) cesses on specified commodities. 
(a) CenVAT: CenVAT is levied on all goods manufactured or produced in the 
country. With effect from March 1, 1986 MODVAT was introduced under the 
union excise duty as a system of giving credit for excise duty on inputs. 
Initially, h was introduced for a selected number of commodities. The 
coverage was limited to 37 chapters out of a total of 91. Overtime, MODVAT 
was extended and finally replaced by CenVAT in the Budget 2000-01. 
CenVAT has in general a single rate of 16% with some variations for select 
commodities. This coverage of CenVAT has been extended to all commodities 
except high speed diesel, motor spirit and matches. 
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(b) Special excise duty: There are three rates of special excise duty of 8%, 16% 
and 24% on specified products. Most of the items under special excise duty 
are final products but some of the items also fall in the category of 
intermediate goods. 
(c) Additional excise duty in lieu of sales tax: It is levied only on tobacco, textiles 
and sugar. As followed earlier, this is a tax rental arrangement between the 
Centre and the States with the difference that Eleventh Finance Commission 
has recommended its inclusion under the shareable taxes. 
(d) Additional excise duty on textiles and textile articles and cess on specified 
commodities are primarily meant to raise resources for the development of 
concerned industries. The revenue department administers it but some other 
departments also contribute in this endeavour. 
The structure and procedures under CenVAT as given above indicates that the 
new system results in transparency of the tax burden under union excise duty. In 
addition, it reduces cascading effect of input taxation as well as pyramiding effect of 
the tax. Also, it generates a mechanism to check evasion of tax through self-policing. 
In addition, the reforms implemented under excises have simplified its 
structure especially through CenVAT. While previously there were large numbers of 
rates, over the years it has been brought down considerably and the general rate of 
CenVAT is 16%. Apart from rationalization of rate structure, exemption notifications 
have also been curtailed and the specific rates are converted into ad valorem rates. 
Further, the rate structure of CenVAT is linked to the Harmonized System of 
Nomenclature (HSN) present in a number of countries for providing help in 
international trade. 
Weaknesses of the System under CenVAT 
The existing structure of CenVAT and the procedures for its administration 
are characterization by the following weaknesses: 
(a) The existing procedures for physical controls are outmoded. In the context of 
the liberalized economy the physical control system should be replaced by 
self-assessment procedure. 
(b) The provision of registration of wholesalers has created number of loopholes 
since there was no distinction between a manufacturer, first stage, second 
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stage dealer and so on. This facility should be restricted to only the first-stage 
dealers. 
(c) The coverage of CenVAT has not been extended to all the commodities. 
(d) Misuse of CenVAT tax crediting provisions and widespread evasion also. 
Excise duty Reform Measures 
The CenVAT structure requires immediate reform measures to be initiated by the 
Central government. These measures are; 
(a) The administrative reform of excises is the most important aspect of the 
reform policy. 
(b) There is a strong case for carefully reviewing the large number of products, 
which enjoy complete exemption. Apart from loss of revenue, such 
exemptions affect the CenVAT chain, which provides the core value of VAT-
type taxes. Many products need to restored to the CenVAT rate of 16%. 
(c) Also, the role of special excise should be limited to few luxury consumer 
products such as cars, refi-igerators etc. The rates of such duties should be in 
the range 5to 15%. Apart from raising much needed additional revenue, such 
taxes would counter the regressive nature of a uniform CenVAT. 
(d) The service tax should be integrated with the CenVAT/excise structure. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The analysis on excise duties so far, reveals some important aspects. The 
excise system has witnessed certain far-reaching changes. At the Central level, at the 
time of Independence, India inherited a system of commodity taxation wherein union 
excise duties were levied on about a dozen articles yielding a small proportion of total 
tax revenue to the Centre. Following Independence, the rates were raised, the base 
was enlarged and more and more items were brought into its net, thereby, resulting in 
more revenues also. Excises were levied not only on finished goods, but also on raw 
materials, intermediate goods and capital goods. 
Though there was decline in revenue accruing from excises during the decade 
of eighties and nineties. But situation improved and the share of excise duties intotal 
tax revenue of the central goverrmient again increased. Excise duties have come to 
occupy a dominant position in the revenue growth of the Central government. The 
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calculated buoyancy and growth rate estimates of excises reveals the same scenario. 
The buoyancy and growth rate are moving simultaneously i.e if one is increasing, the 
other is also increasing and vice-versa. But when comparing the trend during the pre-
MODVAT period with post-MODVAT period, buoyancy rate has declined from 1.07 
to 0.94, i.e, from an income-buoyant source it has turned into a non-buoyant source. 
But the growth rate has increased from 12.8% to 13.46%. It impUes that the 
growth rate in GDP has been much faster than the growth rate of excises explaining 
fall in its income buoyancy. Except in the decadal period 1990-2000 and overall 
period 1970-2004, when both buoyancy and growth rates are lower, in other decadal 
periods buoyancy and growth rates are rising. 
However, the overall weak revenue performance of central excises cannot be 
adequately explained by the reduction in rates. Other possible explanations include 
proliferation of exempted products, the wrong use of CenVAT tax crediting 
provisions and widespread evasion. Reforms of excise include administrative reforms, 
single CenVAT rate of 16%, limited number of special excises on consumer products 
and finally integrating service tax with the CenVAT. 
' Webster's New International Dictionary, Quoted in the Report of the Central Excise Reorganization 
Committee, 1963, The Manager of Publications, Delhi-8, p.3. 
" Excise duties on liquor and other narcotics are imposed by the State government under provisions of 
entry 51 of List II (State List) in the Seventh Schedule. The Centre under Article 268 levies duties of 
excise on medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol but they are collected and appropriated 
by the States within which they are leviable. These are levied by the Centre to ensure uniformity in 
their rate throughout the country.Apart from allocating taxation powers, the Constitution also provides 
for the sharing of certain taxes between the Centre and the States. Prior to the constitution (Eightieth 
Amendment) Act, 2000, excise duties belonged to the category of taxes, which may be divided between 
the Centre, and the States (Article 272) and the subject matter of this division fell within the purview of 
the Finance Commission. [Article 280, 3 (a)]. The sharing of excise duties was permissive and 
therefore the States did not enjoy a constitutional right to claim a share out of the revenues from central 
excises. However successive Finance Commission took the view that permissive sharing, contemplated 
under article 272 was not only justified but also even necessary in view of the growing financial needs 
of the States. Therefore, ever since April 1,1952, the states got a share of the proceeds of Central 
excises. The Tenth Finance Commission fixed this share at 47.5 percent for the quinquennuim 1995-
2000. However the Constitution (Eightieth Amendment) Act, 2000 substituted a new Article for Article 
270 under which states are now given a percentage share of all central taxes and duties. However, the 
surcharge levied for purposes of the Union under Article 271 is excluded from the divisible pool. 
Moreover, Article 272 of the Constitution was omitted by the same amendment. 
' Report of the Central Excise Reorganization Committee, 1963. 
* Tariff Item no. 68 was introduced in the budget for 1975-76 and encompassed all goods not elsewhere 
specified in the excise tariff. The rate of duty on this catch-all-item was 1 percent ad valorem in the 
year of introduction and the objective of duty was purely revenue in purpose. Subsequently, the rate of 
duty was raised to 2 % in 1977-78, 5 % in 1978-79, 8% in 1980-81, 10% in 1983-84 and 12% in 1985-
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86. This residual tariff item was abolished with the introduction of harmonized system of commodity 
classification introduced from February 28, 1986. The large assortment of commodities under this 
head got scattered under proper heads in the new nomenclature of excise tariff. 
^ The history of excise tariff classification dates back to the year 1944 when the Central Excises and 
Salt Act was passed, combining separate laws for different goods. This Act of 1944 covered 11 tariff 
items, which were arranged in alphabetical order. 
'' Physical production in case of specific duties and value (production x price) in the case of ad valorem 
rates. 
^ The formula for buoyancy is the same as for elasticity with the difference that tax revenue in the case 
of buoyancy is to be considered in aggregate while for elasticity it has to be interpreted as net of 
discretionary changes. 
'* Excises are levied in specific and \ or ad valorem forms. A specific or volumetric duty represents a 
fixed amount of tax on a unit of the physical quantity of the product. This type of duty is generally 
preferred for commodities the classifications and sub-classifications of which are not numerous i.e. the 
commodity is standardized, e.g. sugar. Specific duties are easy to apply and have the potential and 
psychological advantages of obscuring the actual ratio of the tax to the selling price. They are, 
however, price-neutral i.e. price changes, if any, in the product do not affect the revenue yield. Specific 
duties are quality-neutral also unless differential rates prescribed with reference to the quality of the 
product. Ad valorem duties are imposed as a fixed percentage of the price of the product taxed. They 
are preferred when a commodity has many classifications and sub-classifications, e.g. textiles. Ad 
valorem duties are responsive to price changes and thus help maintain the proportion of taxes in 
national income. The main problem in applying ad valorem rates is the determination of the tax base, 
i.e. valuation of production. 
' Indian Tax Foundation, Excise duties in India 1894-2001 
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CHAPTER-V 
INDIRECT STATE TAXES WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON SALES TAXES 
Introduction 
As we have already discussed in Chapter I that indirect/commodity taxes play 
a crucial role in revenue generation at both Central and State levels. At the Central 
level, union excise duties as a commodity tax has emerged as a major source of 
revenue and was the subject matter of Chapter IV. Now, in this Chapter the case of 
State government's indirect taxes; the significance, trends and issues in Sales tax are 
examined. 
The study also takes into account the difficulties faced by the States in 
implementing sales tax. In response to these problems, the governments at both the 
levels, undertook various efforts. A brief outline is done of these measures that 
resulted in implementing State VAT. 
Another important problem confronted by all the States was the interstate tax 
or central sales tax (CST) that created severe impediments to internal trade and 
market segmentation, inequitable resource transfers with richer States collecting 
significant amount of taxes from the consumers in poorer States. The process of 
phasing out CST was also discussed. 
In this Chapter, another important aspect of the commodity tax system that is 
discuseed is services tax. 
Meaning of Sales Tax 
Sales tax (commercial or trade tax) is the most intricate and controversial 
aspect of the Indian tax system. It is the most important among the taxes raised by the 
States in India and hence it has an important place in the fiscal structure of the Indian 
States. 
Sales tax is normally an ad-valorem levy imposed on the seller with reference 
to the transactions or sale. On the basis of the stage of collection, sales tax is classified 
into (a) multi-point sales tax and (b) single-point sales tax. 
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(a) Multi-point Sales Tax 
As a multi-point levy, sales tax may be applied at two or more stages of 
production and distribution and is same as a turnover tax applicable at each 
transaction of purchase and sale. Multi-stage sales tax is politically advantageous\ 
beneficial since a given amount of revenue can be raised at a lower rate of transaction, 
which also reduces the temptation for tax evasion. 
The main disadvantage of multi-point sales tax is its encouragement to vertical 
integration of production and distribution processes. Producers of finished products 
prefer to produce their own materials and components, and this tendency harms the 
interest of independent suppliers, particularly small ones. Thus, multi-point sales tax 
discriminates against non-integrated firms. Furthermore, it discriminates against those 
goods and their consumers, which have to pass through numerous transactions. 
(b) Single-point Sales Tax 
A single-point sales tax applies to one stage, either at the manufacturing or the 
wholesale, or the retail level. At the manufacturing level, sales tax applies to the sale 
by manufacturer of finished product and is similar to excise duty. At the wholesaler 
level, the tax applies to the last wholesale transaction i.e. purchase by retailer. The 
retail sales tax applies to the final sale that means sale to the consumer. 
The main advantage of single-point sales tax is that it discourages vertical 
integration and promotes horizontal integration. As regards the stage of its imposition, 
the retail stage is considered the most satisfactory due to the following reasons: -
i) Sales tax at the retail stage is collected when final sale to the consumer takes 
place. Thus, it avoids the cascading or pyramiding effect of a tax. 
ii) A given revenue can be realized by applying a lower tax rate at the retail stage 
as compared to other stages because the margins of all middlemen are 
included at the final stage of sale, meaning thereby the enlargement of the tax 
base at the retail stage. 
iii) The desired change in the ratio of tax to consumer expenditure can be 
achieved more effectively in case of retail-stage sales tax. This will be difficult 
at other stages because the margins of dealers on various goods, besides being 
applied to the tax component of the purchase prices, may differ significantly. 
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iv) Sales tax at the retail stage can be shown separately from the price and thus 
made known to the consumer, increasing tax consciousness among the 
taxpayers. 
v) Expected changes in the rates of retails sales tax do not lead to changes in 
inventory position of the firms. Anticipated changes in the rates of sales tax at 
'other stages' may influence inventory decisions of the firms causing 
dislocation in trade cycles. 
However, retail stage sales tax has its own problems, the main being the large 
number of taxpayers in the form of small shopkeepers and scattered retail outlets. In 
developing countries, the problem of tax administration is more acute in view of 
widespread illiteracy, lack of monetisation, and poor accounting practices. From 
administrative point of view, this form of taxation is costlier and cumbersome, 
offering ample scope for tax evasion and corruption. 
Sales tax at manufacturing or wholesale stage is administratively preferable 
because the number of taxpayers is small and readily identifiable. However, the 
problem of cascading will emerge. So there exists a tradeoff between economic 
rationale and administrative efficiency. The relative weightage to competing 
objectives depends on political judgment and the economic circumstances under 
which the sales tax system has to operate. 
Origin of Sales Tax in India 
The origin of Indian sales tax can be traced back to Kautilya's Arthasastra. 
Though it ceased to be in existence after the 1S"^  century, the revival of sales tax in its 
present form in India should be attributed to the Government of India Act of 1935 
when India was under the British rule. Though Maharashtra (erstwhile Bombay 
Presidency) was the first province to impose, within a very limited urban and 
suburban area, a selective tax on the sales of tobacco in 1938, Tamil Nadu was the 
first State in India to levy a general sales tax (GST) in 1939 through a multi-point 
turnover tax primarily to make up for the loss in revenue arising as a result of 
prohibition. The tax was levied on almost all commodities excepting agricultural and 
horticultural commodities sold by the producers. In the footsteps of Tamil Nadu 
several other States soon followed and adopted a general sales tax during and after the 
Second World War. Like for example, 5 States adopted this form of levy in the 
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1940's. West Bengal and Punjab adopted it in 1941, Bihar in 1944, Maharashtra in 
1946, Orissa in 1947 and Assam and U.P resorted to it in 1948. By 1950, 13 States 
including union territories resorted to sales tax. 
The Constitution of 1950 that closely followed the main features of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, clearly divided all the tax powers between the Union 
and the States. Period following the adoption of the Constitution and upto 1955 was a 
transitory phase for sales taxation. It was with the Supreme Court judgment in 1955 
and through the resultant Constitutional amendment in 1956 that the power of the 
States to impose sales tax was clearly demarcated. The right to tax on sales within 
State (intra State sale) was exclusively assigned to the States and taxation of inter 
State sale was within the purview of the Centre. This was done through the Sixth 
Constitutional Amendment Act that introduced Entry 92 A in the List I of the Seventh 
Schedule. This authorized Parliament to levy tax on the sale or purchase of goods 
(other than newspapers) in the course of inter-State trade. As a result, the Central 
Sales tax Act, 1956 was enacted. 
Consequently, the States levy no sales tax on the transactions not within the 
boundaries of the State concerned. Instead a Central Sales Tax (CST) is levied on sale 
or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. The power to 
levy CST and revenue from this tax is, however, assigned to the State occasioning the 
movement of goods from one State to another (i.e., the exporting State). 
Fiscal Significance of Sales Tax 
Tax revenue is vital to every plarmed economic development. As we have seen 
earlier also, in percentage terms the share of States' tax revenue in their total revenue 
has increased substantially; whereas it was 51% in 1970-71, 57% in 1990-91 and it 
increased to 69% in 2003-04 (Table 5.1). 
The States' total tax revenue comes from three broad groups of taxes i.e (i) 
taxes on income (ii) on property and capital transactions and (iii) on commodities and 
services. However, the changes in States' tax revenue have not been in the same 
direction in all the taxes. Taxes on incomes have been an insignificant source of 
revenue in State finances. The Table 5.2 depicts that while their share was 0.92 % of 
States' own tax revenue in 1970-71, it increased to 2.08 % in 1990-91 and in 2003-04 
it was \.5%. The share of taxes on property which includes stamp duty, registration 
fee and urban immovable property tax has, increased from 9.02% in 1990-91 to 
10.45% in 2001-02 and further to 12.53 % in 2003-04. 
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Taxes on commodities and services have come to occupy a prominent place. The 
yield from these taxes rose from Rs.269.7 b in 1990-91 to Rsl048.24 b in 2000-
01 (Table 5.2). The share of these taxes in States' own tax revenue however declined 
marginally from 88.8% in 1990-91 to 87.7% in 2000-OL However taxes on 
commodities and services further include basic taxes in accordance with their 
importance: Sales tax, State excise, motor vehicle tax, electricity duty, passenger and 
goods tax and entertainment tax. 
Since Independence, sales tax has grown considerably in depth and coverage, 
and forms the mainstay of States' own tax revenue. As shown in the Table 5.2,in 
1970-71, the relative share of sales tax in States own tax revenue was Rs. 7 billion out 
of a total tax collection of Rs. 15.5 b. The share of sales tax has increased to 18.2 b in 
1975-76, 37 b in 1980-81, 165 b in 1990-91, 684 b in 2000-01 and 1126.5 b in 2003-
04. 
Additional Resource Mobilization 
The higher growth of sales tax has partly been due to the efforts of the States 
to mobilize additional resources for the planned economic development of the 
country. As and when the States were asked by the Plaiming Commission to raise 
further resources, efforts have been made to mobilize additional resources through 
sales tax either by increasing the tax rate or by changing the coverage of the tax. 
During last years substantial revenue has been raised through additional tax measures 
relating to sales tax. In contrast, there were no significant discretionary changes 
relating to the other taxes excepting State excise. 
Revenue Productivity- Buoyancy of Sales Tax 
In terms of raising revenue, the sales tax has been quite successful. The higher 
growth rate of the sales tax could be attributed to its buoyancy or its responsiveness to 
the tax base (i.e normal automatic growth in revenue due to the growth in the base). 
This could be estimated through relationship: 
Log y = Log a + bLog x 
Where y is tax revenue and x is state income. The relationship shows the 
percentage change in revenue in respect to a percentage change in State income. The 
estimates of the responsiveness of sales tax calculated show that the tax has always 
been highly responsive to increase in its base (Table 5.3). During the decadal periods 
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1970-80, the buoyancy rate wasl.54, in 1980-90; 1.11, in 1990-2000; 1.02 which 
implies that sales tax has been a buoyant source of revenue for the government. But 
the buoyancy rate was less in 1999-2000 as compared to other decadal periods and it 
shows that during this period sales tax was a non-buoyant source of income. 
Table 5.3: Bouyancy and Growth rate of Sales Tax of different periods 
Period 
Buoyancy 
Growth Rate 
1970-80 
1.54 
19.13 
1980-90 
1.11 
15.74 
1990-2000 
1.02 
15.26 
2000-04 
1.52 
14.59 
1981-04 
1.07 
15.32 
1970-2004 
1.15 
16.23 
The buoyancy is also calculated for the overall period of 1970-2004 (1.15) and 
the period 1981-2004 (1.07). This shows that the depressing decadal period of 1990-
2000 has affected the overall buoyancy of 1981-04 and so it's comparatively less. 
Similarly, growth rate is rising in the particular period when buoyancy is also 
increasing and vice-versa. But the two noticeable periods (as in excises) are 1990-00 
and 2000-04, where, although buoyancy rate has increased from 1.02 to 1.52 but the 
growth rate has in fact, declined from 15.3% to 14.6% respectively. It implies that the 
growth rate of sales tax has been much faster than the growth rate of GDP implying 
that sales tax has always been highly responsive to increase in its base. 
Structure of Sales Tax 
The structure of sales tax that has evolved over the years was complex and 
faulty. Since the sales tax were levied by the States in diverse forms, they vary in 
structure - the points of levy and the rates - as well as administrative procedures, 
though some common features do exist. 
a) Point of Levy 
Initially, the systems of sales taxation in India took two main forms - the 
Madras (or multipoint) system and the Bengal (retail taxation) system. Most of the 
States levy tax on just one of the sales from among the series of transactions taking 
place between the manufacturer and the retailer. This was known as a single-point tax. 
The States levying a single-point tax adopt either the first-point tax or the last-point 
tax. When the tax was levied on the last registered dealer who sells commodities 
either to the consumer or to the unregistered dealer, it was called the last-point tax '. 
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In addition, some of the States under pressure to raise more and more revenue have 
resorted to levies in the form of surcharges (SC), on the one hand and additional sales 
tax\ turnover tax (TOT) on the other hand. The surcharges were in operation in a 
majority of the bigger States, the base in some being the amount of general sales tax 
and in some, the total of both general sales tax and TOT payable. The TOT, which 
was levied at all stages of transaction of a commodity, was a multipoint tax. It was 
levied on gross turnover of dealers with sales in excess of the exemption threshold, 
and this applied to intermediate dealers even in States where the general sales tax was 
largely leviable at only one point. 
b) Rate Structure 
Rates of sales tax in Indian States had been so designed that the taxable 
commodities were treated differently according to their nature (i.e. necessities, 
comforts and luxuries). In general, "necessities" were either exempted or taxed at a 
very low rate of 1% to 4 % to help the poor strata of society. "Comforts" were taxed 
at an average rate of 10% to 12 %; and "luxuries" were taxed at a high rate of 15% to 
20%. This arrangement helped in providing not only social justice and equity but also 
promotion of trade and industry within the State. It also provided progressivity to the 
sales tax system in the country. 
c) Exemptions 
In general, most of the States provided exemptions on different articles and for 
a number of reasons. Like exemptions for necessities were granted to reduce the 
regressivity of the tax on equity grounds. These included commodities like basic food 
products sold in unprocessed form, books and maps (including student exercise 
books) and bicycles. Only those non-food commodities, which form an important part 
of the budgets of the lower income groups, were exempted from the tax. Like 
firewood and charcoal, hand-made low priced footwear, orthopaedic footwear, glass 
bangles, non-ornamented ivory bangles, kumkum and low priced (upto Rs.50.00) 
manglasutra. 
Exemptions were also provided as an incentive to industry in the form of 
deferment of sales tax, sales tax holidays, repayment of term loans from sales tax 
collected etc. Such incentives were provided to new industrial units located in some 
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specific area, small scale enterprises and the total amount of sales tax foregone was 
according to the fixed capital investment made by these enterprises. 
In many of the States exemptions were given for some specific organizations 
and institutions like military canteens, public hospitals and so on. 
Services were also exempted from sales tax as per Constitution, which 
empowered States to impose " taxes on sale or purchase of goods" and services were 
not included in this clause. However, exceptions were for electricity, transportation, 
entertainment, and professions (in the recent budget it is proposed to include the 
services of doctors and lawyers also in the tax net) 
Other exemptions included when two statutory authorities levy tax on the 
same commodities, one of the authority exempted the goods and share the revenue 
with the levying authority. For instance. Centre levied additional excise duty in lieu of 
sales tax on commodities like textiles, sugar and tobacco and revenue was shared by 
the States as per the recommendations of various Finance Commissions. 
Also, there were certain exemptions that were granted on grounds of 
administrative ease. This was due to the fact that a badly administered tax adversely 
affected the morale of the honest taxpayers. Thus, exemption was granted to most of 
the perishable agricultural and dairy products. 
d) Taxation of Inputs 
Sales tax was generally levied on the sale or purchase of all commodities 
including raw materials, inputs and capital goods except for some exempted 
commodities. Inputs were bought by the manufacturers at different rates depending 
upon the input treatment of the State concerned. This treatment under sales tax laws in 
different States could be classified into three categories. 
Firstly, total exemptions on inputs were allowed in some of the 
States\territories like Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab. This, 
however exemption was (except J&K and Delhi) only for raw materials used in the 
manufacture of taxable gods sold within the States. If the goods were transferred to 
other State, no exemption was available on these manufacturing inputs. 
Secondly, in many States concession was provided on inputs but the type and 
extent of a concession differed from State to State. Finally, in Assam State no 
concession was provided on inputs used for manufacturing purposes. However, small 
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scale manufacturing units (whose total fixed capital investment does not exceed 
Rs.6.5 lakh) registered as small-scale industrial units with the Director of Industries 
were allowed to set off or drawback by way of refund of taxes paid on raw materials 
after assessment. 
e) Taxation of Inter-State Sales 
The States levy tax not only on sale and purchase of goods within their 
territories but also on inter-State sales. To deal with inter-State sales. Central Sales 
Tax (CST) Act was enacted in 1956. The Constitution empowers the Centre to levy 
tax on inter-state sales but the States were also authorized to levy CST on sales in 
their territories. Earlier, 1% was the rate of tax and this had been raised to 4%. In case 
of sales to an unregistered dealer 10 % or the rate applicable on local sales including 
additional sales tax and surcharge, whichever was higher was levied. However, an 
amendment was passed to levy sales tax on consignment. 
After analyzing the structure of the sales tax as described above we can easily 
conclude that there existed large scale variations in the tax rates and the problem of 
multiplicity of rates. Different tax rates were levied on different types of commodities 
like necessities, comforts and luxuries. Also, exemptions were granted not only on 
necessary commodities but to specific institutions and certain services also. The 
treatment of inputs also differed from one State to another. Even inter-State sales 
created complexities and ill effects in the sales tax structure of the States. 
Problems confronted by the Sales Tax Structure 
The above description of the earlier structure of sales tax in Indian States 
exhibited the following weaknesses in the system: -
i) Complex Structure 
The Indian sales tax structure was considered to be one of the most complex 
structures around the world. The various laws, rules and procedures lay down for their 
enforcement made the structure even more complex. 
ii) Lack of Uniformity in Tax Rates 
The rate structure as presented above shows that there were large variations in tax 
rates among different States. These variations exist in almost all the commodities. 
Certain basic food articles like cereals, pulses which were necessary for human 
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existences were exempted in some of the States while in other States were subject to 
tax at a low rate. Articles such as toilet articles and cosmetics were also taxed 
differently and they were generally taxed at a higher rate. However, some uniformity 
existed in the taxation of luxury goods whose rates vary froml0%-16 % and they 
were levied at the first point. Although some uniform floor rates had been introduced 
to curb rate war but variations do exist in the rates of a large number of commodities 
leading to complexities and inefficiencies in the system. 
iii) Bad Effects of First-Point sales Tax 
Most of the States applied sales tax at the first point of sale, which falls either 
on the manufacturers or on importers from other States or from abroad. States prefer 
first point sales taxation since they were easy to administer. But sales tax levied at 
first point suffered fi^om many weaknesses also: -
a) The base of the first-point tax was lower than the last-point tax so the rates 
were set at a higher level to derive same amount of revenue. The high rates 
than resulted in increased cost of holding inventories and so higher interest 
payments causing cascading and avoidance of tax on the part of consumers 
and business firms. 
b) Taxes on input led to changes in relative factor prices, which affected the 
production process and created related inefficiencies. 
c) In case of first point tax or manufacturers' sales tax, commodities which had 
larger value added at the wholesaler\ retail level had an advantage of lower tax 
over those commodities whose value added was substantial at the earlier 
stages. The consumer durables had low value added and it was high for luxury 
goods, so the first point tax encourages the consumption of luxury goods. 
Also, it allocated scarce resources for the production of non-essential items. 
d) The first point also resulted in vertical integration of firms to avoid tax and 
affected the growth of ancillary industries. 
The sales tax system caused adverse pyramiding effect on the industry. Even if 
the sellers had set the sale price of goods with a profit margin, the absolute size of 
mark-up for profits increased due to taxes levied in the initial stages. The government 
however, collected only a smaller fraction of the income collected through taxes. 
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Sales Tax Reforms 
According to the Study Team on the Reform of Domestic Trade Taxes in 
India, "Domestic trade taxes in hidia are in need of urgent reform. The system that is 
operating at present is archaic, irrational and complex - according to knowledgeable 
experts, the most complex in the world." It was envisaged that for accelerating growth 
and for evolving an efficient tax system, steps should be taken to transform the 
prevailing sales tax system in the States into a destination based consumption type, 
retail stage value added tax (VAT). Introduction of State VAT is the most significant 
tax reform measure at State level. The State VAT has replaced the earlier State Sales 
Tax system. 
The process of reforms in the State level Sales tax system began with the 
Conference of the State Finance Ministers held on May 27, 1994, at the instance of 
the Union Ministry of Finance. In November 1999, the then Union Finance Minister 
convened a conference of Chief Ministers of States/ UTs, in which it was decided to 
simplify the prevailing tax system in the States by introduction of VAT. On the 
recommendation of the Chief Ministers, the Empowered Committee (EC) consisting 
of finance ministers from nine States was also constituted on 17th July 2000 to 
monitor the process of introduction of VAT. 
This decision was reiterated during the subsequent meetings held in June 
2000 and July 2001. The consensus arrived at to introduce VAT from April 1, 2003 
but could not be adhered to as States were not fully prepared both in terms of 
legislative requirements as well as administrative infrastructure required for the 
purpose. Only one State i.e. Haryana adopted VAT on the same principles as 
approved by the EC. 
However, at the meeting of the EC (Convenor: Dr.Asim Dasgupta) held on 
June 11, 2004, it was agreed to implement State level VAT from April 1, 2005. This 
decision had been further reaffirmed in subsequent meetings of the Empowered 
Committee held on Sep.23, 2004 and Nov.2, 2004. Accordingly, VAT has been 
introduced by 30 States/UTs . Two UTs, namely, Andaman and Nicabor Islands and 
Lakshwadeep do not have Sales taxA '^AT. The remaining three States/UTs, namely, 
Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry didn't introduce the VAT. Out of them, 
Tamil Nadu had armounced their decision to implement VAT from Jan. 1, 2007. 
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Recently, even Uttar Pradesh has decided to shift to VAT, with a change in 
government in the State. 
The proposed VAT is a multi-point destination based system of taxation, with 
tax being levied on value addition at each stage of transaction in the production / 
distribution chain. The EC has, through its deliberations over the years, finalized the 
design of VAT adopted by the States, which seeks to retain the essential features of 
VAT, while at the same time providing a measure of flexibility to the States to enable 
them to meet their local requirements. Some other salient features of the VAT design 
are as follows: -
a) The rates of VAT on various commodities shall be uniform for all the States/ 
UTs. There are 2 basic rates of 4% and 12.5%, besides an exempt category 
and a special rate of 1% for a few selected items. The items of basic 
necessities have been put in the 0% or the exempted schedule. Gold, silver and 
precious stones have been put in the 1% schedule. The 4% rate applies to other 
essential items and industrial inputs. The 12.5% rate is residual rate of VAT 
applicable to commodities not covered by other schedules. 
There is also a category with 20% floor rate of tax, but the commodities listed 
in this schedule will not be Vatable. This category covers items like motor 
spirit (including ATF), liquor etc. It is also pertinent to mention here that 
States have been given the flexibility to select 10 items each as "goods of local 
importance", which can be put in the 0% or the exempted schedule. This 
would make the tax system simple and uniform and prevent unhealthy tax 
competition among the States. 
b) Provision has been made for allowing "Input Tax Credit (ITC)", which is the 
basic feature of VAT. However, since the VAT being implemented is intra-
state VAT only and does not cover inter-State sale transactions, the ITC will 
not be available on inter-State purchases. The provision of input tax credit 
would help in preventing cascading effect of tax. 
c) There are provisions to make the system more business-friendly. For instance, 
there is provision for self-assessment by the dealers. Similarly, there is 
provision of a threshold limit for registration of dealers in terms of annual 
turnover of Rs. 5 lakhs (i.e. dealers with lower turnover are not required to 
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obtain registration under VAT). There is also provision for composition of tax 
liability up to aiuiual turnover limit of Rs. 50 lacs. The provision of self-
assessment by dealers would reduce harassment. 
d) Exports will be zero-rated, i.e no tax will be charged on exports and at the 
same time, credit will be given for all taxes on inputs/purchases, related to 
such exports. The zero-rating of exports would increase the competitiveness of 
Indian exports. 
e) There is provision for eliminating the multiplicity of taxes. In fact, all the State 
taxes on purchase or sale of goods (excluding entry tax in lieu of octroi) are 
required to be subsumed in VAT or made Vatable. 
f) Regarding the industrial incentives, the States have been allowed to continue 
with the existing incentives, without breaking the VAT chain. However, no 
fresh sales taxA'^ AT based incentives are permitted. 
Role of Central Goverrunent 
Since State sales tax / VAT is a State subject, the central government is 
playing the role of a facilitator for successful implementation of VAT. Some of the 
steps taken in this regard are as follows; 
a) The Central government convened Conferences of State Chief Ministers and 
Finance Ministers, constituted an EC to facilitate and generate deliberations 
and decisions on tax reform at State level. The necessary technical expertise 
required for this purpose was also made available through National Institute of 
Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) or otherwise. 
b) The Central government also got a Model VAT Bill prepared and made it 
available to the States, to help them in preparation of their VAT bills. 
c) One of the concerns expressed by States in adopting VAT relates to the 
possible loss of revenue in the initial years. To remove these apprehensions of 
States and to provide a measure of comfort, the Central government agreed to 
compensate the estimated loss on the basis of an agreed formula, on account of 
the introduction of VAT, to the extent of 100% of the loss in the first year, 
75% of the loss in the second year and 50% in the third year of introduction of 
VAT. 
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d) The Central government has also been providing technical and financial 
support to the EC as well as the States for VAT computerization and for VAT 
related publicity. 
Encouraging Experience 
Before the implementation of VAT on 1"' April 2004, apprehensions were 
there in the minds of both business community and State governments as well as sale 
tax/commercial tax department officials. However, the central government had 
endeavoured to mitigate there apprehensions. The experience of implementation of 
VAT has been very encouraging so far. The new system has been received well by the 
business community as well as the general public and the transition to the new system 
has been quite smooth. The EC has been constantly reviewing the position and 
resolving various issues that arise from time to time. The trend of revenue collection 
in VAT implementing States is also encouraging. During 2005-06, the tax revenue of 
the VAT implementing States showed an increase of around 13.8% over tax revenue 
of 2004-05, which is higher than the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 
sales tax revenues of these States for last 5 years (upto 2004-05). During April-June, 
2006, the tax revenue of VAT implementing States has shown an increase of about 
27.1% over the corresponding period of last year, which is quite remarkable and 
indicates that the VAT system has started stabilising and yielding the desired results. 
The total amount released to the States on account of VAT compensation 
during 2005-06 was Rs. 2,471.27 crore. The expenditure is likely to be higher during 
2006-07, since a number of VAT compensation claims relating to the year 2005-06 
have been filed by the States in 2006-07 only. As of now, only 8 States out of 30 VAT 
implementing States/ UTs have been claiming VAT compensation (http: 
Indlawnews.com). 
Reform in Central Sales Tax 
The interstate sales tax or CST was introduced at a rate of 1% on registered 
dealers, as a mechanism to trace inter-State sale. In subsequent years, it was used as a 
revenue measure and the ceiling rate on inter-State sale to registered dealers was 
increased in stages to 4%. But, the dealers had misused the tax by pretending inter-
State sale as consignment transfer and selling the commodity within the State. 
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While CST had been used as an instrument for raising revenue and more 
importantly, a vehicle for exporting the tax burden to non-residents, the original 
objective of developing a mechanism to trace inter-State transaction had remained 
unfulfilled. The States had also erected border check posts which had created a 
serious impediment to inter-State trade leading to trade diversion. The levy of CST 
not only created distortions but also led to adverse inter-regional equity implications. 
In a mark up pricing situation, the taxes are shifted forward and the consumers in 
poorer States pay taxes to richer producing States (Rao 2003). 
To overcome the problem of CST in the States and to promote economic 
activity in their respective jurisdictions, different economists advocate phasing out of 
CST in a planned manner. The phasing out of CST should, however, be calibrated 
carefully since the share of CST in State's sales tax revenue was increasing 
consistently. Moreover, zero rating of the CST would have reduced the revenues of 
the States and created budgetary difficulties in the short term, so the need arised to 
provide compensation to most of the States. 
In Jan. 2007, Chidambaram has armounced a gradual phase-out programme of 
CST by 2010-11. CST phase out would start from Aprill, 2007 on the basis of full 
compensation package to State. As part of a compensation package for revenue loss 
because of CST cut. States are likely to get the entire revenue from tax on 33 services 
that are currently being levied by the Centre. Chidambaram said an agreement has 
also been reached to make legislative changes, if required, to start the phase out and 
compensate the States. The CST is expected to generate more than Rs 25,000 crore in 
the next fiscal and if the tax is reduced by one per cent as planned out. States are 
likely to lose about Rs 6,250 crore. 
Taxation of Services in India 
Sales tax in India was confined almost exclusively to goods; services were 
exempt subject to a few exceptions contained in the State List of the Constitution. The 
exceptions, which the States had the power to tax, were electricity, transportation, 
entertainment and professional services. There is no such power under the Union List 
but under the provisions of the residuary entry of the Constitution the Union 
government has the power to tax services like on foreign travel, hotel expenditure, 
telephone, stockbrokers, non-life insurance, advertising, couriering, radio paging and 
a host of other services. 
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'Services' constitute a very heterogeneous spectrum of economic activities. 
Over a period of time, the definition of 'service' has also undergone change. Service 
sector now occupies the centre stage of the economy, so much so that in the 
contemporary world, development of the service sector has become synonymous with 
the advancement of the economy. The share of the services sector in the real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in India has surpassed that of agriculture and industry at a 
relatively faster pace, as compared to other industrialised nations. 
Service tax is a tax levied on service providers in India, except the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. The tax is levied on service providers who have an annual 
revenue of more than 8 lakhs, which encourages smaller service providers. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org) 
Taxes on services were imposed for the first time in 1994 at a rate of 5% on 
three services only i.e Telephone, stockbroker, and general insurance. Many new 
services were added in every Budget and the number has reached to around 96. 
Details of services are provided in the Annexure A.5.1. 
Considering the increasing workload due to the expanding coverage of service 
tax, it has been decided to centralise all the work and entrust the same to a separate 
unit supervised by a very senior official. Accordingly, the office of Director General 
(Service Tax) has been formed in the year 1997. It is headed by the Director General 
(Service Tax). 
Presently there are 65 Central Excise Commissionerates and 6 Service tax 
Commissionerates within the jurisdiction of 23 Central Excise Zones. The 6 Service 
Tax Commissionerates have been established in Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, 
Ahmedabad & Bangalore. 
Central Board of Excise and CustomsfCBEO 
The responsibility of collecting the tax lies with the Central Board of Excise 
and Customs(CBEC). Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) is a part of the 
Department of Revenue under the Ministry of Finance, Government of India. It deals 
with the tasks of formulation of policy concerning levy and collection of Customs and 
CentraJ Excise duties, prevention of smuggling and administration of matters relating 
to Customs, Central Excise and Narcotics to the extent under CBEC's purview. The 
Board is the administrative authority for its subordinate organizations, including 
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Custom Houses, Central Excise Commissionerates and the Central Revenues Control 
Laboratory. 
Constitutional & legal provisions behind levy of service tax in India 
To enable parliament to formulate by law principles for determining the 
modalities of levying the Service Tax by the Central Government and collection of 
the proceeds thereof by the Central government and the State, the amendment vide 
constitution (95"^ amendment) Act, 2003 has been made. Consequently, new article 
268 A has been inserted for Service Tax levy by Union government collected and 
appropriated by the Union government, £ind amendment of seventh schedule to the 
Constitution, in list I-Union list after entry 92B, entry 92C has been inserted for taxes 
on services as well as in article 270 of the constitution the clause (1) article 268 A has 
been included. 
Analysis of Service Tax 
The Service tax collections have shown a steady rise since its inception in 
1994. The tax collections have grown manifolds since 1994-95 i.e Rs. 410 crores in 
1994-95 to Rs. 14196 crores in 2004-05. 
Service tax revenue collection target for the year 2004-05 was fixed at Rs. 
14150 crores, but the actual service tax revenue collection stands at Rs. 14196.19 
crores. It indicates a growth of 79.93% against the actual realization Rs. 7889.97 
crores during the last financial year 2003-04. 
There is a substantial growth in the assessee base from 403856 numbers in 
2003-04 to 7,74,988 numbers in 2004-05. It indicates a growth of almost 91%, which 
is significantly robust ever after 1994-95 in comparison with 74% growth rate of 
previous year. The revenue and assessee statistics from the year 1994-95 to 2004-05 is 
as shown in the Table-5.4 below 
138 
Table 5.4: Growth in Revenue and Assesses of service tax 
Financial 
Year 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
Revnue 
Rs. Crores 
410 
846 
1022 
1515 
1787 
2072 
2540 
3305 
4125 
7890 
14196 
% Growth 
Base Year 
101 
24 
49 
18 
16 
23 
26 
25 
91 
79.93 
No. of 
Services taxed 
3 
3 
6 
18 
30 
27 
26 
41 
51 
58 
71 
No. of 
Assessees 
3943 
4866 
13982 
45991 
107479 
115495 
122326 
187577 
232048 
403856 
774988 
% Growth 
Base Year 
19 
187 
228 
133 
7.45 
5.91 
53 
24 
74 
91 
Source: wikipedia.org 
Future Proposals 
The Finance Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram in his Budget speech 2006, has 
indicated the government's intent of merging all taxes like Service Tax, CenVAT and 
StateVAT into a common Goods and Service Tax by the year 2010. To achieve this 
objective, the rate of Central excise and service tax will be progressively altered and 
brought to a common rate. 
Summary and Conclusion 
In the foregoing analysis, an overview is done of the system of State sales tax. 
Modem sales tax system has its origin with imposition of general sales tax in the State 
of Tamil Nadu at a modest rate on multi-point basis. Since then all other States also 
started levying this tax. 
Sales tax is normally an ad-valorem levy imposed and collected from the 
seller with reference to the transactions or sale at the single point stage or at the multi-
point stage. The sales tax system till switching over to VAT, was partly origin-based 
and partly destination-based. It's importance as a buoyant revenue source for the 
States has increased by leaps and bounds. 
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The buoyancy and growth rate estimated for the States in the period between 
1970-2004 and the decadal periods from 1970's show some interesting results. The 
buoyancy and growth rate were quite high (more than 1) in all decades except 1999-
2000 when sales tax was a non-buoyant source. 
Another feature that is noticeable in the estimates of buoyancy and growth rate 
is that except the two periods 1990-2000 and 2000-04, in all other periods buoyancy 
and growth rate are moving/changing in the same direction. In these two periods when 
the buoyancy rate was increasing from 1.02 to 1.52, the growth rate in fact reduced 
from 15.3% to 14.6%. This shows that during these two periods growth in sales tax 
revenue was comparatively more v^th regard to GDP growth. Moreover, it can also 
be concluded that out of the two commodity taxes; excises and sales tax, sales tax 
were a more buoyant source of revenue. 
Predominantly, first point sales tax was imposed by many of the States, 
rendering the tax base narrow. Multiplicity of rates and surcharges, turnover taxes and 
entry taxes loaded on to them made the systems complex and opaque. Moreover, the 
levy of central sales taxes (CST) created severe impediments to internal trade and 
market segmentation, inequitable resource transfers with richer States collecting 
significant amount of taxes from the consumers in poorer States. 
Various studies were done, since the Study Team on Domestic Trade Taxes 
submitted its report and the steps envisaged by these committees were to transform 
the prevailing sales tax system in the States into a destination based consumption 
type, retail stage VAT. The EC of State Finance Ministers was formulated and in 
1999 decided to implement VAT in place of sales tax. Though deliberations were 
carried on by the EC but a consensus couldn't be reached with the States and it's only 
in the year 2005 almost all the States agreed to introduce State VAT. 
The experience of implementation of VAT has been very encouraging so far. 
During 2005-06, the tax revenue of the VAT implementing States showed an increase 
of around 13.8% over tax revenue of 2004-05. During April-June, 2006, the tax 
revenue of VAT implementing States has shown an increase of about 27.1% over the 
corresponding period of last year, which is quite remarkable and indicates that the 
VAT system has started stabilising and yielding the desired results. 
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Another area of concern was the phasing of CST in a planned manner and to 
compensate the States for the loss of revenue as a result of phasing out. Chidambaram 
announced the gradual phasing out of CST from April 1, 2007 with a compensation 
package for the States. 
In this Chapter, another important aspect of the commodity tax system is 
considered i.e services tax. Beginning with just three services taxed in the year 1994, 
the ambit of service tax has widened substantially, in terms of coverage of services 
and revenue generated by them. A comprehensive Goods and Services tax (GST) , 
however requires the CenVAT/ services tax to be integrated with the State VAT's 
introduced in 19 States and 2 UTs on April,2005 in place of earlier sales taxes. 
The last point tax is akin to a retail sales tax in the literature on public finance. In the Indian context, 
the sale is taxable only when made by the last registered dealer to a non-registered dealer or to a 
consumer. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TAX REFORM MEASURES SINCE 1953-54 AND ITS FUTURE 
Introduction 
The analysis so far has highlighted certain features of the form of commodity 
taxation, its weakness and other cascading effects leading it to be termed as 
distortionary tax. Since 1953-54, with the publication of Report of Taxation Enquiry 
Committee, till now switching over to VAT, attempts are being made to reform 
domestic trade taxes. 
As a result different study teams, committees and commissions were set up. 
The present Chapter is an attempt to review them. Also, the impact of VAT, imposed 
in the State of Haryana, is also examined. 
Need for Reforms of Commodity Taxes 
The commodity taxes have continued to play an important role in the Indian 
tax system and they will continue to play such a role in future because direct taxes 
have a limited coverage on account of lower incomes. So, the commodity taxes were 
considered to be a better source of revenue for both Centre and States and less 
burdensome for the taxpayers also. However, commodity taxes in India were in urgent 
need of reform. "The reason simply is that the system that is operating at present is 
antiquated, complex - according to knowledgeable experts the most complex in the 
world and injurious to the economy in many ways."(Bagchi, 1994) 
While designing the tax policy it was assigned many objectives but its macro 
aspects were generally ignored. When the incidence of individual taxes were analysed 
certain problems were ignored like taxation of the same base by various taxes (such as 
Union excise duty. State excise duty, sales tax, octroi and entry tax) causing cascading 
and pyramiding of the taxes. The adverse affects were the plethora of rates on relative 
prices, progressive taxes on income and property and inequality in distribution of 
income. More importantly, administrative aspects of the tax policy were not given due 
consideration. We have already discussed in detail these deficiencies in the 
commodity taxes in the last few chapters. 
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The Evolution 
Reforms in the commodity taxes had arisen due to above-mentioned reasons. 
Also the decade of the 1980s witnessed sweeping reform of tax systems across the 
world and in India a beginning was made in 1986 with the introduction of MODVAT. 
Fairness, efficiency and simplicity have been the guiding aims of the reform. An 
additional motivation particularly in the developing countries was the need for raising 
government revenues to reduce budgetary deficits, which had increased drastically in 
the wake of the oil shocks in the seventies and the economic crisis that many 
countries had to cope with in the early eighties. The crisis that affected the Indian 
economy in 1991 necessitated the need to carry out some radical reform of the tax 
system, which was delayed for a long time. However, the current phase of tax reforms 
in India is linked to the ongoing structural reforms of 1991 related to liberalization of 
the economy. Reforms in the trade and industrial policies requires additional reforms 
in the tax system so that it did not act as a constraint on the growth of domestic 
industries or their competitiveness in the world markets. 
Various committees have been formed from time to time to analyse the tax 
system and the problems associated with it and suggested measures to reform the 
system. Apart from the major report on the tax system brought out in the fifties by the 
John Mathai Commission (1953-54), the Report of the Indirect Taxation Enquiry 
Committee ITEC (1978) was the first comprehensive and illuminating report on 
indirect taxes, which paved the way for an integrated commodity tax system in the 
country. It recommended a Manufacturers Value Added Tax (MANVAT) for 
replacing the then existing union excise duties. This report in the words of John F. 
Due is " one of the most exhaustive studies of indirect taxation ever made in any 
country." 
In addition to the ITEC Report a large number of studies by the scholars and 
other reports of different committees have contributed since independence, especially 
during the last two decades towards reforms in the tax system. Reports of the Tax 
Reforms Committee (1991, 1992 and 1993) sets the way for the reforms undertaken in 
the last decade. In the words of Bird (1993), h offers a "clear and sound guidance as 
to what can should be done." 
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Pre-requisites of Tax Reforms 
It has long been established that the tax system is complex and has adverse 
effects on efficiency and neutrality. It has also created a parallel economy. Tax 
reforms were initiated taking into account the criteria of neutrality, efficiency and 
equity. It also ensures fiscal autonomy of all the layers of governments. To achieve 
this, following are the main pre-requisites of reform measures: -
(a) Broad-based and destination based tax 
The tax system should be broad-based including all goods and services with a 
uniform rate of tax. The tax should fall on consumption and not on production of 
goods. This means that goods and services should be taxed in the State where they are 
consumed and not where they are produced. This results in free movement of goods 
and services. 
(b) Harmonised rates 
The complex tax regime should be replaced by a few tax rates across the 
States. In this regard, the reforms should harmonise the base for both excises and sales 
tax, as the rates of all the taxes are applied at the same base. This harmonized tax 
system should be efficiently implemented by more or less uniform administrative 
procedures. 
(c) Fiscal autonomy of the Centre and the States 
Proposed tax reforms should take into account the significance of consumption 
taxes in the finances of the Centre and the States and so they should continue to enjoy 
fiscal autonomy. Also, inter-State tax competition should be stopped. 
(d) Promotion of a National market 
In a federal economy, there should be a common national market and not a 
fragmented one. There should be free flow of goods and services among the States. 
This norm of national sales tax should be applied to international trade also. 
Adoption of a Value Added Tax as a Reform Measure 
As mentioned in the Chapter III, VAT is the most desirable method to combat 
adverse inefficiencies in the commodity tax system. In its ideal form, VAT is a multi-
stage tax levied on all stages of production and distribution of a commodity. It is 
collected in installments on the basis of value added at each stage of production and 
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distribution. Since an input is taxed only once, VAT avoids the cascading effects, 
which is the chief demerit of a generalized system of excise or sales taxation. Value 
added tax discourages vertical integration of industries to the advantage of small-scale 
sector. Since the cumulative effect of input taxation is absent under VAT, the impact 
of this tax on cost of production is limited to the amount of tax itself. By not allowing 
urmecessary cost escalation, VAT promotes competitiveness among domestic 
industries in the world market and thus generates favorable effects on exports. 
However, the operation of VAT has certain limitations in a developing country 
like India. Firstly, VAT is a comprehensive levy covering almost all production. It is 
different from excise duties, which are in many cases selective in nature. Also, VAT 
like sales tax is essentially levied on ad valorem basis and does not admit of physical 
production as a criterion for tax liability assessment. In India, excise duties were 
imposed on ad valorem, specific, and ad va/orew-cum-specific basis or even in the 
form of a compounded levy. 
In principle VAT should be impose at a uniform rate or at the most 2 or 3 rates 
at all stages of production and distribution so that tax credit claims could be made 
easily. However, in India though Central excise rates have converged to a single rate, 
sales tax is imposed at a variety of rates on different commodities by the State 
Governments. The higher the number of rates, the more complicated the operation of 
VAT becomes. Value added tax tends to be regressive in view of uniformity or 
limited number of rates. One way to ensure progressivity under VAT is to impose 
special excise duties on a select band of final commodities (luxuries) without 
extending the advantage of tax credit. At the other end, zero-rating or exemption may 
be applied in the case of necessities. 
Value added tax is more suitable under a unitary form of government, i.e. 
under a single tax authority for commodity taxation. In a federation, where different 
tiers of government enjoy commodity taxation powers, VAT would be difficult to 
operate due to problems of overlapping and lack of co-ordination. VAT can be 
advantageous only if it replaces both CenVAT and State VAT. It is unlikely that the 
States would agree to surrender their power to levy sales tax, particularly in view of 
its dominant and growing importance in States' revenues. 
Lastly, a comprehensive VAT requires an elaborate system of book keeping, 
involving numerous computations at each level of production. It calls for additional 
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and efficient administrative efforts to check and crosscheck the paper work done by 
the taxpayers. Apparently, both collection and compliance costs have a tendency to 
increase. The problem of administration was more serious in India where accounting 
practices were less developed, partly due to low literacy rate. It is much simpler for 
firms to file returns of gross turnover than the value added returns, which require, 
accounts of taxes paid on inputs. This problem was further compounded because of 
the prevalence of small-scale producers and sellers. These conditions deprive VAT of 
its theoretical advantage of automatic crosschecking to discourage evasion. Lack of 
proper recording of transactions and the unmanageable number of small taxpayers 
engages the administration in a futile exercise of hide and seek. This problem can 
partly be solved by extending the VAT system only to the wholesale stage and by 
exempting sectors dominated by small-scale production. For further simplification, 
VAT may be restricted to the manufacturing stage as is the case in India at present. 
Exclusion of retail and wholesale stages has significantly reduced the burden on 
administration without, at the same time, interfering in the working of the tax because 
they come at the end of the production chain. 
Now, in this section a study is done to examine the various Committees 
formulated by the Central government since the planning process started, and their 
recommendations, which paved the way for the adoption of VAT. 
Reform Measures Recommended by Various Committees 
The Planning period started in 1950's and since then various committees have 
been formed, time and again, which gave various recommendations to solve tax 
problems and some of them are accepted also. A beginning was made when the first 
Committee was formulated under the chairmanship of John Matthai titled Report of 
the Taxation Enquiry Commission (1953-54). The Commission was instituted to 
make "a comprehensive enquiry into the system of taxation in this country". 
The Report, however, exhibits the following broad features: Indirect taxes can 
be used as a means of progressive taxation, although in a limited manner. There is a 
scope for widening the base for taxation. According to the Commission, sales tax 
faces a number of problems including collusive evasion by the consumer and trader, 
lack of uniform rates, problem of co-ordination of tax between different States due to 
large-scale evasion and difficulties of law and administration. Another problem 
relates to wide disparities in the exempted "essential" goods of different States and in 
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a few instances, the power of imposing a sales tax ceiling on "essential" goods has 
been exercised by the Union with respect to commodities on which it continues itself 
to levy relatively high duties of customs and excises. 
The Commission had put forward various recommendations to solve the 
discrepancies arising out of the tax system. The Commission however said that the 
sales tax should specifically be a source of revenue for the States, levied and 
administered by them. The Union governments' intervention is allowed only in case 
of inter-State sales and specific intra-State sale as, for example, when raw material 
produced in a State is sold to a manufacturer in that State and the finished goods in 
turn figures significantly in inter-State trade. The Union's power of levy and control 
should be so exercised that there was no avoidable duplication and there was 
incentive for co-ordination between the States. Subject to this, each State should be 
free to evolve the system of sales tax best suited to its conditions. It also 
recommended the levy of a tax on inter-State sales subject to a ceiling of 1%, which 
the States would administer and also retain the revenue. 
The next effort towards reform of the system of commodity taxation in India 
was taken in 1965 when the Fourth Finance Commission (under the chairmanship of 
Dr. P.V Rajamannar) was given a term of reference by the Government of India to 
measure the combined incidence of the Union excise duties and State sales taxes and 
the effect of their incidence on production, consumption or export of the commodities 
taxed, examine the possibility of determining the proportion that the combined money 
burden of union excise duties and sales taxes bore to the sale price of each 
commodity. The Fourth Finance Commission found it difficult to carry on this study 
due to different reasons. 
Even if the Commission were able to determine the proportion that the money 
burden of the two taxes bore to the total price of a commodity, it was not easy to 
assess the effect that money burden had on production, consumption or export of a 
commodity while the factor of taxation had a bearing on the price of a commodity. 
For this, they have to undertake detailed cost analysis of each excisable item. 
Taking into account these observations, the Fourth Finance Commission 
examined the maimer in which better coordination between Union excise duties and 
sales taxes levied by the States could be brought about. This coordination could be 
achieved through a system of ceilings on sales tax along with a financial sanction in 
147 
the form of cut in States' share of excises in case a State exceeded the ceilings, but the 
States had expressed strong views on it. 
According to the States, the sales tax constitute a major portion of their 
revenue and any restriction on sales tax would affect their capacity to raise resources 
and inhibit the growth of industry and trade within their respective areas. Certain 
States had also commented that excise duties on commodities imposed a higher 
money burden than sales taxes and so ceilings should be placed on excise duties. The 
proper coordinated tax policy could be achieved not by a financial sanction but 
through regular exchange of views between the Centre and the States on problems of 
taxation and finding a solution to them. 
Since adequate data for determining the combined incidence of the two taxes 
and their economic effects were not available, the Commission could not recommend 
any scheme of ceilings on the sales tax rates of any of the excisable commodities and 
there was no need of suggesting a formula for adjustments in the share of the States 
out of excise duties. 
With changing circumstances new problems arise in the tax system and there 
was a need to review the existing tax system. However, there was increasing 
dissatisfaction with the indirect tax system. Accordingly, in July 1976, the 
Government of India appointed the Indirect Taxation Enquiry Committee under the 
chairmanship of LK Jha, Governor of Jammu and Kashmir (to review the existing 
structure of indirect tax system). The Committee had very wide terms of reference, 
which included the following: -
a) Review of the existing structure of indirect taxes of the Centre, State and local 
bodies; 
b) To examine the role of indirect taxes in promoting economic use of scarce 
resources; 
c) To analyse the structure and level of excise duties, their impact on prices, 
incidence on various expenditure groups and the scope for widening the tax 
base and increasing the elasticity of the system; 
d) To examine the appropriability of Value Added Tax (VAT) in the field of 
indirect taxation and if found feasible, to suggest the appropriate stage to 
which it should be extended - manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers. 
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e) To examine, feasibility of concessions in indirect taxes to particular industries, 
keeping in view the administrative and revenue aspects etc; 
t) To consider the interaction and proper balance between indirect and direct 
taxes in the tax structure while examining the role of indirect taxation in 
mobilizing resources. 
According to the Committee, the existing complex system of indirect taxes is 
the result of a more or less uncoordinated growth of major individual indirect taxes 
levied independently by the Centre, State and local authorities. There is lack of 
uniformity and abundance of diversity regarding rates, coverage, procedures etc. in 
indirect taxation especially in the sphere of State taxes like sales tax, octroi and the 
like. Also there is an overlapping of excise and sales taxation over a number of 
products. The committee also found that the existing indirect taxation does not have 
an adequate built-in-elasticity because each year the tax rates have to be revised 
upwards and coverage increased to meet revenue requirements. 
The taxes also suffer from a cost-cascading effect and results in inefficiencies 
in the tax system, like vertical integration, lower exports and also it becomes difficult 
to have an assured progressive and effective tax policy. 
Recommendations of the Committee 
The Committee was in view of initiating reforms, which ensures a sufficient 
availability of resources of the government and develop an efficient, result oriented, 
equitable system of taxation. The recommendations of the Committee were in the 
nature of both short term and long term measures, though they necessarily overlapped 
in certain areas. 
In the field of excise duties the committee recommended rationlisation of duty 
on final goods, abolition of input taxes, criterion of granting concessions and 
simplification of procedures for collection and assessment of excise duties. In the 
case of sales tax, the committee suggested that the State governments should 
gradually move over to a single point tax at the last stage (Para 8.16). It was also 
suggested that inter-State sales tax be reduced to 1% from 4%, sale of inputs to 
registered manufacturers be tax free etc. For details see Annexure. However, the 
government accepted some of these recommendations. 
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The above recommendations were made without taking into account the need 
and significance of long-term reforms. According to the Committee, a combined tax 
effort should be initiated to minimize the problem of cascading and overlapping of 
excise and sales taxes. It is in this context that the committee proposed the option of 
VAT system at the manufacturing level (MANVAT). "It would be prudent to make a 
start with 3 or 4 industries which produce final products.... Such a pilot project would 
enable Tax Administration to test out procedures and study the reaction of the tax 
payers" (Para 10.18). 
According to the Committee administratively, MANVAT is not much difficult 
to operate and problems will be minimum, since dealings are with big manufacturers 
and number of taxpayers will be small. The committee recommended that the tax 
credit version of MANVAT should be adopted ' 
In pursuance of the proposal made in the Long Term Fiscal Policy Statement 
(December 1985) to extend the Proforma Credit scheme which observed that, "The 
basic approach will be to move towards an extension of the present system of 
proforma credit to all excisable commodities with the exception of a few like 
petroleum, tobacco, and textile products. This programme would amount to a 
modified system of VAT or MODVAT for short". The Government introduced a 
modified system of value added tax or MODVAT in the budget for 1986-87. The 
scheme became operational with effect from Marchl, 1986. MODVAT ushered in a 
new era in the system of excise taxation as it permitted instant credit to manufacturers 
on the duty paid on bought out inputs and intermediates and thereby affected the 
rising incidence of the cascade effect of excise and countervailing duties on the final 
products. In the budget 1987-88, MODVAT was extended to most excisable 
commodities. The underlying objective of MODVAT was to minimize the cascade 
effect and at the same time achieve revenue neutrality. To avoid a fall in revenue 
following MODVAT, the rates had been suitably adjusted upwards in 1986-87 budget 
and more rates were adjusted and raised in 1987-88. 
Although the committee had made far-reaching recommendations but the 
nature of the problem it was analyzing, it could not recommend an overhauling of the 
entire system without suggesting that the authorities should gather experience about 
the new system. To this end, therefore, its recommendations fall into short term and 
long-term proposals. Furthermore, it was facing a difficult issue in the form of merger 
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of sales tax with union excise duties. The solution involved the will and aspirations of 
the States, their past experiences with the Centre and various economic and political 
questions. The committee decided in favour of retention of sales tax by the States for 
the time being. However, it recommended a long-term switch towards VAT system 
right through indirect taxation at both the Centre and State levels together with the 
abolition of octroi at the State level. 
Under the New Economic Policy (NEP) 1991, the Government of India had 
realized that restructuring of the complicated tax structure was required for the 
transformation of the economy. Accordingly, the Tax Reforms Committee under the 
chairmanship of Prof. Raja J. Chelliah was appointed in 1991. The broad terms of 
reference of the committee were to examine and make recommendations on: -
(a) ways of improving the elasticity of tax revenues, both direct and indirect, and 
increasing the share of direct taxes as a proportion of total tax revenues and of 
GDP; 
(b) making the tax system fairer and broad-based with necessary rate adjustments, 
particularly with regard to commodity taxation and personal taxation; 
(c) simplification and rationalization of the structure of excise duties for better tax 
compliance and administration. 
(d) the scope of extending the MOD VAT scheme etc. 
According to the Committee, the Structural Adjustment Programme initiated 
by several countries includes tax reform as an important part but comprehensive tax 
reform has gained mass momentum. According to the committee, to the extent the 
MODVAT operates, the union excise does not cause distortions in the producers' 
choice of inputs. The exporters were greatly benefited, because all inputs were 
relieved of excise and\or countervailing excise on imports. Cascading continues when 
excise taxes fall on machinery, accessories, fitting tools, office equipment and 
vehicles. However, in other countries, capital goods have been treated like other 
inputs to concentrate the tax on consumption and to encourage saving. 
The Committee had listed various problems faced by the commodity tax 
system and these were similar to what other committees had pointed out i.e 
exemptions to small sector under the excise system, the cascading effect of CST, 
biasedness of the inter-State sales tax etc. 
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Also the system of tax administration in respect of both direct and indirect 
taxes required much improvement. Record keeping was in bad shape and new 
methods of detecting evasion were not being developed. Unsrucupulous taxpayers 
who indulged in large-scale tax evasion continued to do so with impunity either 
because there was little chance of detection or because they had made suitable 
arrangements with the tax officers. 
Reform Measures 
The committee had planned out a number of reform measures with regard to 
"the criterion of a sound tax structure i.e. equity, economic efficiency and 
administrative tax." The constant refrain of this report was that the tax system should 
be broad-based, simple and should have moderate rates. 
(a) The first major reform should be to convert the existing MOD VAT into a full-
fledged VAT system at the Central level. For this it is necessary to simplify 
the excise-cum-MODVAT system, expand its base, removal of most 
exemptions, and increase its income and price elasticity. 
(b) The committee also recommended the replacement of specific duties by ad-
valorem rates not only for introducing full-fledged VAT at the manufacturing 
level, but also for enhanced elasticity of revenue with respect to the national 
income and buoyancy in revenue on account of increase in prices. 
(c) For broadening the tax base and lowering of rates, services must be brought 
under taxation. The service tax must be part of VAT in course of time and 
should be levied at the Central level. A cascading type services tax should be 
avoided at all costs. 
(d) There must be selective excises on specified products- mainly commodities of 
luxury or non-essential consumption and goods whose use must be 
discouraged for purposes of conservation and\or protection of the 
environment. To make the VAT system simple and easily administrable, it 
should be levied at two or three rates, say, at 10, 15 or 20 per cent. The 
selective excise duties on non-essential consumption could be levied at 30, 40 
or 50 percent. This means that maximum rate on a commodity would not 
exceed 50 percent with a few exceptions like cigarettes. 
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(e) It would be ideal if there were one comprehensive VAT and limited 
exemptions replacing the present system of Central excise, the State sales tax 
and other indirect taxes except the State levy on alcoholic liquor and the State 
entertairmient tax. The proceeds of the tax could be shared between the Centre 
and the States. 
(f) Any reform of tax structure had to be accompanied by a reform of tax 
administration, if complete benefits were to be derived from the tax reforms. 
(g) The imposition of the consignment tax as demanded by the States, taken 
together with the existing CST, both being levied at a maximum rate of 4% 
would lead to inefficient allocation of resources and subsequent loss of 
welfare of the backward or less industrialized States and not enabling the 
States to raise more revenues. This was because a tax at 4% of the value of 
inter-State sales, together with a consignment tax, in addition to the tax 
embedded in the costs through the taxation of inputs in the producing States, 
acted as a strong barrier to inter-regional trade within the borders of the 
country and fragments the common market. Such fragmentation goes contrary 
to the attempts being made to integrate the Indian economy with the world 
economy. 
Yet another important and comprehensive report in the direction of reform of 
indirect taxes especially State sales tax and Central excises, was by Dr. Amaresh 
Bagchi, titled "Reform of Domestic Trade Taxes in India", 1994. According to the 
Report, the need for reforms of domestic indirect taxes i.e. Central excises and State 
sales tax arised due to various factors: -
a) The system presently operational was complex, in the sense of, laws and 
procedures, structure and violates canons of taxation- equity, efficiency and 
neutrality. 
b) The decade of 1980's saw commendable changes in the tax systems across the 
world reflecting the importance of the taxes in the growth and development of 
the economy. 
c) Also the need arises, in the developing countries for the governments to 
enhance their revenue generating capacities to cover deficit budgets arising 
due to oil shocks in seventies and economic crisis of early eighties. 
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d) The crisis that shocks the economy in 1991 and the structural adjustment 
programme thus initiated required the reforms of the tax system, which were 
even otherwise long overdue. 
e) The Chelliah Committee (TRC, 1991) recommended measures for direct taxes 
and comprehensive reform of domestic indirect taxes was yet to be 
undertaken. 
According to the Report, the operation of both these taxes had given rise to 
problems and inefficiencies that cost the economy dearly in many ways: Loss of 
output, growth and welfare; inefficiency and high cost in industry and trade; 
impediments to the free flow of trade within the country and growth of the common 
market that the Indian Union offers; inter-jurisdictional conflicts; and high costs of 
compliance and enforcement. 
The costs enumerated above arised essentially due to the following reasons or 
shortcomings in the present tax structure. These were: -
a) Heavy reliance on taxes at the manufacturer\first seller level; 
b) Exclusion of services from the tax base; 
c) Taxation of inputs and capital goods; 
d) High level and multiplicity of rates with too many exemptions and 
concessions; 
e) Taxation of inter-State sale and lack of harmony in States' sales tax systems; 
and 
t) Complex laws and archaic administration. 
Some of these were common to both excises and sales tax while some were 
peculiar to either one or the other. 
Reform Measures 
According to the committee, the primary objectives of domestic trade tax 
reform had to be to impart neutrality and transparency to the tax system, to minimize 
the scope for distortion, harassment and abuse. The following were the main pre-
requisites of reform measures: -
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(a) Economic efficiency and neutrality: - This implies that taxes should apply 
equally to as broad a base as possible including all goods and services. They 
should extend beyond the first point of sale and go as close as possible to 
consumers. Also, taxes on production inputs including plant and equipments 
should be removed. Internal neutrality requires the taxes do not affect the free 
flow of goods and services within the Indian common market. This requires 
that goods and services should be taxed in the State where they are consumed 
and not where they are produced. 
(b) Equity: - Consumption taxes (excises and sales taxes) are regressive and 
regressivity is reduced through differentiation in tax rates and exemptions. So 
the system that has emerged is complex and irrational. Equity is served better 
if the tax is applied to as broad a base, and at a few rates, taking into account 
both social policy and administrative considerations. 
(c) Simplification and harmonization: - International experience shows that 
simpler tax laws not only lower costs of compliance and administration, but 
also contribute to the revenue potential and fairness of the tax system. When 
the tax is applied to a broad base, at fewer rates, the tax laws would be much 
simpler, the costs of compliance and administration much lower and evasion 
more difficult. 
Inter-State and Centre-State harmonization of tax laws and administrative 
procedures could also make a significant contribution to the objective of 
simplification. 
(d) Fiscal autonomy of the Centre and the States: - When a certain degree of 
harmonization among taxes imposed by different governments is essential for 
simplificafion and effective enforcement, consolidation of all taxes into a 
single levy administered by only one level of government, to be shared among 
the Centre and the States, is neither politically feasible nor desirable. This 
implies curtailment of the tax powers of one or the other level of government. 
Given the significance of consumption taxes in the finances of the Centre and 
the State, it was desirable that they continue to enjoy fiscal autonomy with 
respect to the broad design features and overall revenue contribution of these 
taxes. 
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fe) Strengthening of revenue base:- Reform initiatives should not impair the 
overall revenues of the Centre and the States. Governments need revenues to 
provide public resources, to redirect resources to areas of social and economic 
priorities and to reduce inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. 
So there revenue bases need to be strengthened in order for them to maintain 
and improve the quality of the basic public services and infi-astructure. 
According to this Report some of the inefficiencies of the present system 
could be removed through provincial reforms or harmonization of rates among the 
States. But a long-term reform in the form of a VAT could help to stabilize the 
economy and firee from the clutches of complex and outdated system of taxation. 
To reform the sales tax towards a simple, neutral and productive system of 
indirect taxation, the essential measures included in the Report were: -
a) Replace sales tax by VAT by moving over to a multistage system of sales 
taxation with rebate for tax on all purchases with only minimal exceptions. 
b) Allow input tax credits for all production inputs, including raw materials and 
parts, production machinery, equipment etc., consumables and goods for 
resale. 
c) Inter-state harmonization and rationalisation of tax rates. The structure of tax 
rates should be replaced by two or three rates within specified bands, 
applicable in all States and Union Territories. 
d) Remove the exemptions and concessions except for a basic threshold limit and 
items like unprocessed food, concession like tax holiday should also be 
withdrawn. 
e) Zero rate exports out of the country and also inter-State sales and consignment 
transfers to registered dealers with suitable safeguards against misuse. 
f) Tax inter-State sales to non-registered persons as local sales. 
g) Modernize tax administration, computerize operations and the information and 
simplify form and procedures. 
h) Extend the tax base to include all goods sold or based with minimal 
exceptions, and services, which are integral to the sale of goods. The base 
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should also include services, which are predominantly of a consumption 
nature and can be taxed conveniently by the States. 
Union Excises 
TRC, 1991 had made wide-ranging recommendations for the restructuring of 
the Central excises taking into consideration the various problems in excise taxation. 
However, the Report of Domestic Trade Taxes in India proposed on alternate set of 
measures with TRC recommendations in the background. "The main components of 
the proposals were: 
a) Technical improvements in the method of valuation for more effective 
taxation at manufacturer level. 
b) Extension and generalization of MODVAT to transform central excises into a 
manufactures value added tax (MANVAT) as envisaged by the Indirect 
Taxation Enquiry Committee of 1976-77. 
c) Rate rationalization on the lines, suggested by TRC (1991). 
d) Provision of full and immediate credit for tax on inputs including equipment 
for exclusive use in taxable manufacturing. 
e) Broadening the base of excises by withdrawal of exemptions and extension to 
selected services. 
f) Cessation of tax-rental agreement between the Centre and the States in regard 
to levy of sales tax on textiles, tobacco and sugar. 
In the recent past, another Committee which had given some worth 
mentioning recommendations in the field of indirect taxation was the Report on the 
task force on Indirect Taxes, 2002 by Vijay Kelkar. Some of the reform measures 
suggested by this committee were: 
i) The Kelkar Committee has recommended that " through suitable legislative 
changes, the levy of central excise should be progressively based upon value addition 
to be applied only to the processing stage (of manufactured goods) which ensuring 
that the other areas of value addition not relating to the processing activity (such as 
Sales tax) was not entered into and possibility of double taxation was avoided." In the 
Budget 2003, this recommendation was not accepted by the Government. 
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ii) The Kelkar Committee had expressed its concern over the amended Section 
2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which empowered the Executive to rule upon 
what is manufacture and once it is clarified, the Executive would be in a position to 
demand the duty from the tax payer on all production and clearances made over the 
past one year, which would be a heavy burden. So the Committee had advised the 
Government that this provision should not be used regularly and it should also be 
amended. 
The assessment of excise taxes was based on the Retail Sale Price [Maximum 
Retail Price (MRP)] where when the goods were sold in large quantities for actual 
industrial use, certain relaxations were given. Manufacturers take undue advantage of 
these relaxations by taking the goods from the factory in bulk and get it re-packed 
outside. So the Committee had recommended that wherever MRP based levy be 
applied on an item, the act of repacking, re-labeling and putting the item into unit 
container for retail sale might be deemed to be amounting to 'Manufacture'. However, 
the Budget 2003 had again not accepted these recommendations. 
iii) Multiple rates of commodity taxes had long been considered a weakness of the 
indirect tax system in India.The Kelkar Committee, following the principle of 
replacing multitudes of levies by one rate namely, CenVAT, suggested the following 
duty rate: -
0 % - for life saving drugs, security equipments, food items etc. 
6 % - for processed food products and matches. 
14% - standard rate for all items. 
20% - for motor vehicles, air conditioners and aerated water. Higher rate for 
tobacco products and pan masala. 
Tea was to be exempted as coffee was exempted. Cement would continue to have 
a fixed rate. 
The Budget 2003, however, had created a three-tier excise duty structure 
namely 8%, 16% and 24% in place of four tiers- 4%, 8%, 16% and 32%. 
A very good simplification had been suggested for the textile sector. Uniform 
duty of 16% (later 14%) had been suggested on fibers and yarn. For all fabrics it was 
12%. All but 15 exemptions were to be abolished. Uniformity was to be brought about 
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by bringing all duties to the standard rate of 16% and in 2004-05 to 14%. But 
extending the CenVAT to weavers would create serious difficulties due to a large 
number of them being in the small sector. Although a very good scheme, but it was 
not implemented in the following budget. 
iv) Prior to the introduction of MOD VAT in 1986, there were provisions in the 
Central Excises and Salt Rules, 1944, under which certain inputs were exempted from 
taxation to minimize the cumulative effect of excise levies. Thus, Rule 56-A of the 
said Rules, introduced in 1962, allowed the manufactures of certain notified finished 
excisable goods to bring excise paid components (for example compressors for 
refrigerators) to take credit for the said duty in the Proforma Credit Account to get 
adjustment of duty on the final excisable good. Then with recommendation of the 
ITEC, 1978, the Proforma Credit Scheme was extended and MODVAT was 
introduced in 1986. 
According to the Kelkar Committee Report, the CenVAT credit was allowed 
in respect of inputs, which were brought into a factory for use for the manufacture of 
the final products. In contrast, the CenVAT credit was allowed in respect of capital 
goods used in the factory of the manufacturer. This distinction between inputs and 
capital goods caused disputes and litigation. So, the Committee recommended that the 
CenVAT Credit Rules, 2002 should be amended to abolish the distinction between 
capital goods and inputs and allow credit on all inputs brought into the factory (except 
those in the exemption list, such as office furniture, motor vehicles, MS, HSD, etc.) 
and on the capital goods. 
However, the government in the Budget 2003 had not accepted these 
recommendations. In contrast, with regard to the capital goods industry, the Budget 
had given certain negative features, which had adversely affected the sector. 
v) The Kelkar committee report recommended the abolition of multiplicity of 
exemptions and also said that if any help was at all merited it could be given by a 
transparent budgetary grant. Instead of accepting this suggestion, a number of 
location-based exemptions had been increased in this budget. 
vi) With regard to the service tax, the Kelkar Committee had suggested a 
comprehensive service tax where all services should be declared taxable and there 
could be an exemption list. But this does not seem to be a feasible option since there 
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were so many services about which the definitions were not clearly demarcated. Even 
the Kelkar Committee was not clear about 'what is a service'. However, in the budget 
2003, service tax had been raised from 5% to 8%. Ten new services had been brought 
under the purview of service tax. Also the facility of credit of service tax on input 
services had been extended across all services even if the input and the final services 
fall under different headings in the tariff structure. 
Vat in Haryana 
Now let's briefly analyse the situation prevalent in the State of Haryana where 
VAT had already been imposed at a time when no other State was ready to take the 
initiative. In 2003, Haryana replaced the Haryana General Sales Tax Act (HOST) by 
the Haryana Value Added Tax Act. VAT in Haryana is special for more than one 
reason. The first is that this was an experiment, for Haryana went ahead with VAT 
when all other States hesitated for different reasons. Secondly, this was an attempt 
after the failed experiment of Maharashtra in the recent past, and if it does not 
succeed, the whole programme for the rest of India due in April 2005, would receive a 
severe jolt. Lastly, VAT was implemented in Haryana without the bill having received 
the president's assent. 
The design of VAT in Haryana had been on the same lines as that for the rest 
of India. All dealers had been given 11-digit tax identification numbers, just as was 
being planned in the rest of India. The first two digits indicate the name of the State, 
and the second two, the charge of the department. The next four are the identification 
numbers of the dealer, one digit for the tax law and the last two for the correctional 
code. 
The rate structure consisted of three main rates of 4%, 8 %and 12%. Apart 
from that there were exemptions at zero rate (85 items are included such as 
vegetables, sugar cane, bajra, maize fresh fruits etc.) 1% for articles including jewelry 
made of gold, silver and other precious metals and stones and 20% for liquor, aviation 
turbine fuel and petrol. The number of items included at different rates were: at 4 % 
44 items were included like paddy, pesticide raw wool, safety matches etc., 8% tax 
was only for tyres and tubes. A rate of 12% was levied on all other items such as 
refrigerators, cooking appliances, cars, cooked food etc. With the rates being 4%, 8 % 
and 12%o, it became very easy to merge with the rates of 4 % and 12.5 % for the rest 
of India when VAT came on April 1, 2005. As there was only one item namely, tyres 
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and tubes under 8 % VAT, it would fall under 12.5 % category. And ail items under 
the 12 % category would obviously went to the 12.5 % one. This extra 0.5 % would 
give some revenue buoyancy to Haryana. Input credit had been allowed for capital 
goods also. But it had been restricted to capital goods used in the manufacture of 
taxable goods for sale only. 
The treatment of interstate trade was on the same pattern as the proposal for 
the rest of India. This means that input credit would not be given to the goods coming 
from other States but intrastate input credit would be allowed. No input credit would 
be available in the case of branch transfer of consignment sale or for any CST paid for 
interstate trade. The system of sale assessment had been introduced so that dealers 
could write down their own assessment, pay the VAT and submit the return to the 
sales tax office. The system that had been adopted for the calculation of VAT was on 
the basis of the invoice method. Under the invoice system, the dealer could take tax 
credit for all taxes paid for the input, which had been purchased, and debit this 
amount from the total amount of VAT to be paid. The balance amount could be 
deposited as the next sum of VAT that was to be paid in a month. The same method 
was followed under the CenVAT procedure. An audit team had also been set up. 
Revenue growth was the most important aspect by which to judge the success 
of VAT in Haryana. VAT had given the State 43 per cent additional revenue in 2004-
05. The State's revenue had gone upto Rs 4,778 crore in 2004-05 from Rs 3,346 crore 
in the 2003-04. The number of taxpayers had increased from 6,417 before VAT to 
8,504 after, which itself was an indication of the broadening of the tax base. The 
increase in revenue could be seen from the following Table 6.1. 
According to Associated Chambers of Commerce and Management 
(ASSOCHAM), certain revelations were made by the Haryana Finance Minister, Mr. 
Birendra Singh while having interactions with senior members of the Chamber. 
Mr. Singh said that the Haryana experience should be emulated by those 
States that were resisting VAT's implementation, an ASSOCHAM release stated. 
"Our experience has been that ever since Haryana adopted VAT, not only its tax 
collections have gone up but also the retail prices of essential commodities like grains, 
pulses, fruits and vegetables, electrical appliances, consumer goods have remained 
stable compared to those that prevailed in States like Delhi, Punjab and the like during 
2004-05." 
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Comparing the growth of the State's economy with that of the national 
economy after the State adopted VAT, Mr. Singh said, " while the growth rate of the 
nation's economy in 2003-04 was 8.4%, in 2004-05 it is estimated at 6.9%. In 
comparison the GSDP of Haryana recorded a growth of 8.6 % in 2003-04, which is 
almost the same as the national average but the growth rate in the manufacturing 
sector at 7.5% was higher than the national average at 6.6%. In 2004-05, the State 
economy is estimated to record a growth of 8.5 %, which is about 2 % higher than the 
estimate for the national average." 
Table 6.1: Total Tax Revenue in Haryana: Selected years (in %) 
Total tax collection/year 
Total Revenue 
Tax Revenue 
State's own tax revenue 
1) Taxes on income 
2) Taxes on property 
3) Taxes on commodities & services 
a) Sales tax 
2002-03 
86.6 
63.1 
55.5 
NA 
5.5 
50.1 
33.4 
2003-04 
182.48 
131.4 
111.8 
1 
9.5 
101.2 
71.7 
2004-05 
202.06 
151.6 
125.4 
1.3 
10.7 
113.4 
81 
Source: wikipedia.org 
Goods and Services Tax (GST): The Future of Tax Reform 
The Goods and services tax is a value added tax that exists in a number of 
countries. Some of these countries are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore 
and Sri Lanka. Firstly, an analysis is done on the structure of GST in these countries 
and examine to what extent they are successful. Then, the progress made in the 
context of GST in Indian economy is analysed. 
Goods and services tax in Australia 
In Australia the GST was introduced by the Howard government on 1 July 
2000, replacing the previous federal wholesale tax system and designed to phase out 
the various State and territory taxes such as stamp duty and land value tax. It is levied 
at the rate of 10% on most goods and services sold in the country. 
Economic and Social effects of GST 
When GST was introduced in Australia many critics have argued that it was 
similar to a regressive tax, which had a more pronounced effect on lower income 
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earners, meaning that the tax consumes a higher proportion of their income, compared 
to those earning large incomes. However, these claims were somewhat mitigated due 
to the corresponding reductions in personal income taxes. State stamp duties, federal 
wholesale tax and some fuel taxes that were implemented when the GST was 
introduced. Thus, according to the Federal Treasurer of Australia, Peter Costello, 
people were effectively paying no extra tax 
The preceding months before the GST became active saw a spike in 
consumption as consumers rushed to purchase goods that they perceived would be 
substantially more expensive with the GST. Once the tax came into effect however, 
there was plummeting consumer consumption and economic growth, that by the first 
quarter of 2001, the Australian economy plunged into negative growth for the first 
time in more than 10 years. The government was further criticized by small business 
owners on the grounds that administrative costs and red-tape had soared as businesses 
had to submit Business Activity Statements regularly to the Australian Taxation 
office, in addition to having to pay one eleventh of revenue for GST purposes. 
A Study commissioned by the Curtin University of Technology, Sydney in 
2000, argued that the introduction of the GST would negatively impact the real estate 
market as it would add upto 8% to the cost of new homes and reduce demand by 
about 12%. 
These claims might had been accurate during the early GST period, however 
the real estate market returned to unprecedented boom between 2002-04 where 
property prices and demand increased dramatically, particularly in Sydney and 
Melbourne. During the period 2004-06 Perth has also witnessed a sharp climb in real 
estate prices and demand. 
Tourist Refund Scheme 
The removal of import duties, as part of GST, had led to a change in discounts 
available when duty free shopping and the process for claiming tax savings. 
Previously, goods could be purchased from suppliers offering duty free pricing upon 
presentation of a current passport and airline tickets. The goods would then remain 
sealed until the passenger had passed through the customs area to an airport. 
Following the introduction of the GST, a receipt for goods with a combined 
total over AUD$300 was eligible for a referral of any GST paid upon exiting the 
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country with refunds claimed at a TRS (Tourist Refund Scheme) counter at the 
airport. The advantage of this arrangement was that goods purchased upto a month 
prior to departure might be freely used within Australia prior departure as long as they 
were carried in hand luggage and presented when making a refijnd chain. This 
obviously does not extend to consumable goods such as food & beverages. 
Goods and services tax in Canada 
The Canadian GST (French: Taxe sur les produits et services, TPS) is a multi-
level value added tax introduced in Canada on Jan 1, 1991, by P.M Brian Mutroney 
and F.M Michael Wilson. The introduction of the GST in Canada was, however, very 
controversial. 
Structure 
The tax is a 6% charge (previously 7% before July 1, 2006), on the sale of all 
goods and services, except certain essentials such as groceries, residential rent, and 
medical services, and services such as financial services. The tax is levied on each 
sale. Businesses that purchase goods and services as inputs can claim "input tax 
credits"(i-e they deduct from the amount of GST they have collected the amount of 
GST that thay have paid). This avoids "cascading"(i.e the application of the GST on 
the same good or service several times as it passes from business to business on its 
way to the final consumer). In this way, the tax is effectively borne by the final 
consumer. Unfortunately, criminals have defrauded this system by claiming GST 
input credits for non-existent sales by a fictional company. Exported goods are 
exempt, while individuals with low incomes can receive a GST rebate with their 
income tax. 
In 1997, the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland 
and Labrador and the government of Canada merged their respective sales taxes into 
the Harmonised Sales Tax (HST). In these provinces, the HST rate is 14% (previously 
15% before July 1,2006). HST is administered by the federal government with 
revenues divided among participating governments according to a formula. All other 
provinces continue to impose a separate sales tax at the retail level only, with the 
exception of Alberta, which does not have a provincial sales tax. In PEI and Quebec, 
the provincial taxes include the GST in their base. The three territories of Canada 
(Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavat) do not have territorial sales taxes. The 
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government of Quebec administers both the federal GST and the provincial Quebec 
Sales Tax (QST). It is the only province to administer the federal tax. 
Certain services have the tax added in such a way that the total cost is rounded 
to the nearest multiple of cents, due to limitations in the collection mechanism; for e.g 
payphone calls are taxed so that the cost is a multiple of 5 cents; calls payable at 35 
cents or less are not charged GST as the tax is under 2.5 cents. 
Untaxed items 
The tax is a 6% charge on all goods and services except certain items that are 
either "exempt" or "zero-rated". 
a) For tax-free i.e "zero-rated" sales, GST is not charged by vendors. However, 
they are still able to recover any GST paid on purchases used in making tax-
free good or service. This effectively removes all tax from these goods and 
services 
b) Tax-free items include basic groceries, prescription drugs and medical 
devices. Exports are also zero-rated. 
c) For tax-exempt sales, vendors do not charge tax on their sales. By the same 
token, however, they are not entitled to credits for the GST paid on inputs 
bought for the purposes of making the exempt good or service. Tax-exempt 
items include residential rents, health and dental care, educational services, 
day-care services, legal aid services and financial services. 
Implications of GST 
The high profile and public resentment of the GST led to a partial tax revolt on 
the part of Canadians. Surveys, anecdotal evidence and econometric analysis by 
economists all suggest that there was a substantial increase in the size of the 
underground economy in Canada as a result of the introduction of the GST. 
The political ramifications of the GST were severe. The Progressive 
Conservative government of Mulroney became one of the least popular in Canadian 
history. It lost the 1993 election to Liberal Party under the leadership of Jean 
Chretian. 
During the election campaign, Chretian promised to repeal the GST and 
replace it with a different tax. Instead of repeal, the Chretian government attempted to 
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restructure the tax and merge it with the provincial sales taxes in each province. They 
intended to call it the Blended Sales Tax, but when its opponents derisively called it 
the "B.S Tax," they changed the name to Harmonised Sales Tax before its 
introduction. Only 3 provinces agreed to went along with this plan. However, Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick and New foundland and Labrador now have the 14% HST 
instead of separate GST and PST. The decision not to abolish or replace the GST 
caused great controversy, both within the party and without. 
Current Situation 
Fiscally, the GST has accounted for 15% to 17% of total federal tax revenues 
each year since 1999. This is slightly greater than the annual amount of the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer itself. 
Many also argue that a switch towards heavier consumption taxes on the 
European model has helped the Canadian economy become more efficient and 
competitive with lower-priced goods for the international market. However, the 
effects of the GST in this realm are quite modest, and are regularly swamped by large 
changes in the exchange rate. It can also be claimed that the transparent nature of the 
GST has kept Canadians actually aware of their taxation. This has led to a major 
change in political culture so that deficit financing is no longer considered an option 
by the federal and provincial governments. 
The GST once again became an issue, as the Conservative Party of Canada 
reduced the tax by 1% (to 6%) on July 1, 2006 as part of an election promise and to 
reduce it by another 1%. But it could not be implemented due to weak majority in the 
Parliament. 
Tax-free shopping for visitors 
Currently, visitors to Canada may request a tax refund when they leave 
Canada by filling out a form at a Canadian airport or some duty free stores at border 
crossings. The visitor must send in original receipts with a stamp by Canadian 
Customs. Cheques are mailed to the visitor within a few weeks. Recently the 
government has announced plans to eliminate this refund programme 
Goods and Services Tax in New Zealand 
GST is a value added tax introduced in New Zealand on October 1, 1986 at 
10%, but later increased to 12.5% on June 30, 1989.End users pay this tax on all liable 
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goods and services directly, in that it was included in the purchase price of goods and 
services. 
GST registered organizations only pay GST on the difference between GST 
liable sales and GST liable supplies (i.e pay GST on the difference between what they 
sell and what they buy: income less expenditure). This is accomplished by reconciling 
GST received (through sales) and GST paid (through purchases) at regular periods 
(typically every 2 months with some qualifying companies opting for 1 month or 6 
month periods), then either paying the difference to Inland Revenue Department 
(IRD) if the GST collected on sales is higher, or receiving a refund from IRD if the 
GST paid on purchases is higher. Unlike most similar taxation regimes, there are few 
exemptions- all types of food are taxed at the same rate; for example, exceptions that 
are present include rents collected on residential rental properties, donations and 
financial services. Businesses exporting goods and services from New Zealand are 
entitled to "zero-rate" their products effectively, they charge GST at zero percent. 
This permits the business to claim back the input GST but the eventual, non-New 
Zealand based consumer does not pay the tax (businesses that produce GST-exempt 
supplies are not able to claim back input GST). 
Because businesses claim back their input GST, the GST inclusive price is 
usually irrelevant for business purchasing decisions. Consequently, wholesalers often 
state prices exclusive of GST, but must collect the full, GST-inclusive price when 
they make the sale and account to the IRD for the GST so collected. 
The headline price must always be GST-inclusive in advertising and stores. 
The only exceptions are for businesses, which claim a mainly wholesale client-base. 
Otherwise, displaying a prominent GST-exclusive price (i.e. larger and more obvious 
than the GST-inclusive price) is illegal. 
Goods and Services Tax in Singapore 
GST was introduced in Singapore on Aprill, 1994 at 3% but later increased to 
4% on Januaryl, 2003 and 5% on January 1, 2004. It is slated to rise to 7% on Julyl, 
2007. 
Singapore's GST is a broad-based consumption tax levied on import of goods, 
as well as nearly all supplies of goods and services. The only exemptions are for the 
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sales and leases of residential properties and most financial services. Export of goods 
and international services are Zero-rated. 
Objectives 
The GST was introduced as part of a larger tax restructuring exercise, to 
enable Singapore to shift its reliance from direct taxes to indirect taxes. The GST also 
enabled Singapore to sustain a lower income tax rate. 
The government argues that with an ageing population, Singapore's income 
tax base was expected to decline. With a broad-based GST, the taxation burden will 
be more evenly spread among the population. Thus, the GST was introduced as part 
of a larger exercise to put in place a tax structure to see the country into the future. 
A value added tax like GST also has several features that make it attractive. 
Being a tax on consumption, and not on income, the tax system inherently encourages 
savings and investments instead of consumption. The tax also has a self-policing 
mechanism that discourages evasion, unlike in a retail sales tax system or an income 
tax system where it would be relatively easier to scheme to evade taxes. 
Proposed GST increase to 7% 
More details of the GST increase will be announced on 15 February 2007, 
which is "Budget Day". Prime Minister and Finance Minister Lee Hsein Loong added 
that Second Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam would deliver the Budget 
speech. The 2% increment came as surprise to many Singaporeans, which was 
followed shortly after the 2006 general elections. 
Goods and Services Tax in Sri-Lanka 
One of the most controversial issues in Sri-Lanka today, the HST Act was 
made effective only on April 1, 1998. The intent of the law was to enact a system of 
comprehensive value added taxation in line with the U.K value added tax. 
Towards this end, the Act imposes a GST on supply of all goods, and 
rendering of all services, except those listed in the Schedule. At the same time, tax 
provides for relief on account of GST paid by the taxpayer. Thus the tax is only on 
value added, (http://en.wikipedia.org) 
The study of the experience of some of the developed countries like Australia, 
Canada, following the GST in their respective countries, reveals the success of this 
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comprehensive goods and services tax. It gives a boost to the countries like India, who 
are on the path of adopting GST in their countries. 
Goods and Services Tax in India 
In India, the Goods and services tax is a part of the proposed reforms that 
centers on evolving an efficient and harmonized consumption tax system. The Kelkar 
Task Force Committee recommended the introduction of goods and services tax, as it 
would simplify the tax structure. Presently, there are parallel systems of indirect 
taxation at the Central and State levels. Each of the systems needs to be reformed to 
eventually harmonise them. 
In the Union Budget for the year 2006-07, Finance Minister has proposed that 
India should move towards national level Goods and Services Tax that should be 
shared between the Centre and the States. He has proposed to set April 1, 2010 as the 
date for introducing GST. 
Kelkar (2006) has expressed joy and hope that "it will help India achieve 
economies of scale by becoming a common market and help India score in the global 
market for labour intensive manufacturing". According to Kelkar, first of all an EC 
for GST implementation should be set up and since, GST involves both Centre and 
States it should be chaired by the Finance Minister. 
However, Kelkar (2006), Rao (2006), and Srivastava (2007) have given 
different views about how to harmonise the taxes but these views are similar to certain 
extent also. According to them, by early 90's much has already been achieved on the 
way to reform the commodity tax system. But still a lot has to be done to complete the 
process of evolving an efficient and a harmonized consumption tax system in the 
country. According to Rao, such a coordinated indirect tax reform in an environment 
where the states give much importance to their autonomy is not quite easy. 
Reform at the Central Level 
According to Rao, although a considerable progress has been made by 
converging widely varying tax rates and extending input tax credit to convert excise 
duties into a CenVAT. Though on paper fiiU tax credit is supposed to be given for the 
prior taxes paid on both goods and services, in terms of actual operation, much 
remains to be done. Besides, to transform this into a manufacturing stage VAT on 
goods and services requires considerable reforms. 
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To transform CenVAT into MANVAT requires further simplification and 
convergence of excise duties, which, inter alia, also requires conversion of specific 
duties into ad valorem, with the exception of a few items such as cigarettes. 
It is also important to broaden the base of the tax. Almost 40% of the revenue 
from excise duties is collected from petroleum products alone and this concentration, 
particularly on a predominantly intermediate good creates severe distortions. It is also 
necessary to get rid of area-based exemptions and exemptions to small-scale 
industries and rationalize concessions on exports. 
A necessary reform is the extension of the scope of service taxation to all 
services and its merger with CenVAT, VAT on goods and services should apply to all 
services with a small exemption list and a narrow negative list. 
Once the service tax is made general, it may be merged with CenVAT to have 
a common exemption limit and tax rate. After broadening the base by removing 
exemptions to small-scale industries and area-based exemptions and general taxation 
of services, the revenue-neutral rate of tax could be worked out. 
A rate of 12-13% at the manufacturing stage would be equivalent to about 
10% retail VAT. 
Reform at the State level 
As far as the State taxes are concerned, the replacement of cascading and 
narrow based sales taxes with VAT is the most important tax reform in independent 
India. The major gain from the tax has been to simplify the tax system considerably. 
However, there is need to further simplify and rationalize the system. This 
includes restricting the number of items in the 4% category to basic necessities, and 
shifting the "inputs", currently taxed at 4%, to the general tax rate. 
In fact, the general rate itself could be reduced to 10% from the prevailing rate 
of 12.5%. In any case, taxes on all inputs will be credited under VAT and taxing the 
so-called "inputs" at a lower rate only reduces tax compliance. 
The real gains from the reform will accrue only when the tax is extended to all 
the States and tax credit is extended to inter-state transactions. This definitely requires 
an effort to be made by all the States to take up this reform process. 
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It is important to finalise the methodology of relieving taxes on interstate 
transactions to make the tax system destination-based and build the information 
system to administer the levy. According to Kelkar, the Tax Information Network 
(TIN) system, built by NSDL, is the right foundation for implementing the GST. TIN 
already reaches 600,000 establishments, and these are exactly the establishments, 
which need to be plugged into the GST. Hence, the IT development work should be 
initiated at NSDL now, so that it can be ready by April 2007. 
The method of zero-rating transactions at the point of interstate sale requires 
considerable preparation, particularly computerization to ensure that the items 
eventually zero-rated by the exporting State pay the tax in the importing State. 
According to Srivastava, the final reform of the CST lies in its abolition. The 
tax is levied by the Centre but collected but the State governments who are allowed to 
retain the revenue proceeds. It was introduced at the nominal rate of 1%. 
Under pressure from the State governments, the CST rate was progressively 
increased to 4%. Overtime, the CST has become an important source of revenue for 
some States that are known to be 'producing' States, it is paid by the citizens of the 
consuming States. As such, the CST has been a vehicle of tax-exportation violating 
the principle that the tax should accrue to the jurisdiction where the final consumption 
takes place. The total revenue under the CST is estimated to be Rs 19,345 crore in 
2006-07 as per the Budget estimates. Some of the major States such as Maharashtra, 
Gujarat, Kamataka, Tamil Nadu, Haryana and Andhra Pradesh have a comparatively 
high share in this revenue. Considering Rs 20,000 crore as the potential revenue under 
CST for the current year, a decline of 1% point in the CST rate would involve a loss 
of about Rs 5000 crore and the individual annual losses for the States could range 
fi-om about Rs 170 crore for West Bengal to Rs 550 crore for Maharashtra. Part of the 
loss would be made up by increase in the tax base. 
In addition, the State govemments are likely to be allowed to levy State VAT 
at the rate of 4% on inputs. This would be comparable to the countervailing duty that 
the center levies on imports. 
According to Rao, the power to levy VAT on sugar, textiles and tobacco 
products should be given to the States. But, the levy on tobacco products should be 
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only at the general rate and sumptuary powers of the levy will continue with the 
Centre. 
However, both agree that it is necessary to give the power to levy service 
taxation to States as part of the compensation. 
Rao, has suggested two methods of sharing the service tax powers. One is to 
give the States concurrent powers to levy the tax. The other is to share only the 
services of regional spread with the States, but this would neither bring in substantial 
revenues to the States nor enable proper levy of the GST at the State level. 
Then the individual States should be merged into the TIN, one by one, at an 
administrative level while keeping the State VAT distinct from the Central GST. 
Once there are separate Central and State-VAT systems, the next step is to 
work on the harmonisd GST at the Centre and a piggybacking levy by the States. 
Given the prevailing rate structures, on average both could levy the tax at 10%. This 
will allow complete input tax relief and reduce the compliance cost considerably. But 
to achieve the "grand bargain", the States have to agree and this can be done only 
when their fiscal autonomy is ensured. 
All including the Chambers welcomes the news of introducing GST in the 
country. According to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI), integration of goods and services taxation would "provide India a world 
class tax system even while improving tax collections and ending the long standing 
distortions of differential treatments of manufacturing and service sector."(Hindu 
Business line, 2004) 
This will ensure the abolition of taxes such as octroi. Central sales tax. State 
level sales tax, entry tax, stamp duty, telecom license fees, turnover tax, tax on 
consumption or sale of electricity, taxes on transportation of goods and services, and 
eliminate the cascading effects of multiple layers of taxation, it added. 
According to the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India 
(ASSOCHAM), introduction of GST would significantly reduce the overall tax 
burden and would bring down the "cost of compliance". All these proposed 
recommendations would lead to improved intra-state trade, which will benefit the 
common market agenda, it added. But ASSOCHAM "cautioned" on how the 
172 
government would intend to encourage investment in infrastructure, if the concerned 
tax exemptions are done away with. 
According to the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHDCCI), 
exemptions "should be phased out in a manner that the impact on the sector could be 
minimized and effective tax burden does not go up." India has not reached at a stage 
where we should do away with the exemptions relating to Section SOL and Standard 
Deduction, it added. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The review so far can be summarized in the following way. Commodity taxes 
(excises/CenVAT and sales/StateVAT) form the mainstay of revenue generations in 
the Indian economy and since these taxes are beset with several problems it has 
necessitated for tax reforms. 
A beginning in the direction of reforming commodity tax structure was made 
by the 1953-54 report, which had for the first time, listed some of the discrepancies 
present in the indirect tax structure, especially sales tax structure. To remove these 
discrepancies, certain suggestions were made by the committee and even the later 
committees also recommended various measures, continuing the reform process. 
Another noteworthy effort in this direction was the Indirect Taxation enquiry 
Committee Report 1978, which had proposed the option of VAT system at the 
manufacturing level (MANVAT) and it culminated to MOD VAT in 1986. However 
MOD VAT was transform into CenVAT in the Budget 2000-01. 
Yet, another important and comprehensive report was the Reform of domestic 
Trade Taxes, 1994 that actually paved the way for the adoption of VAT in the 
country. In the meantime, deliberations as to how VAT can be implemented was 
started in 1995 with the setting of Empowered Committee. Their effort had 
materialized in the form of State VAT at the State level replacing sales tax (2005). 
The imposition of VAT in Haryana (2003) shows a positive impact on the 
finances of the State. The VAT has given the State 43% additional revenue in 2004-
05. In comparison with the growth rate of the national economy, which was 8.4% in 
2003-04, Haryana recorded a grov^h of 8.6%) in the same year. In 2004-05, the State 
economy is expected to grow at the rate of 8.5%, which is 2% higher than of national 
average of 6.6%. 
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Than the Kelkar Task Force, 2002 had suggested to achieve VAT in its full 
form and recommended merging of CenVAT and StateVAT into a single National 
VAT / GST, as prevalent in most of the federal countries. As seen in the text, various 
countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and SriLanka successfully 
implemented GST. Experiences of these countries should be carefully examined and 
then efforts should be undertaken to implement GST in India. In this direction also, 
Chidambaram has announced in the Budget 2006, the adoption of GST by 2010. 
However, certain queries have emerged as to which model is going to be accepted. 
These queries are left for the future studies to be undertaken in this field. 
' This tax credit version has many advantages such as the possible relief for certain goods, a relief on 
the basis of use of labour intensive techniques, or the need to tax value added at stages before the 
manufacturing stage if it is not possible to apply MANVAT for some reasons. Rule 56-A of the excise 
tax system already provides a method similar to the tax credit one. Extension of this rule was 
recommended as the first step towards adoption of MANVAT. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Fiscal federalism deals with financial arrangements and their working in a 
federal polity. It refers to the division of revenue and expenditure fiinctions among 
Central, State and local layers of governments. An evaluation of federal governance 
raises the issue that whether the system of federal governance also yielded the 
economic benefits associated with federalism. The question however, assumes 
relevance, as it is the economic virtues of federalism that have come to the fore in 
recent years, drawing even independent nations to join in economic combines, while 
not surrendering their independence, the European Union being a prime example. 
Federalism, it is believed, helps to achieve efficiency in the allocation of natural 
resources by assigning governmental functions to different levels of government 
according to their comparative advantage in performing them. It is also considered to 
be an optimal institutional arrangement for the provision of public services. Also, the 
more decentralized the government is, greater is the chance that people's expectations 
are fulfilled and the government's portrayal as a Welfare State is achieved 
India is a quasi-federal set up where both Centre and States (including local 
bodies) are allocated tax and expenditure powers so as to meet the growing needs and 
diversified preferences of people. However, while allocating the powers between the 
Centre and the States, Indian Constitution has assigned most of the buoyant sources of 
tax revenue to the Central government and expenditure functions to the States. This 
has resulted in a mismatch between the revenue sources and expenditure functions 
and is called fiscal imbalances. These imbalances may be vertical (i.e imbalances 
between the Centre and the States, where the degree of dependence of States on the 
Central government is high and concentration of economic power is more with the 
Central government). India's federal fiscal arrangements are also characterized by 
horizontal imbalance (i.e inter-jurisdictional imbalance or inter-State differences in 
budgetary receipts and expenditure's arising out of differential per capita fiscal 
capacities). 
Sources of Tax Financing 
As far as the revenue sources of a government in a developing economy are 
concerned, taxation is considered to be the most important source. Taxes may be 
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Indirect (on outputs) or Direct (on factors) depending on the incidence of the tax. An 
analysis of the relative significance of both direct and indirect taxes in the total tax 
revenue of Centre and States reveals that the share of indirect (commodity) taxes 
(72%) in the total tax revenue of Central and State government is substantially larger 
than that of direct taxes (28%) in the year 2004-05. 
India's indirect tax system is unique, in that, the Constitution specifies the tax 
powers of different levels of government under three lists; the Union List, the State 
List and the Concurrent list. The Union list empowers the Central government to levy 
excise duties (now called CenVAT), customs, and income tax other than agricultural 
income. The State list authorizes the State goverrmient to impose Sales tax (now it is 
State VAT), State excise duty, electricity duty, entertainment tax etc. The transactions 
taking place between the two States i.e. the inter-state transactions are taxed by the 
Centre under the Central Sales Tax (CST). However, the CST is assigned to the States 
and the exporting State (i.e the State from where the goods are sent to the other State) 
collects the tax on the basis of origin and retains it. The fact is that out of the Central 
taxes, excise duty (44.6%) was the most important revenue-generating source for the 
Central government. While out of the different State taxes. Sales tax (36.1%)occupies 
the prominent position in the year 2003-04. 
In case of Commodity taxes, the framers of the Constitution had conceived 
excise duties as a tax levied by the Central government on a few commodities on the 
manufactures. Initially, it remained as a tax on a few manufactured goods and the 
revenue was also not very significant. States imposed a low rate of sales tax primarily 
at the retail level. Therefore, in the initial stages of introduction of these taxes, there 
was no major overlapping of taxing powers. 
Overtime, to raise more revenue, to fulfill the targets of planning process, both 
the Central and State governments exploited these taxes. Consequently, on the part of 
the Centre, excise duties were levied on all the manufactured items causing high 
incidence of tax. Simultaneously, new taxes in the form of additional excises, cesses 
on specified commodifies and additional duties of excise on textiles were levied. 
Similarly, on the part of the States, the concept of levy of sales tax on final sales had 
been ignored and States had shifted to a system of first-point tax. So, the tax was 
levied mainly at the level of manufacture and if not available, at the level of 
wholesale. 
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Thus, the two systems of taxation, excise duties and sales tax had been levied 
primarily on the same base. In terms of revenue, the two important commodity taxes 
levied by the Central and the State governments accounted for almost half the 
combined revenue of both the governments. This had caused extensive double 
taxation of the base at the manufacturing level by the two tiers of the government. 
Further, the same had caused considerable cascading and pyramiding effects. The 
result had been vertical integration of firms and lack of transparency of the tax 
burden. The structure of Commodity taxes was unintegrated and had given rise to 
several problems. 
Theory of Federalism and Taxation 
The conservative economists have shown a keen interest in having a uniform 
structure of indirect taxation to overcome these problems and even the government's 
policy reflect this view. A uniform tax policy is generally based on equity and 
efficiency considerations but there exists a trade-off between these two important 
objectives. However, the partial equilibriimi analysis demonstrates the non-
desirability of uniform rates. When the tax is imposed, the price gets distorted and 
causes efficiency loss. Then to increase efficiency in the tax system, the equity 
consideration is affected in the process. Various models are considered in this regard. 
The Ramsey tax model with an efficiency objective in view, has examined whether 
the uniform tax is preferable or not. In case of lumpsum tax, welfare rises. But on the 
issue of commodity wise variation no solution could be derived. The answers may 
however, be obtained by relaxing and varying different assumptions. 
But the equity objective doses not imply uniform taxation when the elasticity 
of demand differs between the goods in question. So only if the price elasticity were 
the same that uniform tax rates would be horizontally equitable. 
Apart from uniformity in the tax system, another aspect that is taken into 
consideration in a tax system in a federal country is harmonization of broad taxes (like 
union excises, sales tax, service tax etc.). 
It is also necessary to take into account the different theoretical principles that 
guide the federal fiscal arrangements in federalist countries. As discussed earlier, 
federalism is formulated to fulfill the goal of social welfare maximization when the 
public services are made efficiently. This requires that the basic functions of budget 
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policy i.e allocation, distribution and stabilization are provided to various levels of 
governments but with economic efficiency. 
Different models are explained to show how the government maximizes the 
welfare of the consumers, while undertaking allocation function. According to 
Breton's Perfect Mapping Model, there exists an association between incentives of 
government and the existence of competition among governments. The competition 
among governments creates incentives for their decision makers and it lowers prices 
and higher welfare for consumers. 
Olson's approach analyses the necessary condition for the allocative efficiency 
in the provision of collective goods by considering stabilization and income 
redistribution functions as most appropriate to Central governments. 
According to Olson, both the 'centralizing' and 'decentralizing' ideologies are 
wrong and leads to inefficiencies. If there are several levels of government, these 
large numbers of governments can reduce the disparities between the boundaries of 
jurisdictions and the boundaries of collective goods. Thus, there is a need for both 
centralized and decentralized government in the same framework. 
Wallace Oates has presented a model where each level of government, 
possessing complete knowledge of the tastes and preferences of its consumers and 
seeking to maximize their welfare, would provide the Pareto-efficient level of output. 
This is given by the equation: 
MRS^^.Y"^ = MRS'^ x^ ,Y^  = MRTx.Y + hl'^i Fx (4) 
Where 
A and B are two natural sub-groupings within the total population with 
identical preferences. 
X and Y are two private goods that are consumed by all members of the 
society. 
A,2 = The Lagrangian multiplier associated with society's production 
possibilities, F ( ) = 0. 
>.3 = The lagrangian multiplier associated with the new constraint, y^= y^. 
Finally, Tiebout's model talks about the choice process of individual's 
jurisdictions where the residents will determine an equilibrium provision of local 
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public goods in accord with the tastes of residents, thereby sorting the population into 
optimum communities. 
In India, the federal fiscal arrangements are explained in the Constitution from 
where both Central and State governments derive their powers and functions. 
However, discrepancy has emerged in the powers and functions of both these levels of 
government since financial powers are concentrated in the Central government and 
responsibility with the States. These discrepancies are known as Fiscal Imbalances 
and there are two types of imbalances. One is the imbalances at different levels of the 
government or inter-governmental imbalances known as Vertical imbalances. Other is 
the Horizontal imbalances which exists at the different units of the same level of 
government. Common tax base of two levels of government is another problem faced 
by the federal system. To mitigate these discrepancies inter-governmental or fiscal 
transfers are done through Finance Commission, Planning Commission and central 
transfers to States. 
Another problem faced by the federal system is of Overlapping of tax and 
expenditure functions among different governmental units. These overlapping can 
again be Vertical - between different levels of government and Horizontal - among 
different units within each level. In India, the States collect about 30% of aggregate 
total revenues of the Centre and the States taken together and incur about 55% of total 
expenditures. Thus, the revenues raised by the State governments form quite a 
significant proportion of total revenues and therefore, the method of raising these 
revenues and their consequences would have important allocative and equity 
implications. States' finance 43%of their expenditure from their own tax revenue 
sources and depends upon central transfers for the remaining 57%. The share of 
States' own revenue in their current expenditures (or fiscal independence) has 
declined from 45.1% in 1970-71 to 41.1% in 2003-04. 
Adoption of Value Added Tax (VAT) as prevalent in most West European 
countries is considered to be a most important solution to the problems of Indian 
commodity tax system. In fact, almost all-successful tax reforms are associated with 
the introduction of VAT and by now 140 countries had comprehensive VAT. In 
federal economies, to initiate tax reforms, the prevailing tax system should be made 
simple, transparent, board based and States should be given more fiscal powers. 
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The existing taxes on commodities and services can be converted into VAT 
when certain conditions are fulfilled. This requires that commodity taxes are extended 
up to the retail level, broad based taxes are included, no taxes should be paid on 
inputs, capital goods and inter-State sale of goods and revenue generated by Centre 
and States should at least remain the same as before the tax reforms. This requires 
levy of concurrent VAT by both Centre and States. It has a number of advantages 
also. Besides making the tax system efficient, this will safeguard the fiscal autonomy 
of the States, and when inter-State transactions are zero-rated, will get rid of tax 
exportation as well. 
However, such a system required a coordinated effort on the part of Centre 
and States. Through negotiations they can form a uniform tax base for both the levels 
of government, but a State could levy different tax rates for providing a higher level 
of public services. But this needs an amendment in the Constitution allowing the 
Centre to levy tax at stages subsequent to manufacturing and to allow the States to 
levy the tax on consumption of services in addition to those on goods allowed 
presently. 
The international experience regarding levy of VAT by sub-national levels of 
goverrmient is not quite heartening. In Brazil, sub-national VAT is levied but has not 
proved to be successfiil in eliminating inter-State tax exportation. However, the 
system of VAT followed by the European union, where inter country transactions are 
zero-rated, present a good example of successful levy of VAT at sub-Central levels. 
As we have already seen that excise duties and sales tax are the most 
important commodity taxes of Centre and State governments respectively. So an 
effort has been made to harmonise both these taxes. 
Union Excise Duty (CenVAT) 
At the Central level, at the time of Independence, India inherited a system of 
commodity taxation wherein union excise duties were levied on about a dozen articles 
yielding a small proportion of total tax revenue to the Centre. Following 
Independence, the rates were raised, the base was enlarged and more and more items 
were brought into its net. In 1970-71, the share of excise duties in total tax revenue 
was 56%. But its share reduced to 27% in 1995-96. Excises were also levied on 
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finished goods, raw materials, intermediate goods and capital goods. However, their 
share again reached to 48.5% in 2003-04. 
This proves that excise duties occupy a dominant position in the revenue 
growth of the Central government. The calculated buoyancy and growth rate estimates 
of excises reveals the same scenario. The buoyancy and growth rate are moving 
simultaneously i.e if one is increasing, the other is also increasing and vice-versa. But 
when comparing the trend during the pre-MODVAT period with post-MODVAT 
period, buoyancy rate has declined from 1.07 to 0.94, i.e, from an income-buoyant 
source it has turned into a non-buoyant source. 
But the growth rate has increased from 12.8% to 13.46%). It implies that the 
growth rate in GDP has been much faster than the growth rate of excises explaining 
fall in its income buoyancy. Except in the decadal period 1990-2000 and overall 
period 1970-2004, when both buoyancy and growth rates are lower, in other decadal 
periods buoyancy and growth rates are rising. 
The weak revenue performance of central excises was due to certain problems 
affecting the excise system. These inefficiencies had resulted from structural and 
administrative system followed by the tax authorities. These problems were: -
i) The Extended System 
The system was not integrated but an 'extended' one, wherein the taxes were 
levied at the different stages of production. The final product, the inputs, 
intermediates and raw materials, the packaging material etc were all subject to excise 
duties. The duties had been raised on most occasions, but reduced only rarely. There 
was no single levy as the "excise duty"; but there was the basic excise duty, the 
special excise duty, the auxiliary duties of excise, the additional excise duties on 
specified textiles, the additional duties of excise and customs in the case of the whole 
range of P.O.L products, the various cesses and, of course, the additional duties of 
excise in lieu of sales tax. These different levies made it inconvenient and time 
consuming for the assesses to calculate the exact amount under each head and the 
total duty payable. Also, most of the listed products bear at least two of these levies 
and some, like the textiles, the P.O.L levies and products, 3 or 4 different levies and 
cesses. 
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ii) Taxation at the Manufacturer level 
Although the Constitution had distinctly defined excisable goods as goods 
manufactured or produced in India and sales tax as tax on sale or purchase of goods. 
But the two taxes had come to overlap as the sales tax were levied on manufacture 
and importers to avoid problems in administering taxes levied it at the retail level. 
iii) Definitional Irregularities and Problem of Valuation 
Excise taxation implied taxation at the manufacturer level, but the term 
"manufacturing" is quite difficult to define as goods might had undergone a change 
of form due to a variety of processing activities performed after their initial 
production or manufacturing. 
In taxation at the manufacturer level, determination of manufacturing value 
also was equally troublesome. Manufacturers often sold their products through their 
own distributors or wholesalers and sometimes directly to the customers. In 
determining the value at the manufacturer level adjustments had to be made for trade 
margins at different trade levels. Then came the question whether costs of after-sale 
service, advertisement and selling, organization expenses come under manufacturing 
cost. The Supreme Court ruled in a leading case that the post manufacturing expenses 
to be added to the assessable value; only the durable and returnable containers were 
exempted and the value of all other packing was added (Union of India Vs Bombay 
Tyre International). Even after such rulings, determination of excisable value had 
continued to present acute problems. 
iv) Multiplicity of Rates 
Prior to tax reforms initiated in 1991, excise taxation in India was an 
interesting example of the multiple of rates, which were subject to frequent revisions. 
Various considerations contributed to the complexity of excise rates. 
Broadly speaking, necessities of life were either exempt or paid a low rate of 
duty, semi-luxuries were moderately taxed, and luxuries and tobacco products stood 
out distinctly as high-rated tariff items ranging from 100 to 110 per cent, capital 
goods were however, subject to a relatively low rate of duty. 
v) Taxation of Inputs and Capital Goods 
Input excises (raw materials, components and other intermediates) enhanced 
costs and profits and therefore increased the prices of goods much more than the 
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amount of excise collected. Moreover, if excises were imposed on inputs as well as 
the finished goods for which these inputs were used, a gap emerges between the 
nominal rate of tax and the cumulative rate of tax. This phenomenon made the excise 
system complicated and hindered the proper evaluation, particularly on equity 
criterion. 
Still further, excises on inputs may promote vertical integration in an industry, 
a trend that is harmful to the growth of small-scale sector. Lastly, input excises 
impose inequitable burden on different economic classes by not discriminating 
between essential and non-essential uses of a product. 
vi) Exemptions and Concessions 
As in other countries, exemptions and concessions were an integral part of the 
Indian excise system. Excise preferences and reliefs were given to promote a wide 
range of socio-economic objectives. If wisely used, such tax preferences could 
become an effective tool of economic change on desired lines. 
However, excise exemptions narrowed the tax base and therefore reduced 
governmental revenue. They interfered with the designing of the excise system and 
led to complexities in the excise law, which in turn caused tax evasion and litigation. 
They also obscure the evaluation of excise system, particularly from equity angle. 
Excise concession to a particular industry resulted in similar demands by other 
industries, causing unsettling effects on producers, consumers, and the administration. 
Some of the goods exempted from the excise duties were technical, 
educational and research institute, goods of welfare of defence personnel, goods 
donated to the National Defence Fund or to the Ministry of Defence etc. 
vii) Controlled use of Modvat Svstem 
To tackle the cascading effects of input taxation of excises, a modified system 
of value added tax (VAT) or MODVAT was introduced in 1986-87. At that time, a 
full fledged Value Added Tax (VAT) could not be adopted as the Indian excise 
system was quite complicated with large number of excise rates and any major change 
wouldl affect the system drastically. Under the Modvat scheme, credit of the excise 
duty and additional duty of customs (countervailing duty) was paid on inputs when 
used in the manufacture of the final products. However, there was restrictive use of 
Modvat facility since the scope of the provisions of law was not readily accepted. 
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Purchases, which from the economic angle clearly pertain to the manufacture of the 
commodities, were often denied Modvat credit on technical grounds. 
vii) Exclusion of Services 
The excise taxes were levied on goods only, excluding the services from its 
base. Services form an integral part of manufacturing and the distinction between 
goods and services had minimized. 
In response to these inefficiencies, the government, time and again initiated 
various reform measures. However, a detailed study of these reform measures is done 
in the Chapter VI. The result of these reform measures was implicit, in the shift from 
union excise duties to a Central VAT (CenVAT) in the Budget 2000-01. 
Now, the prevailing structure includes (i) CenVAT (present name of excises), 
(ii) special excise duty, (iii) additional excise duty in lieu of sales tax, (iv) addhional 
duty of excise on textiles and textile articles, and (v) cesses on specified commodities. 
(i) CenVAT: CenVAT is levied on all goods manufactured or produced in the 
country. With effect from March 1, 1986 Modvat was introduced under the 
union excise duty as a system of giving credit for excise duty on inputs. 
Initially, it was introduced for a selected number of commodities. The 
coverage was limited to 37 chapters out of a total of 91. Overtime, Modvat 
was extended and finally replaced by CenVAT in the Budget 2000-01. 
CenVAT has in general a single rate of 16% with some variations for select 
commodities. This coverage of CenVAT has been extended to all commodities 
except high speed diesel, motor spirit and matches. 
(ii) Special excise duty: There are three rates of special excise duty of 8%, 16% 
and 24% on specified products. Most of the items under special excise duty 
are final products but some of the items also fall in the category of 
intermediate goods. 
(iii) Additional excise duty in lieu of sales tax: It is levied only on tobacco, textiles 
and sugar. As followed earlier, this is a tax rental arrangement between the 
Centre and the States with the difference that Eleventh Finance Commission 
has recommended its inclusion under the shareable taxes. 
(iv) Additional excise duty on textiles and textile articles and cess on specified 
commodities are primarily meant to raise resources for the development of 
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concerned industries. The revenue department administers it but some other 
departments also contribute in this endeavour. 
The structure and procedures under CenVAT as given above indicates that the 
new system results in transparency of the tax burden under union excise duty. In 
addition, it reduces cascading effect of input taxation as well as pyramiding effect of 
the tax. Also, it generates a mechanism to check evasion of tax through self-policing. 
In addition, the reforms implemented under excises have simplified its 
structure especially through CenVAT. While previously there were large numbers of 
rates, over the years it has been brought down considerably and the general rate of 
CenVAT is 16%. Apart from rationalization of rate structure, exemption notifications 
have also been curtailed and the specific rates are converted into ad valorem rates. 
Further, the rate structure of CenVAT is linked to the Harmonized System of 
Nomenclature (HSN) present in a number of countries for providing help in 
international trade. 
Weaknesses of the System under CenVAT 
The existing structure of CenVAT and the procedures for its administration 
are characterization by the following weaknesses: 
(i) The existing procedures for physical controls are outmoded. In the context of 
the liberalized economy the physical control system should be replaced by 
self-assessment procedure. 
(ii) The provision of registration of wholesalers has created number of loopholes 
since there was no distinction between a manufacturer, first stage, second 
stage dealer and so on. This facility should be restricted to only the first-stage 
dealers. 
(iii) The coverage of CenVAT has not been extended to all the commodhies. 
Misuse of CenVAT tax crediting provisions and widespread evasion also. 
Excise dutv Reform Measures 
The CenVAT structure however, requires immediate reform measures to be 
initiated by the Central government. These measures are: 
(i) The administrative reform of excises is the most important aspect of the 
reform policy. 
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(ii) There is a strong case for carefully reviewing the large number of products, 
which enjoy complete exemption. Apart from loss of revenue, such 
exemptions affect the CenVAT chain, which provides the core value of VAT-
type taxes. Many products need to restored to the CenVAT rate of 16%. 
(iii) Also, the role of special excise should be limited to few luxury consumer 
products such as cars, refrigerators etc. The rates of such duties should be in 
the range 5to 15%. Apart from raising much needed additional revenue, such 
taxes would counter the regressive nature of a uniform CenVAT. 
(iv) The service tax should be integrated with the CenVAT/excise structure. 
Sales Taxes (State VAT) 
Sales tax, on the other hand occupies an important position in the revenue 
structure of the States. Modem sales tax system has its origin with imposition of 
general sales tax in the State of Tamil Nadu at a modest rate on multi-point basis. 
Since then all other States also started levying this tax. 
Sales tax is normally an ad-valorem levy imposed and collected from the 
seller with reference to the transactions or sale at the single point stage or at the multi-
point stage. The sales tax system till switching over to VAT, was partly origin-based 
and partly destination-based. The sheire of States' tax revenue in their total revenue 
has increased substantially; it was 51% in 1970-71, 57% in 1990-91 and it increased 
to 69%) in 2003-04. It's importance as a buoyant revenue source for the States has 
increased by leaps and bounds. 
The buoyancy and growth rate estimated for the States in the period between 
1970-2004 and the decadal periods from 1970's show some interesting results. The 
buoyancy and growth rate were quite high (more than 1) in all decades except 1999-
2000 when sales tax was a non-buoyant source. 
Another feature that is noticeable in the estimates of buoyancy and growth rate 
is that except the two periods 1990-2000 and 2000-04, in all other periods buoyancy 
and growth rate are moving/changing in the same direction. In these two periods when 
the buoyancy rate was increasing from 1.02 to 1.52, the growth rate in fact reduced 
from 15.3%) to 14.6%). This shows that during these two periods growth in sales tax 
revenue was comparatively more with regard to GDP growth. Moreover, it can also 
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be concluded that out of the two commodity taxes; excises and sales tax, sales tax 
were a more buoyant source of revenue. 
Predominantly, first point sales tax was imposed by many of the States, 
rendering the tax base narrow. Multiplicity of rates and surcharges, turnover taxes and 
entry taxes loaded on to them made the systems complex and opaque. Moreover, the 
levy of central sales taxes (CST) created severe impediments to internal trade and 
market segmentation, inequitable resource transfers with richer States collecting 
significant amount of taxes from the consumers in poorer States. 
However, in India, the initial moves to implement VAT at the State level came 
in 1993 with the then finance minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, in his budget speech 
stated the need to reform the outdated States sales taxes by replacing them with the 
VAT. The States became interested with the idea only when a presentation was made 
by the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi in May 1994 before 
a conference of chief ministers for consideration. Small groups of chief ministers and 
finally an empowered committee of finance ministers were formed to examine the 
alternatives and select an acceptable design of VAT and to workout a schedule for its 
implementation. After a number of roimd of deliberations a deadline was set for the 
transition. But a final decision could not be reached. Then the date was set April 
1,2003. But hindrances occurred again at the last moment as traders and several States 
protested angrily. The date was shifted forward to Junel, 2003. Sixteen States seem to 
be ready and in one State Haryana, VAT has been actually introduced. But the union 
finance minister Jaswant Singh declared that VAT couldn't be implemented unless all 
States were prepared for it. Thus, another golden chance of reforming the commodity 
tax system was lost. Finally, all except one State (Uttar Pradesh, who is also now 
ready to adopt VAT with the change in the Government recently) have adopted the 
system in the year 2005. 
The experience of implementation of VAT has been very encouraging so far. 
During 2005-06, the tax revenue of the VAT implementing States showed an increase 
of around 13.8% over tax revenue of 2004-05. During April-June, 2006, the tax 
revenue of VAT implementing States has shown an increase of about 27.1% over the 
corresponding period of last year, which is quite remarkable and indicates that the 
VAT system has started stabilising and yielding the desired results. 
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Another area of concern was the phasing of C ST in a planned manner and to 
compensate the States for the loss of revenue as a result of phasing out. Chidambaram 
announced the gradual phasing out of CST from April 1, 2007 with a compensation 
package for the States. 
Another important aspect of the commodity tax system is the services tax 
which requires due consideration. Beginning with just three services taxed in the year 
1994, the ambit of service tax has widened substantially, in terms of coverage of 
services and revenue generated by them. The service tax collections have shown a 
steady rise since its inception in 1994. the tax collections have grown manifolds since 
1994-95 i.e Rs.410 crores in to Rs.l4196 crores in 2004-05. 
A comprehensive Goods and Services tax (GST), however, requires the 
CenVAT/ services tax to be integrated with the State VAT's introduced in 19 States 
and 2 UTs on April,2005 in place of earlier sales taxes. 
It has been observed that commodity taxes in India have undergone a massive 
overhaul over the period. The foundation of these reform measures was laid down 
with the publication of Report of Taxation Enquiry Committee, 1953-54. At various 
intervals, policy interventions have changed its course. Major among them is the 
Report of Indirect Taxation Enquiry Committee, 1978 paving the way to introduce 
VAT in Indian model of MODVAT on commodities at manufacturing level (UED) in 
1986. Subsequently, changes were made to rationalize the excise structure and finally, 
MODVAT was converted into CenVAT in 2000-01. The other report is Domestic 
Trade Taxes which was instrumental in introducing VAT at State level by replacing 
sales taxes. 
However, both these forms of taxes at Central and State need a lot of changes, 
i.e. a comprehensive VAT is required. Also, service taxes are assuming greater fiscal 
importance, which is in the hands of Union government. It also bears the issue of 
revenue sharing. The ultimate solution therefore, seems to be a comprehensive 
National Goods and Services tax (GST) merging CenVAT, State VAT and service tax 
to a single tax rate. 
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Annexure-A.1.4 
LIST I -UNION LIST 
82) Taxes on income other than agricultural income 
83) Duties of customs including export duties 
84) Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India 
except-
a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; 
b) opium, Indian hemp and other neircotic drugs and narcotics 
but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any 
substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry. 
85) Corporation tax 
86) Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of 
individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of companies. 
87) Estate duty in respect of property other than agricultural land 
88) Duties in respect of succession to property other than agricultural land. 
89) Terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on 
railway fares and freights. 
90) Taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in stock exchanges and future 
markets. 
91) Rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes, bills 
of lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies 
and receipts. 
92) Taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published 
therein. 
92 A] Taxes on sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or 
purchase takes place in the course of inter-state trade or commerce." 
92 B] Taxes on the consigiunent of goods (whether the consignment is to the person 
making it or to any other person) where such consignment takes place in the course of 
inter-state trade or commerce).* 
93) Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this list. 
94) Enquiries, surveys and statistics for the purpose of any of the matters in this list. 
95) Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any 
of the matters in this list; admiralty jurisdiction. 
96) Fees in respect of any of the matters in this list, but not including fees taken in any 
court. 
97) Any other matter not enumerated in list II or list III including any tax not 
mentioned in either of those lists. 
" Fns. by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, 52 
* Ins. by the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1988 
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Annexure- A.1.5 
LlSXn -STATE LIST 
46) Taxes on agricultural income 
47) Duties in respect of succession to agricultural land 
48) Estate duty in respect of agricultural land 
49) Taxes on lands and buildings 
50) Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law 
relating to mineral development 
51) Duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or produced in the state and 
countervailing duties at the same time or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or 
produced elsewhere in India-
a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; 
b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics; 
52) Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein 
53) Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity 
54) Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the 
provisions of Entry 92-A of List I 
55) Taxes on advertisements other than advertisements published in the newspapers'" 
[and advertisements broadcast by radio or television] 
56) Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or an inland waterway 
57) Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, 
including tram cars subject to the provisions of Entry 35 of List III 
58) Taxes on animals and boats 
59) Tolls 
60) Taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments 
61) Capitation taxes 
62) Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and 
gambling 
63) Rates of stamp duty in respect of documents other than those specified in the 
provisions of List I with regard to rates of stamp duty 
64) Offences against laws with respect to ant of the matters in this list 
65) Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any 
of the matters in this list 
66) Fees in respect of any of the matters in this list, but not including fees taken in any 
court. 
Subs, by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, s.2 for the original Entry 54. 
Ins. by the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976, s.57 (w.e.f 3-1-1977) 
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Annexure-A.1.6 
LIST III - CONCURRENT LIST 
33) Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of; 
a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the union is 
declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported 
goods of the same kind as such products; 
b) foodstuffs, industry edible oilseeds and oils; 
c) cattle fodder including oilcakes and other concentrates; 
d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned and cotton seed; 
e) raw jute* 
33-A Weights and measures except establishment of standards* 
34) Price control 
35) Mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such 
vehicles are to be levied 
36) Factories 
37) Boilers 
38) Electricity 
39) Newspapers, books and printing presses 
40) Archaeological sites and remains other than those** [declared by or under law made 
by Parliament] to be of national importance. 
41) Custody, management and disposal of property (including agricultural land) 
declared by law to be evacuee property 
42) Acquisition and requisitioning of property* 
43) Recovery in a state of claims in respect of taxes and other public demands, 
including arrears of land revenue and sums recoverable as such arrears, arising outside 
that state 
44) Stamp duties other than duties or fees collected by means of judicial stamps, but not 
including rates of stamp duty 
45) Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters specified in List 11 or 
List III 
46) Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any 
of the matters in this list 
47) Fees in respect of any of the matters in this list, but not including fees taken in any 
court. 
" Subs, by the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1954, 5.2 
" Ins. by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s.57 (w.e.f 3-1-1977) 
" Ins. by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s.57 (w.e.f 3-1-1977) 
# Subs, by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, s.27, for" declared by Parliament by Law" 
* Subs, by S.26, ibid, for the original entry 42 
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Annexure- A.3.1 
Explanations to Endnotes 
This is related with the sections. The connecting numbers are also provided for help. 
(a) Let us denote the consumer price by qk and write the demand curve as qk(Xk)-
The excess burden caused by the tax on good k may then be seen from Figure 3.1 to 
equal: 
B,^fq,dX,-p,{Xl-X[) (3.a.i) 
where Xl denotes the equilibrium quantity before the tax is introduced, X[ that after 
the tax is introduced. From this it follows that 
dB, dX[ dX[ ^ dx[ _^ ..^  
— - = -q.—- + Pk—-^-Pkh— (3.a.n) 
where the term in qk arises from differentiating the lower limit of integration and the 
second step follows from the fact that qu =pk(l+tk)-
(b) 2 This constrained maximization problem may be formulated in terms of the 
Lagrangean (q): 
g = -Y^B,+A(R-R,) (3.b.i) 
A=l 
The first-order conditions for the choice of tk are therefore 
^ = A— = Ap^Xl+Ap^t;^^ for all/t (3.b.ii) 
Combining this with Equation 10.4.1.1, we obtain 
. ...(3.b.iii) •tk dX[ A 
X[ dt, \ + X 
or 
-A_ = 4- (3.b.iv) 
1+^ . 4 (This step may be seen if we rewrite the left-hand side as 
' t, pM.^oT dx[ 
which equals r^  /(l +1,^ ) times the elasticity of demand. } 
where 9 is equal to A /(I + X) and E'I is the elasticity of demand for good k. 
3 Ramsey's theorem is a generalization of Dilworth's lemma which states for 
each pair of positive integers ^ and ^ there exists an integer ^(•*'.'0(known as the 
Ramsey number) such that any graph with ^ i^> 0 nodes contains a clique with at least 
'^nodes or an independent set with at least ^ nodes. 
Another statement of the theorem is that for integers ^J^'^, there exists a least 
positive integer ^(*j^such that no matter how the complete graph ^^t*.1is two-
colored, it will contain a green sub-graph ^* or a red sub-graph ^i. 
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A third statement of the theorem states that for all '^  ^ N^  there exists an ^ ^ ^such that 
any complete digraph on ^ graph vertices contains a complete transitive sub-graph of'^  
graph vertices. 
For example, RQ.^) = 6 and ^ C4,4) = 18^  but ^ (5, 5) are only known to lie in the ranges 
43 < /? (5, 5) s 49 and 102 < R (6, 6) < 165. 
It is true that 
Rik,[)sR[k-l,[}+RikJ-iy 
if A, ^>3. 
4 Assume to maximize U(X, L) subject to the budget constraint 
Xg,X,=wL (3.i) 
(=1 
Suppose that a tax of r is imposed on wage income. The consumer's budget 
constraint becomes 
Y,q:X^=w(l-T)L (3.ii) 
(the summation runs from 1 to n unless otherwise indicated). As far as the consumer 
is concerned, this is equivalent to a situation where there is no wage tax and qi is 
increased to q/(l-T); i.e., for the tax rate to become effective rate r', for the /''' 
commodity: 
, . . l l ! L _ i = Ii!L (3.iii) 
' 1-r I - r 
The government revenue in the latter case is 
Z''-^.=zf^V- (3.iv) l - r 
which may be compared with that in the case of the wage tax. With both types of 
taxes, 
where we have substituted for wL from Equation (3.i). 
5 Forming the Lagrangean (g): 
g = V{q,w) + A(^t^X^-R,) (3.i) 
gives first-order conditions for the tax rate tk 
r ^v \ 
-A dx, 
I ^9* J 
for it = 1, ... , n (3.ii) 
Writing a for the marginal utility of income to the consumer, and using the 
properties of the indirect utility function {dV / dq,^ = -aX^), 
y a ^ ^ _ ( A - a ) ioxk = l, ...,n (3.iii) 
These equations may be transformed using the Slutsky relationship 
^ = S^^ -X, ^ for all U (3.iv) 
dq^ dM 
where 5,^  is the derivative of the compensated demand curve and dX^ I dM denotes 
the income-effect (evaluated at M (after tax other income) = 0). Substituting, we 
obtain 
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^-^\Y foik = l,...,n (3.V) 
Using the symmetry of the Slutsky terms(5,^ =5;t/). ^nd introducing 0 for the 
coefficient of X^ in (3.v), 
J]/.5^, = -OX, for k = l, ..., n (3.vi) 
From this expression, one can see the relation with the partial equilibrium formula 
(3.iii). If there are no income-effects(3Z, /9M = o), and if 5,;^  =0 for/7!:^, then 
Equation (3.vi) becomes/^ (-5^^) = OXi^. 
6 The Lagrangean then becomes 
g = Viq,T) + Z{T + j;^t,X,-R,) (3.i) 
i 
From this we can see that, using the definition of 6*, 
^ = -a + i l - y / , 3 - l = ^A (3.ii) 
(Since dV IdT = -a and dXJdT --dXJdM). Now suppose that the government 
were allowed to make a small increase dT in the lump-sum tax (moving away from 
the optimum described above), where the commodity taxes are adjusted so that the 
revenue constraint continues to hold. Then dg I dT = dgldT (since dqldt^ = 0 for all k 
from the first-order conditions) and, since the revenue constraint continues to hold, 
dg = dV = XOdT. 
The first-order conditions become 
(3.iii) 
Since there are constant returns to scale, there is no pure profit income, so that 
differentiating the consumer's budget constraint yields 
^ = ^ * ^ I . , | ^ (3-iv) 
dq, ,• dq,, 
Profit maximization in the private sector implies F, = pi, where pi are producer prices 
(the private sector maximizes Y,P:X, - F{X^,...,XJ.), so it follows that 
3q, 
f •^v \ 
^ . + 1 ' . dX: 
V ' ^h ) 
(3.V) 
(noting that q, -p, = ti). We are therefore back with first order condition (3.iii). The 
form of the first-order conditions is therefore unaffected in the case of constant returns 
to scale, on the other hand, the producers prices in general vary with changes in the 
tax rates. 
7 If we denote a possible variation in tax rates by the vector dt, then, by 
the properties of the indirect utility function, 
dV = -ccX'xit (3.i) 
The effect of this variation on the revenue is 
dR = t'xiX + X'xit (3.ii) 
The solution involves idenfifying conditions under which variafions satisfying (3.2) 
could not achieve an increase in welfare. 
If the proportionate reduction is db(> 0), then 
dt = -{q - p)db = -tdh (3.iii) 
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The change in lump-sum tax is 
dT =-t'dX-rdt... ...(3.iv) 
The change in welfare is 
dV = -aX'dt-adT (3.v) 
= at'dX 
(using (3.4)). Now the change in demands consists of a substitution term and an 
income term. The substitution component is given by 
at'Sdt =-at'Stdb (3.vi) 
where S is the Slutsky matrix. From the negative semi-defmiteness of S, it follows 
that this component is non-negative. 
Geometrically, the effect is that a move in the direction PB raises welfare (the origin 
being drawn at t/ == t2 - 0). 
For example, 
Z ( ^ ^ ) ' ^ l (3-vi-a) 
and 
Z K|<1 (3.vi.b) 
8 Let us consider the redistributive goals of the government by maximizing a 
social welfare function ^(Vi , ... , Vf^. Horizontal inequity is not ruled out by the 
maximization of this social welfare function. This is a further referred to in Ramsey 
tax problem, and it may be possible to raise social welfare by taxing identical 
individuals at different rates. 
9 In order to illustrate the relationship between these objectives, let us suppose 
that tastes may be represented by a single parameter;', so that the indirect utility 
function may be written as V{q,w,y). The social welfare function approach 
recognizes such taste differences as a legitimate basis for discrimination, and the 
government maximizes ¥{y{q,w,y)). On the other hand, if we introduce the concept 
of horizontal equity and interpret this as meaning that difference in tastes are not 
"relevant" characteristics for discrimination, then these has two implications. First, it 
introduces a cardinalization, V{q,w,y)=V{p,w), so that only endowments (w) and 
consumer prices (normalized at before-tax levels) are relevant. Second, it constrains 
the government in levying taxes {q ^  p)to maintain 
V{q,w,r)^V{q,M') (3.i) 
Suppose that the government were to adopt this version of horizontal equity; 
what would be the implications for the optimal tax structure? It is popularly believed 
that it would require uniform taxation. If two individuals are identical in all respects 
except that one likes chocolate ice cream and the other likes vanilla, a system that 
taxes chocolate ice cream at a higher rate is felt to be horizontally inequitable. This is 
not however necessarily correct. Horizontal equity does not imply uniform taxation 
where the elasticity of demand differs between the goods in question. The horizontal 
equity condition (10.6.2.1) implies in fact 
q'r-q'i'' (3.ii) 
where "y denotes the (constant) elasticity of demand for good /, and the taste 
differences are multiplicative (affecting X; and JG only). The condition for horizontal 
equity is not necessarily, therefore, uniform taxation; only if the price elasticity is the 
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same - as of course it may be in the chocolate-vanilla ice cream case - would uniform 
tax rates be horizontally equitable. 
Finally, we may note that this example also brings out the conflict between 
horizontal equity and maximization of a social welfare function. The condition (3.i) is 
not in general consistent with the maximization of ¥(V). On the other hand, on the 
interpretation of horizontal equity as a constraint on instruments - what we have 
identified as the "means", rather than "ends", approach - there is no necessary conflict. 
The horizontal equity criterion is logically prior, imposing constraints on the choice of 
tax policy. On this basis, discrimination against chocolate ice cream lovers would be 
ruled out a priori. 
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Annexure- A.3.2 
Brief history of Fiscal Federalism in India 
India is a federal state with Constitutional demarcation of financial powers and 
responsibilities between the Center and the constituent units namely the states. India 
has completed more than 130 years of fiscal federalism, 50 years of which are 
considered under a democratic framework. The history of fiscal federalism in India 
can be traced back to the pre-independence arrangements for inter-governmental 
financial transfers and their influences on the making of the Constitution of India. 
Prior to 1871, the administration of the country was highly centralized and the 
British imperialist had absolute control over provincial revenues and expenditures. 
William Massey made an abortive scheme of federal finance in British Indian 
administration with the assumption of administrative powers by the crown in 1858. 
The first beginning towards decentralization of finances was made when the Mayo 
Resolution was adopted in 1871 when extra powers and responsibilities were 
delegated to the provinces. Though this was done for administrative convenience but 
it could not provide adequate resources to provinces. 
Later on, in 1877 provinces were given a share in some growing sources of 
revenue like irrigation charges, excise duties and stamp duties. However, the 
Government of India Act 1919 (based on Montague Chelmsford Report on 
Constitutional Reforms) provided some sort of financial autonomy to provincial 
governments for the first time. In the meantime, the Indian Taxation Enquiry 
Committee (President: Sir Charles Todhunter), 1924-25 examined, inter alia, the 
division of sources of revenue between the Centre and the Provinces. But the 
Government of India Act passed in 1935 envisaged the formation of a federal form of 
government at the center with autonomy granted to provinces. Sir Otto Niemeyer, a 
financial expert from England was asked to investigate the relations between the 
Center and the provinces. The Niemeyer proposals were followed till 1947 although 
neither the Central nor the provincial government was satisfied with it. 
However, CD. Deshmukh gave the final shape of decentralization finance in 
1949 that recommended a new scheme of distribution of tax revenues between the 
center and the states. The Constitution of India, enforced in 1950 carried forward 
theses provisions along with setting up of a Finance Commission to determine the 
distribution of the net proceeds of the taxes between the union and the states and the 
grants in aid to be provided to the states, which are in need of assistance. 
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Annexure A.3.3 
Revenue/Current Expenditures of the States 
Year 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
Source: Go 
Non-Development 
Expenditure 
A 
15.27 
18.28 
20.37 
23.52 
21.56 
25.19 
27.39 
29.46 
33.03 
38.02 
46.99 
54.64 
68.08 
79.18 
93.2 
112.54 
128.18 
153.93 
181.86 
215.88 
264.21 
318.01 
364.82 
424.51 
543.82 
643.93 
695.95 
812.47 
950.93 
1183.38 
1290.1 
1508.46 
1596.06 
1930.33 
vemment of India, V 
Development 
Expenditure 
B 
18.87 
22.32 
25.95 
29.25 
33.68 
39.19 
46.33 
52.17 
63.58 
74.01 
90.88 
103.47 
121.04 
143.25 
173.21 
195.7 
225.5 
268.81 
303.58 
341.14 
403.6 
504.95 
538.09 
615.33 
675.93 
760.24 
908.53 
974.81 
1170.33 
1334.91 
1384.16 
1489.47 
1512.56 
1961.36 
inistry of Finance, Inc 
(Rs billion) 
Transfer to Funds 
C 
0.26 
0.3 
0.29 
N.A. 
0.78 
0.84 
1.84 
2.18 
2.11 
3.09 
3.48 
3.82 
4.42 
4.48 
4.76 
5.37 
5.92 
7.38 
10.48 
11.29 
10.79 
13.14 
18.58 
14.56 
17.74 
0.82 
22.28 
27.5 
38.68 
30.19 
45.4 
56.5 
69.18 
84.84 
ian Economic Statisti 
Total 
A+B+C 
34.4 
40.9 
46.6 
52.77 
56.02 
65.22 
75.56 
83.81 
98.72 
115.12 
141.35 
161.93 
193.54 
226.91 
271.17 
313.61 
359.6 
430.12 
495.92 
568.31 
678.6 
836.1 
921.49 
1054.4 
1237.49 
1404.99 
1626.76 
1814.78 
2159.94 
2548.48 
2719.66 
3054.43 
3177.8 
3976.53 
cs 
(Various Issues) 
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Annexure-A.4.1 
List I, Seventh Schedule, Union Excise Duties 
• Shareable duties 
(a) Basic excise duties 
(b) Auxiliary duties of excise 
(c) Additional excise duties on Mineral products 
(d) Special excise duties 
• Duties Assigned to States 
(a) Additional excise duties in lieu of sales tax 
• Non-shareable duties 
(a) Special excise duties 
(b) Additional excise duties on textile and textile article 
(c) Additional excise duties on television sets 
(d) Additional excise duties on indigenous motor spirit 
(e) Additional excise duties on high speed diesel oil 
(f) National calamity contingent duty 
(g) Special additional duty of excises on motor spirit 
• Cess on commodities 
(a) Cess on coal and coke 
(b) Cess on jute 
(c) Cess on tea 
(d) Cess on copra 
(e) Cess on oil and oil seeds 
(f) Cess on cotton 
(g) Handloom Cess on rayon and artsilk fabric 
(h) Handloom Cess on woollen fabric 
(i) Handloom Cess on cotton fabric 
(j) Cess on iron-ore 
(k) Cess on limestone and dolomite 
(I) Cess on salt 
(m)Cess on bidis 
(n) Cess on tobacco 
(o) Cess on rubber 
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(p) Cess on crude oil 
(q) Cess on coffee 
(r) Cess on sugar 
(s) Handloom Cess on man-made fabrics 
(t) Cess on paper 
(u) Cess on straw board 
(v) Cess on vegetable oils 
(w) Cess on automobiles 
(x) Cess on textiles 
(y) Cess on feature films 
(z) Cess on matches 
Cess on other commodities 
Source : Union Government, Finance Accounts, 2003-04, p.85-86 
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Annexure- A.4.2 
Different Procedures to Collect Excise Duties 
Central excise duties are assessed and collected through a vast network of 
offices scattered all over the country. There are various procedures to assess and 
collect excise duties. These are: -
1. Physical control system 
The physical control method was based on personal verification by excise 
officers who were posted at the factory to keep watch over the operations in the 
various departments of the factory of production, storage and clearance to prevent 
illegal disposal of excisable goods. 
The manufacturers, however, were unhappy with this direct interference in the 
manufacturing process and it was replaced by a new system called self-removal 
procedure from June 1,1968. 
2. Self- Removal procedure (SRP) 
Under this system, introduced in place of the physical control system, an 
assesse is allowed to take clearances on his own assessment of the duty liability 
without prior permission of physical checks by excise officers. An assessee is, 
however, required to get his classification list approved by the excise authorities, 
which gives the detail description of the goods produced so that they may be 
categorized in terms of rate of duty applicable to them. In case of ad valorem duties, 
the assessee is further required to submit a price list showing the price charged along 
with discounts and deductions, if any. Unfortunately, heavy evasion of excise duty 
has taken place under this scheme by following such malpractices as incorrect 
accounting of goods, under valuation of goods and creating the conditions subject to 
which any goods may be exempted from duty. 
3. Compounded levy scheme 
This is another procedure for the benefit of small-scale sector and for 
administrative convenience. Introduced in 1954, under this system, a lump sum 
payment is made on the basis of some installations, e.g. the number of looms in case 
of textile units. Once the compounded levy has been paid, the producer becomes free 
trom all excise formalities except to maintain a record of looms in operation. The 
scheme is applicable at present to small units producing khandasari and cotton fabrics 
produced on power looms. This system proves to be advantageous to the small 
producers in so far as the fiscal burden is generally lower and they are also saved from 
the cumbersome normal excise procedures. 
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Annexure A.4.3: GNP and Excise Revenue of Centre 
(Rs. Billion) 
Year 
1 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05(R.E) 
Source: RBI Bui 
National Income at 
current prices(GNP) 
2 
456.77 
489.32 
539.47 
656.13 
774.79 
832.69 
897.39 
1015.97 
1101.33 
1208.41 
1437.62 
1686 
1882.62 
2194.96 
2455.15 
2779.91 
3111.77 
3543.43 
4215.67 
4861.79 
5686.74 
6531.17 
7483.67 
8592.2 
10127.7 
11880.12 
13682.09 
15225.47 
17409.85 
19368.31 
20895 
22719.84 
24633.24 
27600.25 
31055.12 
etin, Indian Economic 
Actual excise revenue 
3 
13.69 
15.86 
17.58 
19.71 
25.28 
29.88 
31.93 
33.35 
41.28 
34.8 
37.22 
41.8 
45.67 
61.64 
66.26 
73.3 
81.64 
94.23 
109.23 
130.96 
140.1 
160.17 
163.67 
172.24 
210.64 
221.76 
234.93 
255.16 
285.81 
349.44 
497.58 
544.69 
823.1 
907.74 
1007.2 
Statistics 
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Annexure A.5.1 
History of Service tax 
The provisions relating to Service Tax were brought into force with effect from 1st 
July 1994. The services, brought under the tax net in the year 1994-95 ,are as below: 
(1) Telephone (2) Stockbroker (3) General Insurance 
The Finance Act (2) 1996 enlarged the scope of levy of Service Tax covering three 
more services, viz., (4) Advertising agencies, (5) Courier agencies (6) Radio pager 
services. But tax on these services was made applicable from 1st November, 1996. 
The Finance Acts of 1997 and 1998 further extended the scope of service tax to cover 
a larger number of services rendered by the following service providers, from the 
dates indicated against each of them. (7) Consulting engineers (7th July, 1997) (8) 
Custom house agents (15th June, 1997) (9) Steamer agents (15th June, 1997) (10) 
Clearing & forwarding agents (16th July, 1997) (11) Air travel agents — (1st July, 
1997) (12) Tour operators (exempted upto 31.3.2000 Notification No.52/98, 8th July, 
1998, reintroduced w.e.f 1.4.2000) (13) Rent-a-Cab Operators (exempted upto 
31.3.2000 Vide Notification No.3/99 Dt.28.2.99, reintroduced w.e.f 1.4.2000) (14) 
Manpower recruitment Agency (1st July, 1997) (15) Mandap Keepers (1st July, 1997) 
The services provided by goods transport operators, out door caterers and pandal 
shamiana contractors were brought under the tax net in the budget 1997-98, but 
abolished vide Notification No.49/98, 2nd June, 1998. 
Government of India has notified imposition of service Tax on twelve new services in 
1998-99 union Budget. These services listed below were notified on 7th October, 
1998 and were subjected to levy of Service Tax w.e.f 16th October, 1998. (16) 
Architects (17) Interior Decorators (18) Management Consultants (19) Practicing 
Chartered Accountants (20) Practicing Company Secretaries (21) Practicing Cost 
Accountants (22) Real Estates Agents/Consultants (23) Credit Rating Agencies (24) 
Private Security Agencies (25) Market Research Agencies (26) Underwriters 
Agencies 
In case of mechanized slaughter houses, since exempted, vide Notification No.58/98 
dtd. 07.10.1998, the rate of Service Tax was used to be a specific rate based on per 
animal slaughtered. In the Finance Act'2001, the levy of service tax has been 
extended to 14 more services, which are listed below. This levy is effective from 
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16.07.2001. (27) Scientific and technical consultancy services (28) Photography (29) 
Convention (30) Telegraph (31) Telex (32) Facsimile (fax) (33) Online information 
and database access or retrieval (34) Video-tape production (35) Sound recording (36) 
Broadcasting (37) Insurance auxiliary activity (38) Banking and other financial 
services (39) Port (40) Authorised Service Stations (41) Leased circuits Services 
In the Budget 2002-2003, 10 more services have been added to the tax net which are 
listed below. This levy is effective from 16.08.2002. (42) Auxiliary services to life 
insurance (43) Cargo handling (44) Storage and warehousing services (45) Event 
Management (46) Cable operators (47) Beauty parlours (48) Health and fitness 
centres (49) Fashion designer (50) Rail travel agents. (51) Dry cleaning services, and 
these services have been notified on 1-8-2002 and were subject to levy of Service Tax 
w.e.f. 16-8-2002. It is expected that in view of more & more services brought under 
the Service Tax net, the service tax revenue would now form a major part in Govt. 
Revenue earnings. In the Budget 2003-04 seven more services along with extension to 
three existing services have been added to the tax net which are listed below. The levy 
of service tax on these services is effective from 1st July, 2003. (52). Commercial 
vocational institute, coaching centres and private tutorials (53). Technical testing and 
analysis (excluding health & diagnostic testing) technical inspection and certification 
service. (54). Maintenance & repair services (55). Commission and Installation 
Services (56). Business auxiliary services, namely business promotion and Support 
services (excluding on information technology services) (57). Internet cafe (58). 
Franchise Services The rate of Service Tax was increased from 5% to 8% on all the 
taxable services w.e.f. 14.5.2003. 
In the Budget 2004-05, 10 more services have been introduced in the service tax net 
along with reintroduction of three existing services as follows: (59) Transport of 
goods by road (earlier Goods Transport Operators service re- introduced). (60) Out 
door Caterer's service (re-introduced) (61) Pandal or Shamiana service (re-
introduced) (62) Airport Services (63) Transport of Goods by Air Services (64) 
Business Exhibition Services (65) Construction Services in relation to Commercial or 
Industrial BuildingConstruction Services in relation to Commercial or Industrial 
Building The levy of service tax on these services is effecfive from 10th September, 
2004 and the rate of service tax has been enhanced to 10% from 8%. Besides this 2% 
Education Cess on the amount of service tax has also been introduced. Thereafter 
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Service Tax is increased up to 12.24 % and now currently the effective service tax 
rate is 12.36% including Education Cess. 
In the Budget 2005-06, 9 more services have been introduced in the service tax net as 
follows with effect from 16.06.2005: (66) Intellectual Property Services (67) Opinion 
Poll Services (68) TV or Radio Programme Services (69) Survey and Exploration of 
Minerals Services (70) Travel Agent's Services other than Rail and Air travel agents 
(71) Forward Contract Services (72) Transport of goods through pipe line or other 
conduit Services. (73) Site preparation & clearance Services (74) Dredging Services 
(75) Survey & Mapmaking Services (76) Cleaning Services (77) Membership of 
Clubs & Associations (78) Packaging Services (79) Mailing list compilation & 
Mailing Sei-vices (80) Construction Services in relation to Residential Complexes. 
In the Budget 2006-07, the new services made taxable include services provided by share 
transfer agents and registrar to issues, recovery agents and registrar to issues, recovery agents, 
maintenance and management of Automatic Teller Machines, sale of advertising space or 
time (except for print media), sponsorship of events by companies (except for sports), public 
relations management services, ship management services, international air travel (excluding 
economy class), rail container handling services (excluding haulage charges), cruise ship 
travel, Internet telephony services, business support services, auctioneers' service (excluding 
auction of property under directions or orders of a court of law or auction by the government) 
and credit card, debit card and other payment card-related services. 
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Annexure A. 6.1 
Recommendations of the ITEC 
In the field of Excise duties the Committee recommended the following measures: 
a) the rationalization of the duty structure on final goods such that progressivity in the 
tax system could be achieved to fulfill economic objectives. According to the 
Committee, specific duties tend to be regressive and encourage the production of 
expensive goods. However, an ad-valorem duty encourages the production of lower 
cost goods, they are income elastic and there is no need to revise the rates oftenly. 
b) rationalization of the rates of duties on raw materials such that like items should be 
taxed at same rates and there should be different slabs of excise duties with an 
average of 20 per cent, while essential goods should be tax free. Accordingly, the 
committee recommended the abolition of taxation of inputs straightway. "High rates 
on particular materials imposed for special reasons in the past will be curtailed in the 
interest of lowering the cost of production in the economy as a whole" (para 13.4). 
Hence, the Committee recommended a reduction of duties on diesel engines, power 
driven pumps, electric motors and refrigerating and air conditioning machinery used 
for industrial purposes. It also recommended lowering of duty on cement. Some of 
these recommendations were accepted by the Government and presented in the 
Budget 1978-79. 
c) the Committee pointed out a number of criterion to grant concessions to small 
producers like value or quantity of clearance, the number of workers employed, the 
use of power and the value of plant and machinery installed. This recommendation 
was also accepted in the 1978-79 budget. 
d) the Committee recommended the simplification of procedures for collection and 
assessment of excise duties. In this regard, it suggested certain modifications in the 
Central Excise (Self-Removal Procedure) Scheme, which provided against the loss to 
the producer. 
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